OF  SOVIETISM 


BORIS  L.  BRASOL 


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THE  BALANCE  SHEET 
OF  SOVIETISM 


THE 

BALANCE  SHEET 
OF  SOVIETISM 


By 
BORIS  L.  BRASOL 

Author    of    "Socialism    Vs.    Civilization,"    "The 
World  at  the  Crossroads,"  "Critical  Essays,"  etc. 


Lasciate  ogni  esperanza     .     . 

Dakte.  Inferno. 

Awake!     Arise!     Or  be  forever  fallen. 

Milton.  Paradise  Lost. 


NEW  YORK 

DUFFIELD  AND  COMPANY 

1922 


Copyright,  1922,  by 
DUFFIELD  AND  COMPANY 


Printed  in  V.  S.  A. 


CONTENTS 


^  I.  The  Soviet  Machine 3 

DC 

2         II.  Land  Problem  in  Russia 36 

c       III.  The  Ruin  op  Russian  Industries    ....      64 

5 

-^       IV.  Trade  and   Finance 120 

o 

Q         V.  Russia  Under  the  Soviet  Heel 148 


VI.  The  All-Russian  Famine 213 

VII.  Soviet  Foreign  Policy 233 


112788 


FOREWORD 

npHE  tragic  fate  of  Russia  has  attracted  the 
-■■  attention  of  civilized  mankind.  Much  has 
been  said  and  written  about  the  amazing  de- 
gradation of  the  political,  social  and  economic 
life  of  a  country  which  hitherto  was  justly- 
considered  the  biggest  reservoir  of  wealth  and 
economic  potentiality.  In  our  day  the  fact 
can  scarcely  be  denied  that  Russia's  present 
suffering  was  caused  by  and  is  the  direct  re- 
sult of  the  incompetent  and  sinister  Communist 
practice  wrought  upon  her  people  by  a  small 
but  unscrupulous  and  closely  organized  group 
of  professional  agitators  or  incurable  theoreti- 
cians belonging  to  the  Marxian  school. 

Idle  are  the  attempts  to  explain  the  sys- 
tematic destruction  of  Russian  economics  by 
the  much  debated  'Allied  ^* blockade,"  or  the 
drought  and  other  meteorological  fluctuations, 
no  matter  how  unfavorable  such  may  have 
been.  At  present  the  most  stubborn  Socialist 
adherents  are  somewhat  ashamed  to  attribute 
all  the  blame  for  the  prevailing  conditions  in 
Russia  to  the  events  and  circumstances  which 
have  had  but  an  insignificant  and  rather  re- 
mote bearing  upon  the  destinies  of  her  people. 

During  a  period  of  five  years  the  Bolsheviki 
have  been  given  the  chance  to  work  out  a  prac- 
tical program  for  putting  their  theories  into 
effect.    Nor  was  there  lack  of  effort  on  their 


viii        THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

part  to  **TJse  the  weapons  of  hell  to  attain  the 
Communist  paradise/'  Hell  they  have  at- 
tained, while  paradise  is  still  to  be  found  in 
the  column  of  articles  lost. 

In  the  case  of  Russia,  the  world  is  witness- 
ing the  most  complete  failure  of  a  govern- 
mental system  that  has  ever  been  recorded  in 
history.  Every  department  of  present  Rus- 
sian life  distinctly  proves  the  hopelessness  of 
further  attempts  to  erect  a  stable  economic  edi- 
fice upon  the  sandy  foundations  of  Marxian 
principles.  On  the  plains  of  Russia,  Socialism 
has  suffered  a  defeat  so  conclusive  as  to  make 
its  recovery  impossible.  The  Soviet  leaders 
themselves  have  been  compelled  to  admit  their 
failure.  Their  battle-cry  of  1917 :  '* Proletarians 
of  all  countries  unite  to  smash  Capitalism/'  has 
been  converted  into  a  new  motto:  ** Capitalists 
of  all  countries  unite  to  save  Communism." 

Having  received  but  little  encouragement 
from  international  labor,  the  Red  rulers  of 
Russia  are  now  seeking  the  support  of  Inter- 
national Finance.  Those  **who  got  slapped" 
by  the  Russian  workers  and  peasants,  have 
suddenly  turned  their  attention  to  the  pocket- 
book  of  the  Western  Banker.  For  it  is  not  im- 
possible that  short-sighted  greed  may  induce  the 
wealth-owning  classes  to  disastrous  endeavors 
to  consolidate  the  waning  power  of  Commun- 
ism in  Russia.  The  Genoa  and  Hague  Con- 
ferences were  early  manifestations  of  this  new 


FOREWORD  ix 

policy  which  may  be  put  in  operation  on   a 
colossal  scale. 

But  whatever  course  the  dealings  with  the 
So\^ets  may  assume,  it  is  apparent  that  the 
first  stage  of  the  Socialist  experiment  in  Rus- 
sia has  been  completed  and  a  new  phase  is 
rapidly  evolving.  With  International  Finance 
playing  an  important  part  in  the  future  devel- 
opment of  Eussia,  the  whole  trend  of  events 
must  necessarily  become  the  joint  function  of 
two  factors,  Communism  and  Capitalism,  seek- 
ing to  make  concessions  to  each  other.  Social- 
ists are  hoping  that  these  mutual  reverences 
will  result  in  converting  Capitalism  into  mild 
Communism,  while  capitalists  expect  Commun- 
ism to  assume  the  form  of  mild  Capitalism.  In 
all  probability  both  groups  will  fail  in  their 
expectations  as,  from  a  strictly  scientific  view- 
point, Capitalism  and  Socialism  are  phenomena 
mutually  excluding  each  other. 

However,  this  volume  is  not  intended  to  deal 
with  the  problematic  future.  Its  object  is 
merely  confined  to  an  analysis  of  the  actual 
** achievements"  of  Communism,  in  the  light  of 
economic  and  social  policies  enforced  by  the 
Bolsheviki  during  the  whole  period  of  their 
amazing  misrule.  In  this  sense  the  volume  as 
it  stands  is  nothing  but  the  balance  sheet  of 
Communism,  and  it  is  no  fault  of  ours  that  the 
account  presents  a  vivid  picture  of  fraudulent 
hanhruptcy. 


THE  BALANCE  SHEET 
OF  SOVIETISM 


The  Balance  Sheet  of  Sovietism 

1 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  SOVIET  MACHINE 

117' HAT  is  Soviet  Russia?* 
^  ^  The  average  person  having  but  a  vague 
conception  of  social  and  political  conditions 
abroad,  may  give  a  somewhat  evasive  answer, 
stating  that  Soviet  Russia  is  a  part  of  the  terri- 
tory of  the  former  Russian  Empire,  through- 
out which  chaos  reigns,  and  where  nothing  but 
instability  is  stable. 

To  a  certain  degree  such  a  definition  would 
be  accurate  for  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the 
November  revolution  of  1917  did  turn  things 
upside  down  in  Russia.  The  moment  the  Bol- 
sheviki  placed  themselves  in  the  saddle  of  gov- 
ernmental power,  they  began  issuing  numerous 
decrees  and  regulations,  the  chief  purpose  of 
which  was  to  tear  history  out  of  Russians  heart, 

*  The  word  "Soviet"  is  derived  from  the  Eassian,  meaning  Coun- 
cil. In  the  modem  sense  it  is  used  to  describe  a  form  of  revolu- 
tionary organization  and  i»  more  specifically  applied  to  the  organ- 
ization of  the  Communist  Governments  which  were  set  up  in  dif- 
ferent countries  during  the  years  following  the  World  War.  The 
specific  meaning  attached  to  the  word  "Soviet"  dates  its  origin 
back  to  1905,  the  time  of  the  first  outbreak  of  the  revolutionary 
movement  in  Eussia,  when  the  extremist  leaders  in  Petrograd  and 
other  Eussian  cities  induced  the  industrial  workers  and  employees  to 
elect  their  representatives  to  the  Central  Council  or  Soviet,  an  in- 
stitution which  was  designed  to  control  the  revolutionary  movemeot. 

3 


4        THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

causing  the  ruin  of  a  social  and  political  order 
which  had  stood  solid  for  many  centuries  in 
the  past.  There  was  a  real  epidemic  of  *' aboli- 
tions" of  every  kind.  Everything  that  went 
to  make  up  Russian  statesmanship,  history, 
economics,  and  national  spirit,  was  overnight 
denounced,  eliminated,  abolished,  torn  into 
pieces,  or  otherwise  destroyed,  for  the  sake  of 
erecting  **a  new  social  order"  along  the  lines 
of  Karl  Marx's  doctrine. 

The  feverish  haste  with  which  the  historical 
foundations  of  Russian  culture  were  annihilated 
by  the  Reds  was  bound  to  result  in  confusion 
and  general  chaos.  The  vast  majority  of  the 
people  were  utterly  stupefied  at  this  work  of 
colossal  destruction,  ostensibly  undertaken  in 
their  name,  on  their  behalf,  and  of  their  own 
volition.  So  great  was  the  consternation  among 
the  peaceful  population  that  at  first  nobody 
seemed  to  have  the  courage  to  protest  against 
the  unparalleled  violation  of  the  sovereign 
rights  of  an  independent  nation,  perpetrated 
by  a  clique  of  irresponsible  internationalists 
and  political  lunatics. 

It  was  not  until  the  early  part  of  1918  that 
the  people  began  to  revolt  against  the  tyranny 
suddenly  forced  upon  them. 

Still  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  infer  that  the 
Communist  misrule  during  that  period  was 
solely  confined  to  destruction,  because  the  very 
system  of  terror  and   oppression,   used   as   a 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE  5 

weapon  against  the  nation,  necessitated  the  im- 
mediate establishment  of  an  elaborate  admini- 
strative apparatus  bearing  all  the  tj^ical  marks 
of  bureaucratic  management.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Communist  regime,  being  a  Socialist 
undertaking,  adopted  as  its  first  measure  the 
seizure  of  other  people's  property,  declaring 
production  and  distribution  the  business  of  the 
State.  Therefore,  it  became  the  business  of 
the  State  to  build  up  a  machinery  adapted  to 
control  all  economic  functions.  This,  in  turn, 
required  something  in  the  nature  of  a  consti- 
tution, or  some  kind  of  fundamental  laws,  pro- 
scribing technical  methods  and  means  for  gov- 
erning a  country  with  over  100,000,000  inhabi- 
tants, and  with  an  area  almost  four  times  as 
large  as  the  United  States. 

The  Socialist  adherents  who  stood  behind  the 
Communist  revolution  in  Russia  were  naturally 
faithful  disciples  of  Karl  Marx.  It  was  their 
great  ambition  to  follow  Marx 's  political  alpha- 
bet as  closely  as  possible.  No  wonder,  therefore, 
that  the  fundamental  aims  of  the  so-called 
Soviet  constitution  fully  coincide  with  those 
outlined  by  Marx  over  seventy  years  ago.  His 
first  concern  was  to  destroy  the  ^'bourgeois 
society"  founded  on  the  principles  of  private 
property.  As  a  means  thereto,  he  advocated  the 
*' forcible  overthrow  of  all  existing  social  condi- 
tions/' the  establishment  of  a  proletarian  dic- 
tatorship, and  **the  expropriation  of  the  ex- 


6   THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

propriators. "  He  also  strongly  emphasized  that 
a  Commimist  revolution  would  necessarily  en- 
tail a  merciless  war  against  the  wealth-owning 
classes.  On  this  subject  Marx,  indeed,  used 
plain  language  when  he  concluded  his  Com- 
munist Manifesto  with  the  daring  threat:  **Let 
the  ruling  classes  tremble  at  a  Communistic 
revolution/*  To  make  the  Communist  program 
more  appealing  to  the  masses  of  the  people, 
Marx  sweetened  the  social  panacea  thus  pre- 
scribed with  the  promise  that: 

*'Iii  pla<je  of  the  old  bourgeois  society,  with  its 
classes  land  class  antagonisms,  we  shall  have  an 
association,  in  which  tihe  free  development  of  each 
is  the  condition  for  the  free  development  of  all." 

Quite  in  accordance  with  these  cardinal  prin- 
ciples, the  immediate  purposes  for  establishing 
the  **  Russian  Eepublic  of  Soviets  of  Work- 
ers,' Soldiers'  and  Peasants'  Deputies"  were 
thus  defined  by  Lenin  and  his  associates: 

"The  abolition  of  the  exploitation  of  men  by 
men,  the  entire  abolition  of  the  division  of  the 
people  into  classes,  the  suppression  of  exploiters, 
the  establishment  of  a  Socialist  society,  and  the 
victory  of  Socialists  in  all  lands,    •    •     •    •  " 

This  statement  is  embodied  in  the  ^'Declara- 
tion of  Rights  of  the  Laboring  and  Exploited 
People' '  which  forms  part  of  the  Soviet  con- 
stitution. 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE  7 

In  order  to  draw  a  comprehensive  picture 
of  the  present  conditions  in  Russia,  giving  a 
precise  answer  to  the  question,  ''What  is 
Soviet  Eussia?",  it  is  essential  to  analyze  the 
laws  and  regulations  which  form  the  basis  of 
the  Soviet  system.  In  this  connection  it  must 
be  remembered  that  the  ''fundamental  law" 
of  the  Soviet  Republic  consists  of  a  series  of 
separate  statutes  or  administrative  acts  which 
were  either  first  adopted  or  merely  confirmed 
by  the  Fifth  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets 
on  July  10,  1918.  The  Soviet  "constitution" 
in  this  shape  contains  five  parts,  divided  into 
seventeen  chapters,  and  subdivided  into  ninety 
paragraphs.  Summarizing  its  distorted  fea- 
tures, it  may  be  noted  that  only  two  specific 
objects  are  set  forth  for  the  Communists  to 
achieve:  First,  the  organization  of  a  Socialist 
society  in  Russia;  and,  second,  a  Socialist  vic- 
tory in  all  lands. 

While  the  first  aim  is  confined  to  Russia 
proper,  the  second  applies  to  the  world  at  large, 
involving  all  other  countries  in  a  revolutionary 
upheaval,  thereby  enacting  a  world  drama,  the 
prologue  of  which  was  staged  on  Russian  soil. 
This  proves  that  the  Soviet  regime  is  not 
merely  a  local  matter  restricted  to  Russian  do- 
mains. On  the  contrary,  the  Soviet  "constitu- 
tion" itself  contains  a  specific  provision  en- 
titling the  present  rulers  of  Russia  to  inter- 
meddle with  political  affairs  all  over  the  world, 


8        THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

fostering  revolutionary  mischief  and  conduct- 
ing systematic  propaganda  undermining  legally 
constituted  governments,  in  lieu  of  which  they 
are  pledged  to  introduce  a  standardized  social 
order  as  decreed  by  Marx. 

Having  thus  defined  their  general  aims,  the 
Soviets  further  sought  to  devise  a  practical 
plan  enabling  them  to  proceed  with  the  actual 
realization  of  their  schemes.  In  this  respect 
too  the  fundamental  laws  of  the  Soviet  Re- 
public differentiate  between  two  lines  of  mea- 
sures, one  of  which  is  calculated  to  effect  the 
desired  social  change  in  Eussia,  while  the  other 
is  intended  to  win  foreign  countries  over  to  the 
Socialist  program. 

These  two  categories  of  measures  are  here 
analyzed   separately. 

Local  Measures 

The  sweeping  character  of  the  Socialist  coup 
d'etat  in  Russia  is  best  illustrated  by  a  mere 
reference  to  such  paragraphs  of  the  Soviet 
'* constitution"  as  were  designed  to  bring  about 
a  radical  change  in  her  social  structure.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  the  Communist 
leaders  in  their  task  were  blindly  following 
Karl  Marx  is  clearly  demonstrated  by  a  com- 
parison of  the  Soviet  provisions  with  the  revo- 
lutionary program  outlined  by  Marx  in  his 
Communist  Manifesto. 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE 


"DECLAKATION  OF 
RIGHTS  OF  THE  LAB- 
ORING AND  EXPLOIT- 
ED PEOPLE." 

"Clause  3: 

' '  (a)  For  the  purpose  of 
attaining  the  socialization  of 
land,  all  private  property  in 
land  is  abolished,  and  the 
entire  land  is  declared  to  be 
national  property  and  is  to 
be  apportioned  among  agri- 
culturists without  any  com- 
pensation to  the  former 
owners,  in  the  measure  of 
each  one 's  ability  to  till  it. ' ' 

"(b)  All  forests  treas- 
ures of  the  earth,  and  waters 
of  general  public  utility,  all 
equipment  whether  animate 
or  inanimate,  model  farms 
and  agricultural  enterprises, 
are  declared  to  be  national 
property." 

"(c)  As  a  first  step 
toward  complete  transfer  of 
ownership  to  the  Soviet  Re- 
public of  all  factories,  mills, 
mines,  railways,  and  other 
means  of  production  and 
transportation,  the  Soviet 
law  for  the  control  by  work- 
men and  the  establishment 
of  the   Supreme   Soviet   of 


THE  COMMUNIST 
MANIFESTO  OF  KARL 
MARX.  Pages  41-42.* 


"Abolition  of  property  in 
land  and  application  of  all 
rents  of  land  to  public  pur- 
poses. * ' 


"Centralization  of  the 
means  of  communication  and 
transport  in  the  hands  of 
the    State." 

"Extension  of  factories 
and  instruments  of  produc- 
tion owned  by  the  State." 


•Charles  H.  Kerr  &  Company,  Chioago. 


lo      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 


"Centralization  of  credit 
in  the  hands  of  the  State,  by 
means  of  a  national  bank 
with  State  capital  and  an 
exclusive  monopoly." 


"Equal  liability  of  all  to 
labor.  Establishment  of  in- 
dustrial armies,  especially 
for  agriculture." 


National  Economy  is  hereby 
confirmed,  so  as  to  insure  the 
power  of  the  workers  over 
the  exploiters. 

"(e)  The  transfer  of  all 
banks  to  the  ownership  of 
the  "Workers'  and  Peasants' 
Government,  as  one  of  the 
conditions  of  the  liberation 
of  the  toiling  masses  from 
the  yoke  of  capital,  is  con- 
firmed." 

"(f)  Universal  obliga- 
tion to  work  is  introduced 
for  the  purpose  of  eliminat- 
ing the  parasitic  strata  of 
society  and  organizing  the 
economic  life  of  the  coun- 
try." 


In  other  words,  the  Marxian  program  is  re- 
flected as  in  a  mirror,  in  the  Soviet  "consti- 
tution," with  the  distinction  that  while  Marx 
is  brief  and  explicit  in  his  statements,  the 
modern  Communists  resort  to  demagogic  elo- 
quence. There  is  only  one  idea  in  the  Soviet 
Declaration  that  has  not  been  directly  borrowed 
from  Marx,  that  is  the  provision  to  build  up  a 
Socialist  army,  simultaneously  disarming  the 
wealth-owning  classes.  The  provision  thereto 
reads  verbatim: 

"For  the  purpose  of  securing  the  working  class 
in  the  possession  of  complete  power,  and  in  order 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE  ii 

to  eliminate  all  possibility  of  restoring  the  power 
of  the  exploiters,  it  is  decreed  that  all  workers 
be  armed  and  that  a  Socialist  Red  Army  be  or- 
ganized and  the  propertied  class  disarmed." 

These  measures  logically  lead  up  to  the 
establishment  of  a  proletarian  dictatorship 
which  is  specifically  described  in  paragraph  9 
of  the  "constitution": 

"The  fundamental  problem  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Re- 
public involves,  in  view  of  the  present  transition 
period,  the  establishment  of  a  dictatorship  of  the 
urban  and  rural  proletariat  and  the  poorest  peas- 
antry in  the  form  of  a  powerful  all-Russiam,  Soviet 
authority,  for  the  purpose  of  abolishing  the  ex- 
ploitation of  men  by  men  and  of  introducing  So- 
cialism, in  which  there  will  be  neither  a  division 
into  classes  nor  a  state  of  autocracy." 

This  stipulation  leaves  no  doubt  as  to  the 
character  of  Bolshevist  rule.  It  proclaims  a 
principle  which  is  entirely  alien  to  the  concep- 
tion of  modern  democracy,  namely,  a  deliberate 
attempt  to  institute  class  rule,  the  rule  of  a 
single  proletarian  class  over  the  rest  of  the 
population.  Liberals  and  Soviet  sympathizers 
in  this  country  and  elsewhere  have  devoted  spe- 
cial efforts  to  prove  that  the  Soviet  regime  in 
its  actual  workings  hardly  differs  from  the  basic 
methods  of  democratic  government.  Mr.  Morris 
Hillquit  has  gone  so  far  as  to  assert  that : 

"In  all  kindness  to  our  comrades  in  Russia, 


12   THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

*  *  *  they  do  not  have  a  dictatorship  of  the  pro- 
letariat. The  Soviet  Government  is  neither  a  dic- 
tatorship nor  a  rule  of  the  proletariat.  That  does 
not  make  it  any  less  dear  to  us." 

On  this  point,  however,  Mr.  Hillquit  differs 
with  *' Comrade"  Lenin,  who,  to  the  great  dis- 
appointment of  his  parlor  Bolshevist  friends 
abroad,   explicitly  states: 

''When  at  war  we  use  military  methods.     We 
don't  promise  any  liberty  nor  any  democracy. ''* 

In  the  light  of  paragraph  9  of  the  Declara- 
tion, and  Lenin's  own  assertion,  it  is  apparent 
how  hopeless  are  the  endeavors  to  present  the 
Soviet  rule  in  the  form  of  a  "real  democracy," 
with  a  slight  admixture  of  mild  Socialism  and 
a  pinkish  shade  of  modern  radicalism.  The 
truth  must  be  clearly  understood :  The  Bolshe- 
viki  did  set  up  in  Russia  a  class  dictatorship — 
rather  a  class  tyranny.  It  is  all  the  more  cruel 
as  the  total  number  of  industrial  workers  in 
Russia  did  not  exceed,  even  in  pre-war  times, 
5,000,000,  or  less  than  3%  per  cent,  of  the  total 
population.  Morover,  if  it  is  conceivable  for  an 
enlightened  minority  to  rule  over  a  majority  of 
highly  ignorant  people,  it  is  quite  insane  to 
entrust  the  reins  of  governmental  power  to  a 
small  group  of  inefficient  and  illiterate  manual 

*  Compare  Lenin 's  address  at  the  Third  Congress  of  the  Com- 
munist Internationale,  as  quoted  in  No.  18  of  the  "Communist  In- 
ternationale," p.  4504.  Moscow,  October,  1921.  Translated  from 
the  Russian. 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE  13 

workers,  giving  them  unrestricted  authority  to 
use  and  abuse  the  entire  political  and  economic 
apparatus. 

This,  however,  is  precisely  what  happened  in 
Eussia.  For  the  American  mind,  and  for  those 
who  have  been  brought  up  in  sympathy  with 
the  republican  ideal,  the  term  **  Soviet  Repub- 
lic^' is  obviously  misleading,  for  the  kind  of 
regime  that  was  established  in  Eussia  in  con- 
sequence of  the  Communist  revolution  has  noth- 
ing in  common  with  modern  conceptions  of  the 
republican  form  of  government.  The  historical 
tendency  of  constitutional  practice  evolved  a 
condition  which  made  it  possible  for  the  major- 
ity of  the  people  to  participate  either  directly 
or  indirectly  in  the  administration  of  State 
affairs.  The  Soviet  ^^constitution,"  on  the  con- 
trary, deliberately  prevents  vast  multitudes  of 
the  Eussian  population  from  taking  any  part 
in  political  life.  For  instance,  on  the  strength 
of  Clause  65  of  the  Bolshevist  fundamental  law, 
the  following  social  groups  enjoy  neither  the 
right  to  vote  nor  the  right  to  be  voted  for: 

(a)  Persons  who  employ  hired  labor  in  order  to 
obtain  from  it  an  increase  in  profits. 

(b)  Persons  who  have  an  income  without  doing 
any  work,  such  as  interest  from  capital,  re- 
ceipts from  property,  etc. 

(c)  Private  merchants,  trade  and  commercial 
brokers. 

(d)  Monks  and  clergy  of  all  denominations. 


14      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

(e)  Employees  and  agents  of  the  former  police, 
as  well  as  members  of  the  former  reigning 
dynasty. 

(f )  Persons  "wiho  have  in  legal  form  been  declared 
demented  or  mentally  deficient,  and  also  per- 
sons under  guardianship. 

'(g)  Persons  who  have  been  deprived  by  a  Soviet 
of  their  rights  of  citizenship  because  of  selfish 
or  dishonorable  offenses,  for  the  period  fixed 
by  the  sentence." 

Even  a  superficial  analysis  of  this  clause 
proves  that  millions  of  Russian  peasants  em- 
ploying hired  labor,  besides  great  numbers  of 
those  involved  in  commercial  intercourse,  must 
be  forced  out  of  political  activities  of  any  kind. 
The  class  tyranny  established  in  Russia  is  fur- 
ther emphasized  in  the  provision  of  the  Soviet 
*  *  constitution ' '  declaring : 

"  •  •  •  During  the  progress  of  the  decisive 
battle  between  the  proletariat  and  its  exploiters, 
the  exploiters  shall  not  hold  a  position  in  any 
branch  of  the  Soviet  Government.  The  power 
must  belong  entirely  to  the  toiling  masses  and 
to  their  plenipotentiary  representatives — the  Sov- 
iets of  Workers',  Soldiers',  and  Peasants'  Depu- 
ties."    (Clause  7.) 

On  the  other  hand,  the  same  policy  is  fol- 
lowed in  Clause  14  which  pertains  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  freedom  of  the  press.  We  quote  it 
verbatim : 

"For  the  purpose  of  securing  freedom  of  ex- 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE  15 

pression  to  the  toiling  masses,  the  Russian  So- 
cialist Federal  Soviet  Republic  abolishes  all  de- 
pendence of  the  press  upon  capital,  and  turns 
over  to  the  working  people  and  the  poorest  peas- 
antry all  technical  and  material  means  for  the 
publication  of  newspapers,  pamphlets,  books,  etc, 
and  guarantees  their  free  circulation  throughout 
the  country." 

This  also  applies  to  the  right  to  hold  meet- 
ings and  form  organizations,  societies  and  vari- 
ous associations.  In  every  instance  these  rights 
are  granted  "to  the  working  class  and  poorest 
peasantry"  only.  Even  regarding  education, 
about  which  boudoir  Bolsheviks  have  babbled 
so  much,  the  Soviet  "constitution'^  conclusively 
proves  that  the  acquirement  of  knowledge  is 
considered  the  exclusive  privilege  of  the  prole- 
tariat, while  all  other  classes  are  left  to  grope 
in  darkness.    The  text  of  Clause  17  reads: 

"For  the  purpose  of  guaranteeing  to  the  work- 
ers real  access  to  knowledge,  the  Russian  Socialist 
Federal  Soviet  Republic  sets  itself  the  task  of 
furnishing  full  and  general  free  education  to  the 
workers  cmd  the  poorest  peasantry." 

What  the  Bolsheviki  actually  meant  by  the 
term  "full  and  general  free  education,''  is  ex- 
plained in  a  resolution  adopted  by  the  Eighth 
Convention  of  the  Russian  Conununist  Labor 
Party.  This  document  is  of  great  interest,  espe- 
cially in  America  where  Soviet  sympathizers 


i6      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM: 

systematically  allude  to  the  so-called  "educa- 
tional acMevements"  of  the  Soviet  regime.  It 
is,  therefore,  proper  to  quote  it  at  length.  Re- 
ferring to  the  methods  to  be  used  for  the  edu- 
cation of  the  poorest  peasantry,  the  resolution 
contains  the  following: 

"For  the  purpose  of  educational  activities  in 
the  villages  the  following  elements  must  co- 
operate : 

1.  Communistic  propaganda; 

2.  General  education; 

3.  Agricultural    education. 

"Political  propaganda  in  the  villages  must  be 
carried  on  among  the  literate  peasants  as  well  aa 
among  the  illiterate. 

"The  propaganda  among  the  literate  must  con- 
sist first  of  all  in  the  distribution  of  popular 
literature  and  newspapers  of  a  communistic  char- 
acter, specially  prepared  for  this  purpose.  Such, 
literature  must  be  sold  at  very  low  prices  in 
schools,  reading  huts  and  in  all  Soviet  stores. 
*  *  *  The  courses  for  children,  and  especially 
those  for  adults — the  academic  as  well  as  the 
special  (agricultural  for  instance),  must  in- 
clude: (1)  popular  history  of  culture  from 
a  scientific  socialistic  point  of  view  and  with 
a  specially  prepared  part  devoted  to  Russian 
history  and  to  the  history  of  the  Great  Russian 
Revolution;  (2)  the  interpretation  of  the  Soviet 
constitution.  For  both  of  these  courses  proper 
text-books  are  to  be  prepared  immediately. 

''The  teachers  are  obliged  to  look  upon  them- 
selves as  upon  agents  not  only  of  a  general  hut 
also  of  a  communistic  education. 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE  17 

"In  this  respect  they  must  be  subjected  to  the 
control  of  their  immediate  heads,  as  well  as  the 
local  party  organizations.  Moving  picture  houses, 
theatres,  concerts,  exhibitions,  etc.,  inasmuch  as 
they  will  reach  the  villages  (and  all  effort  is  to  be 
exerted  for  this  purpose),  must  be  utilized  for 
communistic  propaganda  directly,  i.e.,  through 
the  upkeep  of  these  and  also  by  way  of  combining 
these  with  lectures  and  meetings. ' ' 

Analagous  principles  are  recommended  for 
general  education,  the  Bolsheviki  taking  par- 
ticular care  to  have  it  serve  the  purpose  of 
spreading  Communistic  ideas  among  the  unen- 
lightened masses  of  the  Eussian  people. 

"General  education" — ^thus  further  runs  the 
text  of  the  resolution — "within  school  and  out- 
side of  school  including  artistic  education:  thea- 
tres, concerts,  motion  pictures,  exhibitions,  etc., 
endeavoring  not  only  to  shed  the  light  of  a  varied 
knowledge  on  the  dark  villages,  hut  primarily  to 
aAd  in  the  creation  of  self-conscioiosness  and  of  a 
clear  conception  of  things,  nfiust  he  closely  con- 
nected with  the  communistic  propaganda/'* 

Adding  to  this,  the  provision  of  the  Bolshe- 
vist constitution,  stipulating  that  all  workers 
be  armed  and  the  wealth-owning  classes  dis^ 
armed,  we  have  in  brief  an  accurate  picture  of 
the  internal  policies  adopted  by  the  Soviets 
to  force  upon  the  Eussian  people  an  unparal- 

*  This  resolution  was  first  published  in  the  official  Bolshevist 
** Northern  Commune,"  in  its  issue  of  April  6,  1919,  and  repub- 
lished in  Soviet  Russia  of  New  York  on  July  12,  1919,  pp.  13  and  14. 


i8      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

leled  tyranny.  The  result  is  that  an  insignifi- 
cant minority  is  ruling  over  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  the  population.  The  Soviet  de- 
crees and  regulations,  having  been  applied  to 
every-day  life,  produced  in  Russia  a  reign  of 
terror,  a  proletarian  dictatorship  in  its  precise 
sense,  with  hopeless  demagogues  and  worship- 
pers of  Marx  experimenting  on  a  great  na- 
tion and  making  constructive  progress  abso- 
lutely impossible. 

Soviet  Fobeign  Policy 

The  Bolshevist  constitution  contains  a  num- 
ber of  provisions  directly  bearing  upon  the 
Soviet  foreign  policy.  Contrary  to  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  ahnost  barring  America  from 
participating  in  international  affairs,  the  Com- 
munist rulers  have  laid  particular  stress  upon 
the  necessity  for  Russia  to  interfere  with  mat- 
ters having  no  relation  whatsoever  to  her  in- 
ternal situation  as  such. 

Faithful  to  the  principles  of  Karl  Marx,  who, 
in  his  ''Communist  Manifesto/'  urged  the  So- 
cialists to  "Everywhere  support  every  revo- 
lutionary movement  against  the  social  and  poli- 
tical order  of  things,"  the  Bolsheviki  explicitly 
stated,  making  it  one  of  the  cardinal  points  of 
their  program,  that  they  aim  at  *'The  victory 
of  Socialists  in  all  lands."  Accordingly,  they 
have  a  special  chapter  in  the  "Declaration  of 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE  19 

Rights  of  the  Laboring  and  Exploited  People'' 
entirely  dealing  with  the  methods  for  fostering 
revolutionary  activities  abroad.  Using  bom- 
bastic language,  they  declare: 

"Expressing  its  fixed  resolve  to  liberate  man- 
kind from  the  grip  of  capital  and  imperialism, 
which  flooded  the  earth  with  blood  in  its  present 
most  criminal  of  all  wars,  the  Third  Congress  of 
Soviets  fully  agrees  with  the  Soviet  Government 
in  its  policy  of  abrogating  secret  treaties,  of  or- 
ganizing on  a  wide  scale  the  fraternization  of  the 
workers  and  peasants  of  the  belligerent  armies, 
and  of  making  all  efforts  to  conclude  a  general 
democratic  peace  without  annexations  or  indem- 
nities, upon  the  basis  of  the  free  determination  of 
peoples," 

The  determination  to  liberate  mankind  is  of 
course  very  laudable.  But  is  mankind  pre- 
pared, or  has  it  manifested  a  desire  to  be  lib- 
erated by  or  rather  to  fall  under  the  yoke  of 
the  Soviets?  Each  nation  cherishes  its  own 
ideals  and  methods  of  government,  and  in  no 
way  is  it  bound  to  accept — at  least  without 
vigorous  resistance — ^the  principles  of  the  Marx- 
ian theory,  or  any  other  theory,  that  might  be 
forced  upon  it  from  the  outside.  The  Soviets, 
however,  have  proclaimed  it  their  task  not  only 
to  liberate  mankind,  which  falls  within  the 
range  of  political  lyrics,  but  also  to  pursue  the 
specific  policy  of  sowing  discord  among  the 
so-called  oppressed  peoples.     Clause  5  of  the 


20      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

''constitution"  is  the  nucleus  of  a  disastrous 
undertaking  known  as  ''The  Scheme  of  the  Red 
East,"  which  will  be  treated  in  another  chap- 
ter.   It  reads : 

'*It  is  also  to  this  end  that  the  Third  Congress 
of  Soviets  insists  upon  putting  an  end  to  the 
barbarous  policy  of  the  bourgeois  civilization 
which  enables  the  exploiters  of  a  few  chosen  na- 
tions to  enslave  hundreds  of  millions  of  the  work- 
ing population  of  Asia,  of  the  colonies,  and  of 
small  countries  generally." 

Now,  it  may  be  true  that  Belgian  rule  in  the 
Congo,  or  the  British  regime  in  India,  or  the 
United  States  policy  in  Haiti,  do  not  conform 
with  the  sublime  standards  of  statesmanship; 
but  the  question  is  why  these  and  similar  digres- 
sions from  the  ideal  should  be  a  matter  of  con- 
cern for  the  Bolsheviki  in  Russia?  No  self-re- 
specting State  can  nor  will  tolerate  interference 
with  its  internal  policies  by  an  outside  power.  As 
a  general  rule,  such  interference  constitutes  a 
casus  belli  and  is  liable  to  cause  grave  inter- 
national disturbances.  This,  however,  is  the 
very  thing  that  the  So\iets  are  trying  to  bring 
about  in  order  to  accelerate  the  process  of  world 
revolution,  which  they  hope  will  culminate  in  a 
Socialist  victory  throughout  all  lands.  In  this 
sense  the  Bolshevist  foreign  policy  is  a 
shrewdly  preconceived  plot  against  civilization 
at  large. 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE  21 

As  to  the  Bolshevist  policy  for  the  dismem- 
berment of  the  Russian  Empire,  it  had  its  in- 
ception in  the  Soviet  constitution  itself.  Clause 
6  proclaims  "the  full  independence  of  Finland," 
which  had  been  a  Russian  province  ever  since 
1809.  The  same  article  declares  the  principle 
of  ** self-determination"  for  Armenia.  It  is  a 
matter  of  historical  record  that  the  Soviets 
recognized  the  '* independence"  of  **Ukrainia" 
which  for  centuries  had  been  an  organic  part 
of  Russia,  its  capital,  Kiev,  being  justly  called 
*^The  Mother  of  Russian  cities."  In  further 
adherence  to  this  policy,  the  Bolsheviki  engin- 
eered the  disintegration  of  the  Caucasus,  set- 
ting up  mushroom  republics,  such  as  Georgia 
and  Azerbaijan.  Their  program  of  self -disin- 
tegration was  extended  as  far  East  as  the 
Transbaikal  region,  where  they  established  the 
so-called  "Far  Eastern  Republic,"  thus  split- 
ting up  the  basic  Russian  territory  into  numer- 
ous insignificant  state  communities,  deprived  of 
independent  economic  resources  and  without 
any  historical  foundation. 

After  the  inevitable  collapse  of  the  Soviet 
regime,  decades,  if  not  centuries,  will  be  re- 
quired to  bring  together  these  dissected  terri- 
tories and  once  more  restore  the  unity  of  the 
Russian  Nation. 

Quite  in  line  vdth  the  avowed  precepts  of 
Bolshevist  foreign  policy  is  also  the  demand 
expressed  by  the  Fifth  All-Russian  Congress 


22      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

of  Soviets  that  *^The  annulment  of  loans  made 
by  the  Government  of  the  Czar,  by  landowners 
and  the  bourgeoisie"  be  firmly  upheld,  giving 
new  impetus  to  the  *' Final  victory  of  the  in- 
ternational workers'  revolt  against  the  op- 
pression of  capital." 

The  repudiation  of  Russia's  foreign  debt  was 
and  still  remains  one  of  the  main  obstacles  to 
the  recognition  of  the  Soviet  regime  by  western 
powers.  It  is  true  that  this  obstacle  was  clev- 
erly used  by  the  Soviet  leaders  in  their  his- 
torical controversy  with  western  Europe  at  the 
time  of  the  deliberations  at  Genoa.  England 
and  France  set  forth  the  motto:  '*We  will 
recognize  you  if  you  will  recognize  Russia's 
foreign  debf;  the  Soviet  answer  to  this  being, 
'^We  will  recognize  Russia's  foreign  debt  if 
you  will  recognize  us/'  In  a  way,  this  contro- 
versy is  quite  groundless  for  no  matter  whether 
the  Bolsheviki  will  or  will  not  agree  to  pay,  the 
whole  bargaii^  has  but  a  theoretical  significance. 
Funds  are  not  available  in  Russia  to  meet  for- 
eign obligations.  Moreover,  Tchicherin,  the 
Soviet  spokesman  at  the  Genoa  Conference,  im- 
plied that  the  recognition  of  her  international 
obligations  is  conditioned  upon  obtaining  a 
huge  gold  loan  from  those  very  countries  to 
which  she  is  now  indebted.  And  then  such  a 
loan  would  mean  a  new  asset  for  world  revolu- 
tionary propaganda.  At  this  place  we  merely 
touch  upon  this  question,  but  in  one  of  the  sub- 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE 


23 


sequent  chapters  the  Soviet  foreign  policy  will 
be  analyzed  at  greater  length. 

Such  in  substance  are  the  principles  of  the 
Soviet  *' constitution"  in  its  two  phases,  deal- 
ing both  with  the  internal  conditions  wrought 
upon  Russia  by  the  Communist  regime,  and  its 
attitude  toward  international  affairs. 

Soviet  Organization 

It  now  becomes  important  to  give  a  brief 
sketch  of  the  organization  of  Soviet  institu- 
tions, since  much  of  the  present  plight  in  Russia 
is  directly  due  to  the  incompetent  manner  in 
which  the  Bolsheviki  sought  to  solve  admini- 
stration problems.  So  far  as  political  gen- 
eralities were  concerned,  the  Soviet  leaders 
could  borrow  their  knowledge  from  Karl  Marx, 
and  this  they  have  done  to  the  utmost.  But 
when  it  came  to  actually  building  up  an  appa- 
ratus adapted  to  govern  a  country,  not  only 
regulating  its  political  activities  but  also  super- 
vising the  whole  gamut  of  economic  functions, 
the  Communists  most  emphatically  revealed 
their  inefficiency. 

According  to  the  Soviet  *' constitution,"  the 
supreme  power  in  Bolshevist  Russia  is  vested 
in  *'The  AU-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets" 
(Clause  25).  This  institution  is  composed  of 
representatives  of  urban  Soviets,  one  represent- 
ing 25,000  voters,  and  of  provincial  delegates 


24      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

who  are  elected  to  the  AU-Russian  Congress  by 
Provincial  Soviet  Congresses  (one  delegate  for 
every  125,000  inhabitants). 

The  AU-Russian  Congress  is  convoked  by  the 
AU-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee  at 
least  twice  a  year.  (Clause  26.)  The  AU-Rus- 
sian Congress  of  Soviets  elects  the  AU-Russian 
Central  Executive  Committee,  composed  of  not 
more  than  200  members.  Clause  29  provides 
that  the  AU-Russian  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee **is  entirely  responsible  to  the  AU-Rus- 
sian Congress  of  Soviets,"  but  the  subsequent 
clause  establishes  the  rule  that  "In  the  periods 
between  the  convocation  of  the  Congresses,  the 
AU-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee  is  the 
supreme  power  of  the  Republic."  There  is 
further  an  obvious  contradiction  between  Clause 
24,  vesting  the  supreme  power  of  the  State  in 
the  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets,  and  Clause 
31  reading: 

**The  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee 
is  the  supreme  legislative,  executive,  and  con- 
trolling organ  of  the  Bussian  Socialist  Federal 
Soviet  Republic/' 

The  analysis  of  the  subsequent  article,  de- 
scribing the  authority  of  the  All-Russian  Cen- 
tral Executive  Committee,  shows  that  as  a 
matter  of  fact  the  actual  governmental  power 
is  entrusted  to  the  AU-Russian  Central  Execu- 
tive Committee  and  not  to  the  AU-Russian  Con- 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE  25 

gress  of  Soviets.  Among  other  rights  belonging 
to  the  AU-Russian  Central  Executive  Commit- 
tee, this  body  has  the  right  to  appoint  the  so- 
called  ** Council  of  People's  Commissars  for  the 
purpose  of  general  management  of  the  affairs 
of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Repub- 
lic." (Clause  35.)*  The  Central  Executive 
Committee  also  forms  departments  ( People  *s 
Conmiissariats)  for  the  purpose  of  conducting 
various  governmental  branches. 

To  make  the  confusion  complete,  the  Soviet 
'* constitution"  embodies  two  articles  which  we 
also  quote  verbatim: 

"Clause  37.  The  Council  of  People's  Conimis- 
sai^  is  entrusted  with  the  general  management  of 
the  affairs  of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet 
Republic. 

"Clause  38.  For  the  accomplishment  of  this 
task  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars  issues 
decrees,  resolutions,  ordere,  and,  in  general,  takes 
all  steps  necessary  for  the  proper  and  rapid  con- 
duet  of  governmental  affairs." 

Thus,  the  poor  Soviet  citizen  is  at  once  eon- 
fronted  with  three  supreme  governmental 
powers : 

(a)  The  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets. 

(b)  The    AU-Russian    Central    Executive    Com- 
mittee. 

(c)  The  Council  of  People's  Commissars. 

*  The  Coimcil  of  People's  Commissars  is  an  institution  similar  to 
the  Cabinet  or  Council  of  Ministers. 


26      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Each  one  of  these  institutions  issues  decrees 
and  resolutions;  each  one  of  them  is  entitled 
to  direct  **in  a  general  way"  the  affairs  of  the 
Soviet  Utopia;  and  each  one  of  them  is  de- 
pendent upon  the  other  two.  Although  the 
AU-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets  elects  the  AU- 
Russian  Central  Executive  Committee,  never- 
theless it  is  the  All-Russian  Central  Executive 
Committee  that  convokes  into  session  the  All- 
Russian  Congress,  each  body  acting  simultane- 
ously as  the  chief  executive  and  the  chief  legis- 
lative organ  of  the  State.  On  the  other  hand, 
while  the  central  Executive  Committee  is  osten- 
sibly responsible  to  the  All-Russian  Congress, 
there  is  no  way  of  determining  to  which  of  the 
several  All-Russian  Congresses  the  All-Russian 
Central  Executive  Committee  is  responsible,  for 
there  is  no  logical  sequence  in  the  personnel  of 
the  All-Russian  Congresses.  Furthermore,  be- 
cause the  term  of  service  of  the  Central  Execu- 
tive Committee  is  not  specifically  defined  in 
the  constitution,  there  might  arise  a  condition 
which  would  make  the  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee responsible  to  four  or  five  successive 
All-Russian  Congresses.  This  would  mean  that 
the  Central  Executive  Committee  is  practically 
responsible  to  none  of  them. 

But  the  legal  muddle  does  not  end  here. 
Both  the  All-Russian  Congress  and  the  Central 
Executive  Committee,  besides  exercising  execu- 
tive and  legislative  rights,  are  also  given  author- 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE  27 

ity  to  act  as  the  supreme  judicial  organs  of 
the  State.  These  two  bodies  combine  in  a  most 
peculiar  manner  the  three  functions  of  govern- 
ment :  Legislative,  executive  and  judicial.  Such 
an  organization  of  the  Central  apparatus  in- 
evitably results  in  a  hopeless  confusion  of  all 
governmental  affairs  and  in  the  complete  im- 
munity of  governmental  officials. 

Next  comes  the  inter-relation  between  the 
Central  Executive  Committee  and  the  Council 
of  People's  Commissars. 

The  Council  of  People's  Commissars  is  re- 
sponsible both  to  the  All-Russian  Central  Ex- 
ecutive Comjnittee  and  the  All-Russian  Con- 
gress of  Soviets.  All  orders  **of  great  political 
significance"  are  referred  for  consideration  and 
final  approval  to  the  All-Russian  Central  Ex- 
ecutive Committee.  However,  measures  re- 
quiring immediate  action  may  be  decreed  di- 
rectly by  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars. 
In  point  of  fact,  matters  requiring  immediate 
action  are  usually  those  bearing  **  great  politi- 
cal significance."  Thus  one  provision  practi- 
cally nullifies  the  other,  making  it  impossible 
to  ascertain  where  the  authority  of  the  Council 
ends  and  that  of  the  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee begins. 

Still  further  conflict  is  caused  by  the  pro- 
vision requiring  that  every  People's  Commissar 
be  assisted  by  a  Committee  of  which  he  is  presi- 
dent, while  its  members  are  appointed  by  the 


28      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Council  of  People's  Commissars.  The  role  of 
these  *' assisting"  Committees  is  rather  an 
amusing  one,  as  the  People's  Commissar  **Has 
the  individual  right  to  decide  on  all  questions 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  his  Commissariat," 
his  only  duty  being  to  report  his  decision  to 
the  members  of  the  Committee.  If  any  of  them 
happen  to  disagree  with  the  Commissar,  they 
may  ''without  stopping  the  execution  of  the 
decision,  complain  of  it  to  the  executive  mem- 
bers of  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars  or 
to  the  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee." 

The  desperately  bureaucratic  character  of  the 
Soviet  Central  machinery  is  also  demonstrated 
by  the  fact  that  there  are  as  many  as  seventeen 
different  People's  Commissars  and  People's 
Commissariats,  each  one  of  them  having  its 
special  Commissariat  ''Collegium."  The  fol- 
lowing are  the  departments  enumerated  in  the 
Soviet  constitution:    (Clause  43.) 

**(a)  Foreign  Affairs, 
[b)  Army. 

c)  Navy. 

d)  Interior. 

e)  Justice. 

f)  Labor, 

g)  Social  "Welfare, 
h)  Education, 
i)    Post  and  Telegraph, 
j)    National  Affairs, 
k)  Finances. 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE  29 

(1)    Ways  of  Communication. 

(m)  Agriculture. 

(n)   Commerce  and  Industry. 

(0)  National  Supplies. 

(p)  State  Control. 

(q)   Supreme  Soviet  of  National  Economy. 

(r)  Public  Health." 

In  addition,  there  is  the  "All-Russian  Ex- 
traordinary Committee  for  Combatting  Counter- 
Revolution,  Profiteering  and  Sabotage,"  com- 
monly known  as  the  "Cheka,"  which  actually 
rules  over  the  All-Eussian  Congresses,  the  AU- 
Russian  Central  Executive  Committee,  the  Peo- 
ple's Commissars  and  Commissariats,  and  which 
controls  the  principal  domain  of  Soviet  activity 
— terror. 

On  the  question  of  jurisdiction  of  the  All- 
Russian  Congress  and  the  All-Russian  Central 
Executive  Committee,  the  Communists  became 
so  befuddled  that  they  practically  gave  up  the 
attempt  to  draw  a  line  of  demarcation  between 
the  respective  authority  of  the  two  institutions. 
They  merely  go  on  enmnerating,  under  one 
clause,  the  different  matters  with  which  these 
two  organs  are  entitled  to  deal: 

"The  All-Russian  Congress  and  the  All-Rus- 
sian Central  Executive  Committee  deal  with  ques- 
tions of  State,  such  as: 

(a)  Ratification  and  amendment  of  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal  Soviet 
Republic. 


30      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

(b)  General  direction  of  the  entire  interior  and 
foreign  policy  of  the  Russian  Socialist  Fed- 
eral Soviet  Republic. 

(c)  Establishing  and  changing  boundaries,  also 
ceding  territory  belonging  to  the  Russian 
Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Republic. 

(d)  Establishing  boundaries  for  regional  Soviet 
unions  belonging  to  the  Russian  Socialist 
Federal  Soviet  Republic,  also  settling  dis- 
putes among  them. 

(h)  Foreigis  relations,   declaration  of  war,  and 

the  ratification  of  peace  treaties. 
(i)    Making   loans,   signing   commercial   treaties 

and  financial  agreements. 

(k)  Approval  of  the  budget  of  the  Russian  So- 
cialist Federal  Soviet  Republic. ' '  ( Clause  49. ) 
And  so  on. 

However,  modifying  the  above  stipulations, 
Section  51  draws  a  distinction  between  the  jur- 
isdiction of  the  AU-Russian  Congress  and  the 
All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee,  giv- 
ing the  former  exclusive  right  to  amend  the 
fundamental  principles  of  the  Soviet  consti- 
tution and  also  to  ratify  peace  treaties. 

The  Bolshevist  leaders  did  not  confine  them- 
selves to  a  description  of  the  Central  Soviet 
apparatus.  They  devoted  three  chapters  to  the 
organization  of  local  Soviets.  Without  going 
into  its  details,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  Local 
Soviet  power  is  roughly  divided  into  two 
branches,  one  administered  by  the  Congresses 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE  31 

of  the  Local  Soviets  and  the  other  acting  under 
the  authority  of  the  Local  Soviets  of  Deputies. 
There  are  four  categories  of  Congresses  of 
Local  Soviets: 

(a)  Regional — formed  of  representatives  of  the 
urban  and  county  Soviets,  (One  representa- 
tive for  25,000  inhabitants  of  the  county  and 
one  representative  for  5,000  voters  in  the 
cities.)  These  Soviets  must  not  exceed  500 
members. 

(b)  Provincial — eomi)osed  of  representatives  of 
urban  and  rural  Soviets.  (One  representa- 
tive for  10,000  inhabitants  from  the  rural 
districts  and  one  representative  for  2,000 
voters  in  the  cities.)  The  number  of  mem- 
bers of  this  category  must  not  exceed  300. 

(c)  County — these  (Congresses  are  composed  of 
representatives  of  rural  Soviets,  one  delegate 
for  each  1,000  inhabitants  but  not  more  than 
300  delegates  for  the  entire  county. 

(d)  Rural — composed  of  representatives  of  tall 
village  Soviets  belonging  to  one  volost.* 

Every  Congress  of  Soviets  (Regional,  Pro- 
vincial, County  and  Rural)  elects  its  own  Ex- 
ecutive Committee,  varying  in  number  from 
10  to  25.  The  structure  and  authority  of  the 
Local  Executive  Committees  are  similiar  to 
those  of  the  All-Russian  Central  Executive 
Committee. 

Aside  from  these  bodies,  there  are  the  so- 

•  Smallest  Eussian   administrative   division. 


32      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

called  Soviets  of  Deputies,  both  in  the  cities 
and  other  settlements  (towns,  villages,  hamlets, 
etc.).  The  number  of  deputies  in  such  Soviets 
varies  from  three  to  fifty  for  each  settlement. 
The  term  of  service  of  the  deputies  is  three 
months.  Therefore,  in  practice  Soviet  citizens 
are  continuously  kept  busy  electing  deputies  to 
Soviets  of  different  denominations.  This  elec- 
toral epidemic  is  assuredly  not  contributing  to 
the  stability  and  efficiency  of  the  Soviet  system 
at  large. 

The  very  spirit  of  the  Bolshevist  constitu- 
tion relating  to  organization  of  the  Central  and 
Local  Soviet  authority  is  liable  to  encourage  the 
almost  endless  multiplication  of  Soviet  insti- 
tutions which,  in  turn,  gives  birth  to  an  almost 
unlimited  number  of  Soviet  bureaucrats.  This 
fact  is  admitted  even  by  the  Soviet  leaders  them- 
selves. To  give  only  one  instance  of  the  pre- 
vailing condition  we  cite  No.  282  of  the  official 
Bolshevist  organ,  the  Petrograd  Pravda  for 
1920.  Therein  reference  is  made  to  a  decree 
of  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars,  bear- 
ing the  official  title,  ^'Regulations  for  the  Sta- 
bilisation and  Improvement  of  the  Peasants' 
Household/^  For  the  purpose  of  putting  it 
into  effect,  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars 
decided  to  establish  the  following  Soviets: 

1.  In  every  province  and  county  a  *'S(nuing 
Soviet"  is  composed  of  not  more  than  five 
members  whose  duty  it  is  to  supervise  the 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE  33 

sowing    in    tlie    respective    provinces    and 
counties. 

2.  For  discussing  the  measures  proposed  by  the 
Sowing  Soviets,  special  "Agricultural  Sov- 
iets" are  instituted,  comprising  members  of 
the  Sowing  Soviets,  Regional  Soviets,  Peas- 
ants' Committees,  etc. 

3.  In  order  further  to  expedite  the  agricultural 
work,    special   Rural   Soviets  are   formed. 

4.  Finally,  general  supervision  of  the  activities 
of  the  three  above-named  categories  of  Soviets 
is  vested  in  the  Provincial  Soviet  which  has 
authority  to  issue  its  own  special  decrees, 
cancelling  those  set  forth  by  other  Sowing 
Soviet  organizations. 

This  is  a  typical  illustration  of  the  amazing 
inefficiency  of  the  Communist  liberators  of  man- 
kind. No  wonder  that  the  Bolsheviki  them- 
selves are  quite  alarmed  at  the  bureaucratic 
marasmus  penetrating  the  whole  Soviet  system. 
So,  in  the  Bolshevist  Pravda  (No.  105,  1919) 
the  following  confession  is  made: 

"World  history  has  never  known  an  example 
of  such  endless  dawdling,  combined  with  such  an 
enormous  number  of  employees,  as  we  have  it 
in  our  Soviet  institutions." 

The  governmental  routine  in  Soviet  Russia  is 
quite  irritating.  To  obtain  any  kind  of  infor- 
mation, or  to  have  anything  done  through  Soviet 
officials,  one  has  to  visit  dozens  of  different  de- 
partments, chanceries,  and  offices,  sometimes 
located  in  different  parts  of  the  city,  without 


34      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

even  a  remote  chance  of  ultimately  obtaining 
the  information  needed.  In  Moscow  alone,  out 
of  the  total  population  not  exceeding  900,000, 
there  are  400,000  Soviet  employees.  One  and 
the  same  paper,  before  being  issued  by  this  or 
that  Soviet,  must  have  the  signatures  of  scores 
of  Soviet  parasites,  every  one  of  whom  revises 
the  decision  of  the  preceding  signer.  For- 
eigners who  have  been  admitted  to  Soviet  Rus- 
sia have  presented  long  accounts  of  fabulous 
disorder  reigning  in  Communist  chanceries. 
An  Italian  writer,  Magrini,  once  had  the  mis- 
fortune to  buy  a  couple  of  photographs  relating 
to  revolutionary  events  from  one  of  the  Soviet 
photograph  institutions.  This  is  what  hap- 
pened : 

"In  order  to  pay  1200  rubles,  this  being  the 
price  of  the  photographs,  I  was  compelled  to  waste 
two  hours  visiting  three  Auditing  Departments, 
which  issued  six  receipts.  Three  of  these  receipts 
were  retained  by  me,  while  I  was  instructed  to 
present  two  copies  to  different  Accounting  De- 
partments; and,  finally,  the  last  copy  was  turned 
over  by  me  to  the  cashier. '  '* 

Because  the  Soviet  constitution  fails  to  prop- 
erly define  the  jurisdiction  of  the  various  de- 
partments within  the  Central  apparatus,  none 
of  the  Soviet  bureaucrats  seems  to  know  pre- 

*  Compare  P.  A.  Shcherbina:  "Laws  of  Evolution  and  Bolshe- 
vism," Belgrade,  Ed.  1921.     Translated  from  the  Eussian. 


THE  SOVIET  MACHINE  35 

cisely  wHat  their  rights  and  duties  are.  The  sit- 
uation is  all  the  more  trying  as  the  inter-relation 
between  the  Central  Government  and  Local  Sov- 
iet organs  remains  quite  obscure.  The  Soviet 
constitution  contains  no  provisions  whatsoever 
which  would  serve  as  a  criterion  for  a  compre- 
hensive answer  as  to  where  the  authority  of  the 
local  institutions  ceases  and  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Central  Government  begins.  The  result  is 
that  chaos  and  astounding  disorganization  are 
the  rule  throughout  the  Soviet  offices  and  in  all 
governmental  affairs. 

Truly,  Lenin  and  Bronstein,  Apf  elbaum  and 
Finkelstein  are  cunning  babblers.  Their  elo- 
quence at  times  is  most  convincing.  They  talk 
their  audiences  almost  to  death.  But  efficient 
work  and  practical  achievement,  elementary 
knowledge  and  similar  bourgeois  ** inventions" 
are  not  within  their  realm.  They  seek  to  cap- 
ture the  imagination  of  the  people  by  revolu- 
tionary phraseology  and  cascades  of  demagogic 
rhetoric.  They  hjrpnotize.  They  mislead.  They 
deride.  They  poison  minds  with  vain  promises 
and  political  illusions.  They  undermine  the 
very  foundations  of  common  sense,  morality  and 
faith.  They  talk  and  talk,  achieving  nothing 
but  destruction.  To  use  Hegel's  expression, 
they  practice  the  most  cruel  policy:  "From 
nothing,  through  nothing,  to  nothing,"  and  it 
is  not  surprising  that  such  tactics  have  brought 
Russia  to  misery  and  ruin. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  LAND  PROBLEM  IN  RUSSIA 

n^HE  land  problem  in  Russia  is  the  keynote 
to  the  whole  Russian  situation.  This  is 
explained  by  the  fact  that  Russia  is  a  typical 
agricultural  country. 

Even  in  good  old  prosperous  times,  that  is, 
prior  to  the  revolution,  Russia 's  industrial  level 
was  rather  low,  while  not  less  than  80%  of  the 
entire  population  was  engaged  in  agricultural 
pursuit.  The  Russian  agricultural  output  was 
enormouS;  reaching,  in  1910,  a  total  of  $4,100,- 
000,000 ;  this  in  spite  of  the  comparatively  back- 
ward technique  of  land-tilling  processes.  Not 
only  was  Russia  a  self-supporting  country,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  her  food  supply,  but  heavy 
agricultural  export  formed  the  basis  of  her  pros- 
perous trade  balance  with  foreign  countries. 

Astounding  miscomprehension  has  been  dis- 
played by  many  foreign  authors  who  undertook 
to  render  judgment  on  the  real  land  conditions 
in  Imperial  Russia.  The  general  conception 
of  such  critics  was  largely  based  upon  hearsay 
accounts  of  the  ^Herrible  oppression"  endured 
by  Russian  peasants,  of  the  alleged  despotic 
attitude  of  the  former  land  nobility  toward  the 
small  farmers,  and  similar  stories.  Some  So- 
cialist writers  went  so  far  as  to  assert  that  the 

36 


THE  LAND  PROBLEM  IN  RUSSIA  37 

Russian  peasants  had  never  been  landowners 
and  never  could  own  the  land,  as  the  entire  agri- 
cultural area  was  owned  either  by  the  nobility 
or  by  the  State.  Statements  of  this  kind  have 
been  systematically  disseminated  from  decade 
to  decade,  with  the  result  that  public  opinion 
in  western  countries,  and  more  particularly  in 
America,  accepted  this  as  a  true  picture  of  the 
land  situation. 

In  point  of  fact,  the  whole  problem  was 
grossly  misrepresented.  Yet  a  clear  under- 
standing of  Russian  agragrian  relationship  is 
so  important  that  a  few  statistical  data  bearing 
upon  the  question  will  not  be  out  of  place. 

On  February  19,  1861— that  is  to  say,  two 
years  before  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the 
United  States— over  20,000,000  Russian  peas- 
ants were  liberated  from  bondage  by  Emperor 
Alexander  II.  The  manifesto  liberating  the 
peasants  was  accompanied  by  an  act  granting 
to  them  111,628,506  dessiatines,*  or  318,257,527 
acres  of  land  suitable  for  tilling.  This  land 
was  made  the  property  of  the  peasants.  Every- 
one of  the  8,450,782  peasant  farms  contained  an 
average  of  13  dessiatines,  or  37.18  acres.  Ac- 
cording to  official  statistics  of  1878,  the  whole 
acreage  of  arable  land  in  European  Russia  was 
377,020,161  dessiatines,  which  were  distributed 
in  the  following  way: 

*A  Eussian  dessiatine  is  equal  to  2.86  acres. 

112788 


38      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Dessiatines 
State,    Church   and   Municipal    In- 
stitutions        166,317,099 

Peasants 121,726,820 

Nobility 73,163,744 

Other   Castes    15.812,498 

Now  it  becomes  important  to  demonstrate  the 
gradual  increase  in  peasant  land  ownership: 

1861     111,628,506   Dessiatines 

1878  121,726,820 

1905  167,760,289  " 

1917   (January  1)....  188,000,000 

In  other  words,  prior  to  the  revolution,  the 
peasants  in  European  Russia  owned,  on  the 
basis  of  private  property,  almost  50  per  cent, 
of  the  entire  available  acreage. 

Such  are  the  main  facts  regarding  the  dis- 
tribution of  lands  in  Russia.  Thus  the  histori- 
cal tendency  of  agrarian  relationship  assumed 
the  following  features: 

(a)  The  gradual  transference  of  the 
agricultural  acreage  to  the  peas- 
ants and  small  farmers. 

(b)  The  diminishing  of  lands  owned 
by  the  nobility. 

(c)  The  gradual  but  systematic  in- 
crease in  the  small  farms  and  a 
corresponding  decrease  in  the  acre- 
age of  large  estates. 


THE  LAND  PROBLEM  IN  RUSSIA  39 

This  complex  process  obviously  stood  in  con- 
tradiction to  the  Marxian  theory,  which  affirms 
that  the  small  farmers  are  apt  to  be  **  swal- 
lowed" by  the  wealthy  land  owners,  forcing  the 
former  into  the  ranks  of  agrarian  proletarians. 
However,  in  spite  of  the  fallacy  of  this  asser- 
tion, Socialists  of  all  denominations  have  con- 
ducted violent  propaganda,  urging  the  peasants 
to  revolt  against  *Hhe  greedy  land  owner,*'  and 
to  grab  his  lands,  thus  escaping  the  ^'miserable 
lot  of  sinking  to  the  depths  of  pauperism." 
Year  by  year,  beginning  with  the  70 's,  vicious 
propaganda  of  this  nature  has  been  on  foot. 
Innumerable  Socialist  leaflets  have  been  cir- 
culated among  the  Russian  peasants,  and  finally 
the  revolutionists  have  succeeded  in  imbuing 
the  minds  of  the  farmers  with  the  deeply  rooted 
belief  that  the  land  should  belong  only  to  those 
who  till  it,  and  consequently  that  it  was  the 
right  of  the  peasants  to  take  away,  by  force 
if  necessary,  all  lands  belonging  either  to  the 
State  or  the  nobility.  Instances  were  frequent 
when  revolutionary  agitators,  being  aware  of 
the  unshaken  loyalty  of  the  peasants  to  the 
Imperial  Regime,  would  approach  them  with 
forged  manifestos  announcing  that,  although 
the  Czar  is  willing  to  cede  all  the  land  to  the 
"poor  people,"  he  is  prevented  from  so  doing 
by  the  "tricky  nobility." 

The  results  of  this  propaganda  first  became 
apparent  in  1905,  when  the  long-expected  agra- 


40      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

rian  revolt  broke  out.    At  that  time  tlie  Rus- 
sian Army  was  engaged  in  a  difficult  struggle 
against  Japan.    The  attention  of  the  Govern- 
ment was  centered  on  Far  Eastern  affairs,  and 
the  snake  of  revolutionary  intrigue  gradually 
wormed  its  way  to  the  masses  of  the  people,  in- 
citing them  to  start  a  rebellion  against  their 
*^ oppressors."    The  peasants  began  to  destroy 
large  estates,  setting  fire  to  the  noblemen's  coun- 
try houses,  killing  the  cattle,  wrecking  agricul- 
tural machinery,  and  murdering  the  proprie- 
tors themselves.     Revolutionary   outbreaks   in 
different   cities   accompanied   the   outrages   in 
rural  districts,  and  this  considerably  hampered 
the  task  of  the  Government  in  restoring  order. 
The  situation  remained  grave  until  the  end  of 
1906.     However,  with  the  termination  of  the 
Japanese  War,  Stolypin  having  become  Pre- 
mier, the  revolutionary  movement  was  promptly 
suppressed.    To  the  great  disappointment  of  all 
Marxian  sympathizers,  Stolypin  suddenly  came 
out  with  his  brilliant  project  for  an  all-embrac- 
ing agrarian  reform,  the  chief  aim  of  which  was 
to  accelerate  the  process  of  the  peaceful  ac- 
cumulation of  land  in  the  peasants'  hands.    The 
State  was  given  the  right  to  compel  the  land 
owners  to  sell  their  estates  to  the  Government, 
which,  in  turn,  resold  the  lands  thus  purchased 
to  the  peasants,  at  prices  which  were  from  50 
per  cent,  to  60  per  cent,  lower  than  those  pre- 
vailing on  the  market.    Stolypin  was  the  soul 


THE  LAND  PROBLEM  IN  RUSSIA  41 

and  brains  of  the  reform.  A  man  of  iron  will 
and  boundless  devotion  to  his  country,  he  knew 
that  this  measure,  if  put  into  practice  and  made 
completely  effective,  would  deprive  the  Social- 
ists of  their  last  weapon  of  agitation  and  in 
this  way  save  Russia  from  the  horrors  of  "the 
great  and  bloodless  revolution."  Stolypin's 
reform  was  a  constructive  blow  to  the  revolu- 
tionary underground  and  this  could  not  be  for- 
given by  those  who  were  engaged  in  undermin- 
ing the  greatness  of  the  Russian  Empire.  The 
first  attempt  to  murder  Stolypin  failed.  But  a 
few  months  later  he  was  treacherously  assassi- 
nated by  an  alien  revolutionist  in  the  city  of 
Kiev.  With  the  death  of  Stolypin,  the  great 
work  of  agrarian  reconstruction  lost  its  im- 
petus. Then  came  the  World  War,  with  all  its 
sufferings  and  the  mechanical  displacement  of 
human  multitudes.  The  balance  of  govern- 
mental power  was  lost,  and  Russia  collapsed 
under  the  combined  pressure  of  the  German 
General  Staff,  International  Socialism  and  In- 
ternational Finance. 

The  beginning  of  the  agricultural  disaster 
dates  back  to  the  Socialist  regime  of  Kerensky. 
1917  was  a  repetition  of  1905,  only  on  a  larger 
scale.  It  was  an  epoch  of  wholesale  destruc- 
tion, of  baseless  hopes  placed  in  the  "construc- 
tive genius  of  the  liberated  people";  it  was  the 
honeymoon  of  the  revolution,  when  political 
and  social  mischief  of  every  description  was 


42      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

encouraged  by  the  Provisional  Government  it- 
self. Private  estates  were  subjected  to  the  most 
flagrant  looting.  ^^Grah  the  land!'*  became  the 
resounding  battle-cry  of  trouble-makers  from 
all  parts  of  the  world,  who  hastened  to  invade 
Russia.  Land  owners  were  driven  off  their 
estates,  their  property  seized,  their  families  in- 
sulted, their  art  collections  destroyed,  their 
houses  burned  down.  The  first  result  of  this 
rapacious  policy  was  an  astonishing  decrease  in 
the  agricultural  output  in  1917  as  compared 
with  preceding  years.  Instead  of  4,627,000,000 
poods  of  grain,  jdelded  in  1916,  the  total  for 
1917  fell  to  3,866,000,000  poods,  showing  a  de- 
cline of  771,000,000  poods.  Naturally,  this  im- 
mediately affected  the  whole  scale  of  food 
prices.  By  June,  1918,  the  average  market 
price  of  rye  flour  was  650  to  800  rubles  per 
pood,  as  compared  with  the  normal  price  of 
four  to  five  rubles. 

Thus  it  was  during  the  regime  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government  that  private  lands  were 
actually  seized  by  the  peasants.  By  the  time 
Lenin  and  Trotzky  had  intervened,  the  whole 
agrarian  problem  was  practically  "settled." 
The  Bolshevist  policy  relating  thereto  was  but 
a  continuation  of  the  insane  tactics  resorted  to 
by  the  *^mild  Socialists"  of  the  Kerensky  creed. 
The  Soviets  made  a  further  endeavor  to  encour- 
age the  complete  abolition  of  private  land 
ownership,  substituting  for  it  different  kinds  of 


THE  LAND  PROBLEM  IN  RUSSIA  43 

** collective  homesteads  in  agriculture/'  To  this 
end  they  passed  a  series  of  bills  and  land  de- 
crees, all  of  which  were  ultimately  summarized 
in  one  legislative  act  known  as  the  ^*  Funda- 
mental Law  of  the  Socialization  of  Land."  It 
went  into  effect  in  September,  1918.  Inasmuch 
as  this  law  is  the  basis  of  the  whole  Soviet 
policy  toward  the  land  problem,  it  is  essential 
to  analyze  it  at  some  length. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  spite  of  re- 
peated announcements  in  the  press  about  the 
alleged  revision  of  Soviet  tactics,  the  Commun- 
ist attitude  as  regards  the  agrarian  solution  has 
scarcely  undergone  perceptible  changes. 

Confirming  earlier  provisions  of  the  land  de- 
cree of  November  7,  1917,  the  **  Fundamental 
Law''  in  Article  I  proclaims: 

*^All  property  rights  in  the  land,  treasures  of 
the  earth,  waters,  forests,  and  fundamental  natu- 
ral resources  within  the  boundaries  of  the  Russian 
Federated  Soviet  Republic  are  abolished,'* 

Article  II  further  provides: 

"The  land  passes  over  to  the  use  of  the  entire 
laboring  population  without  any  compensation, 
open  or  secret,  to  the  former  owners." 

It  is  difficult  to  determine  what  **  entire  labor- 
ing population"  means;  but  other  provisions  of 
the  Land  Law  indicate  that  the  term  embraces 


44      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

"those  who  till  the  land  by  their  own  labor." 
At  least  Article  XIII  specifically  states  that: 

"Personal  labor  is  the  general  and  fundamental 
source  of  the  right  to  use  the  land  for  agricultural 
purposes." 

Naturally,  the  employment  of  hired  labor  in 
agricultural  pursuit  is  prohibited  by  the  law. 
It  is  only  in  exceptional  cases  that  such  form 
of  employment  is  permitted,  provided  wages 
are  paid  by  the  State  and  labor  is  subject 
to  the  general  rules  of  the  Workmen's  Control. 

The  general  tendency  of  the  Land  Law  is  to 
repress  private  initiative,  depriving  those  en- 
gaged in  agriculture  of  every  personal  incentive 
to  work  and  increase  the  productivity  of  their 
efforts.  In  this  connection  Article  XXI  is  in- 
dicative of  the  whole  Communist  psychology. 
It  reads: 

**Land  is  given  to  those  who  wish  to  work  it 
themselves  for  the  benefit  of  the  community  and 
not  for  personal  advantage." 

Disregarding  the  basic  laws  of  social  science, 
which  demonstrate  the  fact  that  economic  prog- 
ress is  largely  founded  upon  the  motive  of  per- 
sonal gain,  the  Communists  have  set  forth  a 
principle  designed  to  outwit  nature  herself. 
Contrary  to  reason  and  deeply  rooted  human 
instincts,  they  believe  that  an  economic  system 


THE  LAND  PROBLEM  IN  RUSSIA  45 

can  be  devised  in  accordance  with  bureaucratic 
regulations,  eliminating  the  personal  element 
from  the  whole  range  of  human  relationship. 
In  order  to  force  this  abstract  theory  upon  the 
people,  the  Land  Law  further  provides  that: 

"Surplus  profits,  obtained  on  account  of  the 
natural  fertility  of  the  land,  or  on  account  of  its 
location  near  markets,  are  to  be  turned  over  for 
the  benefit  of  social  needs  to  the  organs  of  the 
Soviet  power."     (Article  XVII.) 

In  addition,  the  trade  in  agricultural  machin- 
ery and  in  grain,  both  internal  and  foreign,  is 
proclaimed  the  monopoly  of  the  Communist 
State  (Articles  XVIII  and  XIX).  This,  of 
course,  takes  away  the  last  stimulus  for  thrift 
and  efforts  to  increase  the  productivity  of  labor. 
It  is  precisely  this  provision  that  led  the  peas- 
ants to  widespread  opposition  to  the  Soviet 
regime.  The  farmers  flatly  refuse  to  grow  more 
wheat  than  actually  needed  for  their  personal 
use. 

Owing  to  the  chaotic  condition  of  Soviet 
statistics,  it  is  impossible  to  give  the  exact  fig- 
ures of  the  decrease  in  the  acreage  under  cul- 
tivation. But  it  can  be  asserted  that  the  situa- 
tion during  the  whole  period  of  Communist 
management,  in  this  respect,  has  been  growing 
from  bad  to  worse.  The  lands  seized  from 
private  land  owners  by  the  peasants  have  re- 
mained untilled.    Aside  from  that,  a  vast  area 


46      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

of  the  peasants'  own  lands  have  been  aban- 
doned, resulting  in  a  systematic  and  alarming 
decline  in  crops. 

As  far  back  as  in  1918,  in  a  pamphlet  en- 
titled *' Struggle  Against  Hunger,"  Trotzky 
frankly  admitted  the  fact  that  Russia  was 
starving.  He  cited  many  wire  dispatches  re- 
ceived by  the  Soviet  Government,  from  differ- 
ent parts  of  the  country,  in  which  the  food  con- 
ditions in  rural  districts  were  described  in  the 
darkest  terms.  Trotzky,  however,  did  not  have 
the  courage  to  explain  the  real  reason  for  this 
condition.  He  sought  to  shift  the  responsibility 
therefore  upon  the  well-to-do  peasants,  who,  he 
declared,  were  the  *' chief  enemies"  of  the  labor- 
ing masses.  It  has  always  been  the  policy  of 
the  Soviets,  while  admitting  Russia's  economic 
degradation,  to  attribute  the  blame  to  anyone 
but  themselves.  The  *' Allied  Blockade," 
the  ** greedy  foreign  capitalists,"  the  **Czarist 
agents,"  the  ^* village  sharks  and  innkeepers" 
— everything  was  used  in  the  way  of  argument 
to  justify  the  horrible  plight  of  the  Russian 
people  under  the  Soviet  regime. 

What  actually  happened  was  that  the  Soviets 
found  themselves  at  war  with  the  entire  rural 
population.  Communist  leaders  have  often  re- 
ferred to  the  so-called  ** selfishness"  of  the 
peasants,  accusing  them  of  concealing  from  the 
State  their  surplus  products.  It  is  true  that  in 
many  districts  the  farmers  would  rather  destroy 


THE  LAND  PROBLEM  IN  RUSSIA  47 

their  crops  than  surrender  them  to  the  Socialist 
Commissars.  The  cities  controlled  by  the  Bol- 
sheviki  declared  war  against  the  villages.  The 
villages,  in  turn,  adopted  a  policy  of  passive  re- 
sistance to  the  Soviet  demands.  The  whole 
situation  became  so  acute  that  extraordinary 
measures  were  needed  to  pump  the  grain  out  of 
the  farmers.  The  notorious  *'food  crusades" 
were  offered  as  a  solution  of  the  intolerable 
food  crisis  in  the  cities.  These  crusades  were 
undertaken  both  by  the  Central  and  Local 
Soviet  authorities,  assisted  by  Red  Army  de- 
tachments. Very  often  regular  battles  would 
take  place  between  the  food  crusaders  and  the 
farmers,  followed  by  wholesale  executions  of 
the  ** defeated  counter-revolutionists."  Some- 
times, in  addition,  punitive  expeditions  were 
dispatched  by  the  Commissars  in  order  to  over- 
come the  peasants*  opposition.  Entire  villages 
were  burned  down,  being  destroyed  by  artillery 
fire.  Fertile  regions  were  devastated  by  the 
Red  Army,  and  yet  up  to  the  present  the  Soviets 
have  failed  to  ''conquer"  rural  Russia. 

The  Bolshevist  press  contains  but  few  ac- 
counts of  the  methods  which  were  and  still  are 
being  used  by  the  Communists  in  their  strug- 
gle against  the  Russian  peasants.  So,  in  No. 
450  of  the  ''Izvestia"  of  the  Central  Executive 
Committee  for  1918  we  read: 

"In   Okhansk  tie  punitive   detachments   are 
mercilessly  punishing  the  criminals  and  have  exe- 


48      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

cuted   thirty  peasants   who  participated  in   the 
counter-revolutionary  outbreak. ' ' 

In  issue  No.  25  of  the  same  organ  for  the 
year  1919,  there  is  this  statement : 

"The  Velij  district  was  in  the  grasp  of  a 
peasants*  White  Guardist  rebellion.  The  revolt 
was  energetically  quelled." 

An  article  in  No.  27  of  the  ^'Izvestia'*  of 
the  Central  Executive  Committee  for  1918, 
written  by  a  Communist,  Kerjentzev,  describes 
a  revolutionary  outbreak  among  the  peasants 
in  the  Kostroma  district.  The  author  briefly 
remarks : 

"The  data  referring  to  the  peasants'  revolt  pre- 
sents a  dreadful  picture  as  regards  the  methods  of 
suppressing  it." 

But  then  the  Kostroma  methods  do  not  differ 
in  the  least  from  those  used  in  other  provincial 
districts. 

In  No.  71  of  the  ^'Northern  Commune*^  for 
1918  we  find: 

"Military  food  detachments  invaded  the  pro- 
vincial districts  with  banners  displaying  the 
motto : 

"'We  will  not  let  the  workmen  starve  from 
hunger.  Merciless  war  against  those  who  conceal 
the  grain.'  " 


THE  LAND  PROBLEM  IN  RUSSIA  49 

According  to  the  same  paper,  during  the 
first  three  months  of  jl919,  in  one  provincial  dis- 
trict alone,  255  food  crusades  were  instituted 
by  the  Soviets.  During  the  first  year  of  Soviet 
rule  77,000,000  rubles  were  levied  as  fines  upon 
the  peasants  in  consequence  of  their  opposition 
to  the  Communist  Land  Law. 

Some  of  the  Bolshevist  officials  themselves 
finally  became  convinced  that  armed  oppression 
alone  is  incapable  of  winning  the  peasants  over 
to  the  Communist  regime.  For  instance,  the 
oiBficial  ^' Economicheskaya  Jisn/'  commenting 
on  a  decision  adopted  by  the  Congress  of  Trade 
Unions,  held  at  Moscow  in  March,  1919,  points 
out: 

"Experience  has  proven  that  it  is  not  wise  to 
dispatch  armed  requisitionary  detachments  to  the 
rural  districts  for  the  results  are  harmful.  The 
peasants  must  be  approached,  not  with  rifles,  but 
with  argument  and  persuasion.  Food  detach- 
ments alone  will  not  help.  The  policy  must  un- 
dergo a  radical  change.  Owing  to  the  present, 
policy  in  regions  where  the  population  hitherto 
never  knew  what  hunger  was,  now  we  witness  the 
disappearance  of  food  supplies." 

Lenin,  who,  by  his  American  admirers,  is 
considered  the  great  prophet  of  the  revolution, 
addressing  on  March  23,  1919,  the  Communist 
Congress  at  Moscow,  emphatically  declared: 

"It  is  necessary  to  win  ihe  confidence  of  the 
peasants.     Up  to  the  present  we  have  been  the 


50      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

pupils  of  the  peasants  and  not  their  teachers. 
There  can  be  nothing  more  silly  than  the  very- 
idea  of  violence  in  the  realm  of  economic  relations 
pertaining  to  the  medium  homestead.  Here  the 
problem  does  not  consist  in  the  expropriation  of 
the  middle-peasantry,  but  in  the  necessity  of  tak- 
ing into  account  the  peculiar  conditions  of  their 
life,  in  the  necessity  to  learn  from  the  peasants 
the  methods  of  gradually  achieving  a  better  order 
of  things  and  not  in  'bossing'  them.  In  this  re- 
spect, comrades,  indeed  we  have  sinned  quite  a 
good  deal."  {'^Izvestia"  of  the  Central  Execu- 
tive Committee,  No.  69,  1919.) 

Still  the  conciliatory  tone  of  Lenin's  admis- 
sion in  reality  meant  nothing.  It  must  be  re- 
membered that  when  Lenin  speaks,  he  usually 
bears  western  countries  in  mind.  His  declama- 
tions are  calculated  to  create  a  favorable  im- 
pression upon  loose-minded  liberals  on  both 
sides  of  the  water.  When,  amidst  his  floods  of 
words,  a  drop  of  reason  is  suddenly  discovered, 
radicals  urhi  et  orhi  begin  to  cheer  his  wisdom, 
commenting  on  every  dot  and  comma,  and 
twisting  his  formulas  in  ten  thousand  different 
ways.  A  great  difference  there  is,  however,  be- 
tween words  and  deeds.  The  actual  situation 
in  the  villages  and  rural  districts  in  general  is 
vividly  described  in  the  '^Izvestia"  of  May  1, 
1919.  The  author  of  the  article,  a  peasant  him- 
self, sends  out  an  S.  O.  S.  in  the  vain  hope  that 
his  voice  will  be  heard  in  the  wilderness  of 
the  Communist  State : 


THE  LAND  PROBLEM  IN  RUSSIA  51 

**Help!  We  are  perishing!" — thus  reads  the 
article — "At  the  time  when  we  are  starving,  do 
you  know  what  is  going  on  in  the  villages?  Take, 
for  instance,  our  village,  Olkhi.  Speculation  is 
rife  there,  especially  with  salt,  which  sells  at  40 
rubles  a  pound.  What  does  the  militia  do? 
What  do  the  Soviets  do?  When  it  is  reported 
to  them,  they  wave  their  hands  and  say,  'This  is 
a  normal  phenomenon.'  Not  only  this,  but  the 
militiamen,  beginning  with  the  chief  and  includ- 
ing some  Communists,  are  all  engaged  in  brewing 
their  own  alcohol,  which  sells  for  70  rubles  a 
bottle.  Nobody  who  is  in  close  touch  with  the 
militia  is  afraid  to  engage  in  this  work.  Hunger 
is  ahead  of  us,  but  neither  the  citizens  nor  the 
'authorities'  recognize  it.  The  people's  judge 
also  drinks,  and  if  one  wishes  to  win  a  case  one 
only  needs  to  treat  him  to  a  drink.  We  live  in 
terrible  filth.  There  is  no  soap.  People  and 
horses  all  suffer  from  skin  diseases.  Epidemics 
are  inevitable  in  the  summer.  If  Moscow  will 
pay  no  attention  to  us,  then  we  shall  perish."* 

In  spite  of  the  complete  fiasco  of  Soviet 
tactics  to  bring  about,  if  not  peace,  then  at 
least  a  truce,  with  the  Russian  peasantry,  in 
spite  of  Lenin's  admissions  and  Trotzky's  con- 
fessions, the  agrarian  policy  of  the  Bolsheviki 
was  pursued  with  remarkable  stubbornness.  It 
culminated  in  the  notorious  decree  of  January 
27,  1921,  which  is  the  prime  cause  of  the  ap- 
palling famine  which  Russia  is  living  through 

*  Quoted  from  *  *  Memorandum  on  Certain  Aspects  of  the  Bolshe- 
vist Movement  in  Buasia. "  Washington  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, 1919,  p.  14. 


52      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

to-day.     The  main  features  of  this  decree  can 
be  summed  up  as  follows: 

(a)  Sowing  the  fields  is  declared  everybody's 
duty  to  the  State.  The  various  Soviet  insti- 
tutions are  given  the  authority  to  devise 
plans  for  the  sowing  campaigns.  They  also 
decide  which  particular  area  must  be  culti- 
vated and  what  kind  of  grain  must  be  sown. 
Individual  farmers  must  comply  with  this 
program  as  a  matter  of  duty  to  the  State. 

(b)  The  technical  methods  of  tilling  the  land  are 
also  regulated  by  the  Soviets,  these  regula- 
tions being  compulsory.  Mechanical  processes 
are  to  be  applied  to  the  tilling  of  land  and  to 
sowing  the  fields. 

(c)  The  entire  crop  becomes  the  property  of  the 
State,  while  the  farmer  gets  only  such  quan- 
tities of  grain  as  are  rationed  to  him  by  the 
respective  Soviet  organs. 

It  is  doubtful  if  a  law  more  inefficient  than 
this,  and  less  adapted  to  the  realities  of  life, 
could  be  found  in  the  history  of  legislation. 

On  its  surface  it  shows  marks  of  hopeless 
bureaucratic  obstinacy  and  failure  to  grasp  the 
substance  of  economic  relations.  No  special  men- 
tal acumen  is  required  to  realize  that  no  govern- 
ment on  earth  has  been  or  will  be  powerful 
enough  to  regulate  the  economic  activities  of 
every  individual  citizen,  teaching  him  how  best 
to  direct  his  creative  energies,  and  how  to  apply 
his  technical  ability  in  solving  diverse  economic 
tasks.    Even  should  we,  for  the  sake  of  argu- 


THE  LAND  PROBLEM  IN  RUSSIA  53 

ment,  admit  that  there  can  be  a  government 
strong  enough  to  control  the  countless  individual 
efforts  which  go  to  make  up  the  economic  life 
of  a  nation,  nevertheless,  bureaucratic  manage- 
ment of  this  kind  would  be  bound  to  result  in 
failure  because  of  the  inequality  of  individual 
faculties.  John  cannot  be  made  to  work  equally 
well,  equally  efficiently  and  equally  fast  as 
Henry.  Besides  John  and  Henry  are  la- 
boring in  different  surroundings  and  under 
unequal  difficulties.  Therefore,  the  standardi- 
zation of  their  work  cannot  be  achieved  no  mat- 
ter how  efficient  a  government  is,  or  how  de- 
spotic it  chooses  to  be. 

Almost  immediately  after  the  issuance  of  the 
decree  of  January  27,  1921,  Soviet  officials  be- 
gan to  elaborate  their  system  of  compulsory 
agriculture.  On  February  8,  1921,  mobiliza- 
tion was  ordered  of  all  specialists  in  agriculture, 
including  the  former  owners  of  the  estates, 
their  superintendents,  and  persons  who  had  re- 
ceived special  training  in  agricultural  colleges. 
Simultaneously,  further  recommendations  were 
made  for  abandoning  individual  forms  of  land 
ownership,  and  inducing  the  peasants  to  adopt 
Communal  or  Socialistic  methods  of  tilling  the 
land.  The  proposed  system  provided  for  the 
participation  of  entire  peasants'  Communes  in 
plowing  the  soil,  while  the  crops  were  to  be 
stored  in  Communal  granaries.  Besides  these 
stipulations,  the  decree  regulates  the  method  of 


54       THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

distribution  of  grain  among  the  population. 
All  these  combined  measures  resulted  in  a  fur- 
ther decrease  of  the  area  under  cultivation, 
thus  preparing  the  ground  for  the  frightful 
famine  of  1922. 

The  land  policy  of  the  Bolsheviki  is  probably 
the  greatest  blunder  in  the  long  series  of  blun- 
ders committed  by  them  since  the  time  they 
rose  to  power.  Even  from  this  brief  sketch  of 
Soviet  measures  pertaining  to  rural  Eussia,  it 
can  be  seen  that  the  keynote  to  Communist 
legislation  is  the  socialization  of  land.  This 
cardinal  principal  was  adopted  by  the  Soviets 
in  full  conformity  with  the  theories  of  Karl 
Marx.  Guided  by  the  avowed  intention  of  work- 
ing out  a  model  Marxian  State,  the  Bolsheviki 
made  an  attempt  to  force  upon  100,000,000 
Russian  peasants  an  economic  system  entirely 
alien  to  their  psychology  and  to  the  whole 
history  of  Russian  agrarian  relations.  It  was 
easy  in  times  past  to  move  the  peasants  to  loot 
and  grab  the  estates  belonging  to  the  nobility. 
Appeals  to  greed  and  base  instincts  usually 
find  prompt  response  when  made  to  the  disor- 
derly and  illiterate  mob.  Nor  was  it  difficult  to 
convince  the  peasants  that  if  they  should  seize 
other  peoples'  lands,  they  would  increase  their 
own  land  holdings,  thereby  getting  something 
for  nothing.  But  when  it  came  to  enforce  the 
program  of  socialization,  which  necessarily 
meant  the  abrogation  of  all  individual  titles  to 


THE  LAND  PROBLEM  IN  RUSSIA  55 

the  land,  the  peasants  emphatically  declined  to 
give  up  any  of  their  own  holdings,  denying  the 
authority  of  the  Communist  State  to  extend  its 
control  over  the  free  use  of  their  lands,  a  right 
which  they  had  enjoyed  in  the  past. 

Despite  the  numerous  Bolshevist  decrees  ^* na- 
tionalizing" the  land  ''for  the  henefit  of  the 
entire  laboring  population/'  the  peasants,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  have  never  given  up  their  prop- 
erty rights  in  the  land,  responding  to  Soviet 
legislation  by  a  series  of  revolts  against  the 
Communist  Commissars.    In  vain  were  the  at- 
tempts to  suppress  by  '' direct  action"  the  coun- 
ter-revolutionary movement  spreading  all  over 
the  rural  districts.     Those  among  the  Bolshe- 
viks who  were  familiar  with  the  psychology  of 
the  people,  understood  that  it  was  impossible  to 
carry  on  a  successful  warfare   against  multi- 
tudes of  rebellious  peasants.    Of  course,  Apf  el- 
baum   (Zinoviev),  the  Red  dictator  of  Petro- 
grad,  did  threaten  to  murder  a  large  portion  of 
the  j)opulation  of  Russia  for  the  sake  of  putting 
into  effect  the  Marxian  program.     It  was  he 
who,  in  1918,  made  this  infamous  statement: 
"To  overcome  our  enemies  we  must  have  our 
own  Socialist  militarism.     "We  must  win  over  to 
our  side  90,000,000  out  of  100,000,000  of  the  popu- 
lation of  Russia  under  the  Soviets.     As  for  the 
rest,  we  have  nothing  to  say  to  them;  they  must 
he  annihilated."* 

*  Speech  made  by  Apfelbaum,  reported  in  the   "Northern  Com- 
mune," September   19,  1918,  No.   109. 


56      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

The  more  intelligent  Bolsheviks,  however, 
insisted  upon  less  brutal  and  more  subtle  mea- 
sures to  be  employed  in  the  Soviet  campaign 
against  the  Russian  peasants.  They  accepted 
the  Machiavellian  principle:  ^^ Divide  et  im- 
pera'\'  in  other  words,  a  method  of  sowing  arti- 
ficial dissension  among  the  peasants  them- 
selves. The  Soviets  have  tried  to  incite  the 
poorer  farmers  against  the  well-to-do  peasants. 
For  this  purpose,  they  formed,  in  rural  dis- 
tricts, so-called  ^'Beggars  Committees,"  which 
were  designed  to  become  the  nuclei  of  Commun- 
ist organizations  throughout  the  agricultural 
regions.  These  Committees  were  put  in  charge 
of  the  distribution  of  food  supplies  among  the 
rural  population,  and  they  were  also  given  au- 
thority to  supervise  the  collection  of  *' surplus" 
food  in  the  villages.  This  measure,  indeed, 
did  help  to  foster  civil  strife,  causing  further 
confusion  among  the  farmers;  but  it  failed  to 
win  the  support  of  the  peasantry  as  a  whole 
to  the  Soviet  regime,  as  neither  the  poorer  nor 
the  wealthier  peasants  were  persuaded  to  sur- 
render their  lands  to  the  Communist  State. 

The  present  situation  with  regard  to  the  land 
problem  may  be  summed  up  as  follows: 

Nominally,  all  the  land  has  been  nationalized. 
In  reality,  however,  the  peasants  persistently 
cling"  to  their  property  rights  and  their  legal 
titles.  On  the  other  hand,  notwithstanding  offi- 
cial encouragement  through  legislation  of  Com- 


THE  LAND  PROBLEM  IN  RUSSIA  57 

munal  or  Socialistic  methods  of  cultivation,  the 
land  is  being  tilled  according  to  old  customs  of 
individual  enterprise.  The  decree  giving  the 
Soviets  authority  to  confiscate  the  "surplus 
crops"  resulted  in  an  amazing  degradation  of 
agriculture  as  such.  It  can  be  asserted  that  in 
1921  the  total  area  under  cultivation  in  Euro- 
pean and  Asiatic  Russia,  including  '*Ukrainia" 
and  Turkestan,  did  not  exceed  25,000,000  dessia- 
tines,*  while  in  Russia  proper  the  gradual  re- 
duction of  crop  areas  roughly  assiuned  the  fol- 
lowing proportions: 

1917 222,300,000   Acres 

1918 182,780,000 

1919 140,790,000 

1920 93,860,000 

1921 41,990,000       **t 

In  famine-stricken  regions  the  area  actually 
sown  in  1921  was  only  9,789,897  acres  as  com- 
pared with  13,267,270  acres  in  1920.t 

*  Compare  these  data  with  exhaustive  statistical  research  of  Pro- 
fessor Pestrjetzky  in  his  monography  on  the  present  land  conditions 
in  Russia,  entitled,  "Around  the  Land,"  pp.  55  to  65,  Berlin,  1922. 
Published  in  Eussian. 

f  According  to  Soviet  statistics,  the  total  area  under  cultivation 
in  1920  was  25  per  cent-  less  than  in  1916.  This  may  be  true  if  the 
whole  territory  embracing  the  former  Eussian  Empire  is  taken  into 
consideration.  However,  confining  the  analysis  to  Russia  proper, 
excluding  the  Little  Eussian  Governments,  or  the  so-called  Ukrainia, 
we  notice  a  much  greater  reduction,  which  is  confirmed  by  data  fur- 
nished by  the  Central  Soviet  Statistical  Board,  showing  the  total 
output  in  cereals  for  1921  amounted  to  only  32,200,000  tons,  which  is 
less  than  50  per  cent,  of  the  average  output  for  1910-1914.  Compare 
these  data  with  pamphlet,  entitled  "How  Bolshevism  Wrecked  Bits- 
sia,"  a  reprint  from  the  "Morning  Post,"  London,  1922. 

:t:See  "Soviet  Bussia,"  No.  1,  January,  1922,  p.  7.  Published 
in  New  York  City. 


58      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Simultaneously,  the  food  ration  throughout 
the  villages  decreased  in  an  alarming  degree. 
In  the  Government  of  Tula,  which  is  considered 
a  model  district  from  the  point  of  view  of  yield- 
ing tax  returns,  according  to  Soviet  statistics, 
in  November,  1920,  91  per  cent,  of  the  popu- 
lation was  living  on  food  substitutes,  con- 
sisting mainly  of  wood  saw-filings  and  husks 
mixed  with  potatoes.  The  daily  ration  in  that 
district  in  November,  1920,  was  equal  to  2,300 
calories;  while  in  February,  1921,  it  was  only 
1,502  calories.  In  the  Government  of  Samara, 
which  in  former  times  was  one  of  the  wealthiest 
agricultural  regions,  the  daily  ration  in  calories 
for  November,  1920,  was  2,540,  while  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1921,  it  had  fallen  to  1,700  calories.  It 
will  be  noted  that  the  normal  ration  for  per- 
sons engaged  in  manual  labor  is  approxi- 
mately 6,000  calories  per  day. 

Further  light  is  thrown  upon  the  extent  of 
agricultural  disintegration  by  figures  showing 
the  extermination  of  horses  in  Soviet  Russia: 

1918 24,000,000   Horses 

1919 9,500,000 

1920 Figures  not  available 

1921 3,300,000  Horses 

In  1922  the  situation  became  so  critical  that 
in  many  rural  districts  plows  were  drawn  by 
the  peasants  themselves  as  all  horses  had  been 


THE  LAND  PROBLEM  IN  RUSSIA  59 

killed  and  tlieir  flesh  used  for  food.    The  out- 
look for  1923  is  hopeless. 

The  same  picture  is  true  about  cattle.  Sheep- 
breeding,  which  was  so  extensive  in  Imperial 
Russia,  has  almost  ceased  under  Communist 
rule,  while  the  number  of  pigs  in  1920  was  80 
per  cent,  less  than  in  1914. 

Between  1900  and  1913  the  gross  output  of 
agricultural  products  in  Russia  increased  33 
per  cent.  The  agrarian  revolution  left  Russia 
almost  without  agricultural  implements,  and  in 
1920  the  peasants  obtained  a  number  of  plows 
seven  times  less  than  in  1913.  The  number 
of  harrows  acquired  by  them  for  the  same 
period  was  ten  times  less.  In  1921  and  1922 
the  output  of  agricultural  machinery  in  Soviet 
Russia  was  almost  nil.  Therefore,  in  1923  it 
will  be  practically  impossible  to  till  the  land 
even  should  grain  in  sufficient  quantities  be  ob- 
tainable. While  the  exact  figures  regarding  the 
output  of  agricultural  machinery  for  1921  and 
1922  are  lacking,  the  comparative  table  on  page 
60  may  give  a  general  idea  of  the  staggering 
depreciation  in  the  manufacture  of  such  ma- 
chinery. 

The  number  of  agricultural  machines  im- 
ported from  abroad  in  1920  was  insignificant 
and  the  total  was  below  16,000  machines  of 
every  kind. 


6o      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

1913  1914  1920 


] 

[mported  from 

Manufactured  Manufactured 

Abroad 

in  Russia 

in  Russia 

Plows 

200,000 

550,000 

500 

Harrows   

36,000 

80,000 

862 

Reaping   m^chineg 

100,000 

38,000 

167 

Fanning   Machines 

15,000 

38,000 

167 

Planting  machines 

10,000 

70,000 

1,068 

Threshing  ma 

chines     operated 

by  'horses 

13,000 

27,000 

558* 

In  this  connection  the  official  Bolshevist 
^' Economicheskaya  Jisn'^  (No.  92,  April  27, 
1922)  furnishes  important  data.  An  article 
published  in  this  issue,  entitled  *'The  Restora- 
tion of  the  Manufacture  of  Agricultural  Ma- 
chinery," reads  in  part  as  follows: 

''The  convention  dealing  with  the  problem  of 
the  manufacture  of  agricultural  machinery  which 
adjourned  a  few  days  ago,  disclosed  the  hope- 
less condition  of  that  branch  of  industry.  Fig- 
ures made  public  during  the  convention  by  the 
Department  of  Agricultural  Machinery  demon- 
strate that  in  the  early  part  of  1922  the  number 
of  workers  engaged  in  this  industry  was  only  26 
per  cent,  of  the  pre-war  number.     The  output 

*  The  above  figures  were  taken  from  the  following  sources: 

"Agriculture,"  issues  Nos.  1  and  2,  September  and  October,  1921. 
Monthly  magazine  issued  in  Prague,  published  in  Russian. 

A.  Rakctov:  "Synopsis  of  the  Economic  and  Financial  Situation 
in  Present  Russia  According  to  Oflicial  Data,"  Reval,  1921.  Pub- 
lished in  Russian. 

Professor  A.  Teme:  "In  the  Bealm  of  Lenin."  Published  in 
Bussian,  Berlin,  1922. 


THE  LAND  PROBLEM  IN  RUSSIA  6i 

varies  from  0.1  per  cent,  to  3  per  cent,  (planting 
machines,  harrows,  threshing  machines,  fanning 
machines)  to  13.3  per  cent,  (plows)  of  the  pre- 
war production.  These  figures  signify  a  catas- 
trophe in  the  manufacturing  of  Russian  agricul- 
tural machinery  and  in  their  supply  to  the  popu- 
lation. Tliis  is  particularly  true  if  we  take  into- 
consideration  that  in  pre-war  times  Russia  manu- 
factured not  more  than  50  per  cent,  of  her  entire 
need  in  these  implements." 

Such  in  brief  is  the  deplorable  result  of  Bol- 
shevist management  in  the  field  of  agricultural 
relationship. 

It  is  only  natural  that  the  peasants  as  a  class 
were  thrown  into  opposition  to  the  Socialist 
regime.  The  wily  promises  made  by  Lenin  to 
the  farmers  will  certainly  fail  to  catch  them 
in  the  Communist  trap.  Russian  peasants  are 
no  fools.  They  remember  well  Lenin's  speech 
delivered  to  the  Tenth  Communist  Congress, 
when  he  said,  *'The  interests  of  the  workers  and 
the  peasants  differ.  Only  an  agreement  with 
the  peasants  can  save  the  Socialist  revolution 
in  Russia  until  the  time  when  a  proletarian 
revolution  will  take  place  in  every  country.'' 
But  the  farmers  also  remember  that  it  was 
upon  Lenin's  own  motion  that  the  same  Con- 
gress adopted  a  new  form  of  taxation,  estab- 
lishing a  tax  in  hind,  the  so-called  ^'Prodnalog," 
a  tax  levied  in  the  form  of  taking  from  the 
farmer  his  agricultural  products  and  turning 
them  over  to  the  State.    Although  Lenin  boasted 


62      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

that  this  measure  would  tend  to  conciliate  the 
peasants  to  the  Soviets,  in  reality,  however,  it 
drove  another  wedge  between  rural  and  urban 
Russia.  That  is  the  reason  why  the  peasants 
regard  the  Communists  as  a  class  of  privileged 
parasites,  and  their  urban  strongholds  as  an 
arena  for  insane  social  experiments. 

Nor  is  the  latest  Bolshevik  agrarian  inven- 
tion going  to  solve  the  land  problem.  On  May 
12,  1922 — so  it  was  reported  in  the  general 
press — ^the  All-Eussian  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee of  Soviets  proposed  a  plan  providing 
life  tenure  for  the  peasants  engaged  in  agricul- 
tural pursuit.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  the 
principle  of  State  ownership  of  all  land  was 
reiterated  and  no  further  changes  were  sug- 
gested. 

In  this  way  the  "new"  land  policy  is  but 
another  version  of  old  principles.  This  plan  as 
well  as  the  "Fundamental  Decree  of  the  Soviet 
Government,''  dated  May  22,  1922,  which  pur- 
ports to  grant  limited  concessions  to  property 
rights,  were  obviously  designed  to  please  Mr. 
Hughes  and  thus  to  drag  the  United  States  into 
a  shameful  deal  with  the  Soviets.  One  of  the 
Communist  Commissars  by  the  name  of  Kursky, 
commenting  on  the  latter  decree,  was  verv  frank 
in  stating  that: 

"Soviet  officials  •  *  *  considered  this  decree 
largely  meets  the  condition  of  Secretary  of  State 
Hughes  for  American  trade  in  Russia." 


THE  LAND  PROBLEM  IN  RUSSIA  63 

Nothing  can  be  expected  from  such  **  sur- 
renders" to  capitalism.  The  thing  which  the 
peasants  want  is  to  own  their  land,  to  keep  it 
on  the  basis  of  private  property,  including  the 
right  of  selling,  mortgaging  it,  and  leaving  it 
to  their  families.  In  other  words,  so  long  as 
private  property  in  land  is  not  restored  in 
full,  the  present  land  chaos  will  prevail  and 
minor  changes  and  modifications  of  the  ^*  Funda- 
mental law  of  socialization  of  the  land"  will 
bring  no  relief  whatsoever  to  the  famine- 
stricken  population,  and  will  prove  unable  to 
relieve  the  general  condition  of  economic  de- 
spair ruling  throughout  Red  Russia. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES 

"ly/TARXIAN  principles  of  socialization  ap- 
•^  •*-  plied  to  Russia  have  ruined  her  agricul- 
tural system  and  proved  equally  disastrous  to 
her  industries. 

Marx  labored  long  and  hard  to  show  that 
the  suffering  of  the  working  class  is  the  direct 
consequence  of  social  conditions  which  enable 
the  capitalist  to  monopolize  all  means  of  pro- 
duction and  distribution,  leaving  to  the  toilers 
the  sad  fate  of  selling  in  the  open  market  their 
only  possession,  that  is,  their  labor.  Accord- 
ing to  his  theory,  the  labor  problem  cannot  be 
solved  without  a  radical  change  in  the  entire 
structure  of  modern  society,  as  the  result  of 
which  all  industrial  and  financial  assets  would 
fall  under  the  control  and  become  the  property 
of  the  working  class.  Marx  anticipated  that 
such  a  social  transformation  must  necessarily 
be  achieved  by  force,  inevitably  upsetting  the 
whole  mechanism  of  economic  relationship. 

The  Bolsheviki,  having  learned  by  heart  the 
Marxian  A-B-C,  saw  no  other  means  of  solving 
the  industrial  problem  than  that  decreed  by 
their  stepfather. 

As  far  as  Russia  was  concerned,  the  national- 
ization of  her  industries  could  not  be  justified 

64 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES       65 

even  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Socialistic 
theory  itself.  Generally  speaking,  Capitalism 
in  the  western  sense  of  the  term  was  non- 
existent there.  It  was  only  during  the  last 
twenty  years  that  modern  industrial  methods 
gradually  began  to  be  applied  to  Russian  soil. 
In  that  country  industry  was  a  weakling,  nour- 
ished by  the  State.  A  high  custom-wall  was 
erected  which  gave  the  manufacturers  sufficient 
time  to  get  upon  their  own  feet.  The  protec- 
tive policies  of  the  Imperial  Government,  it  is 
true,  proved  quite  beneficial.  The  four  years 
preceding  the  World  War  marked  a  deci- 
sive advance  in  Russia's  industrial  prosperity. 
Thus,  during  the  period  between  1910  and  1913, 
the  number  of  new  industrial  and  commercial 
corporations,  and  their  paid-up  capital,  in- 
creased in  the  following  proportion. 


Year 

Number  of  New 
Corporations 

Paid  Up  Capital 

IN  Millions  of 
Rubles 

1910 

104 

119.3 

1911 

166 

185.3 

1912 

202 

233.5 

1913 

240 

403.1* 

Owing  also  to  the  tireless  efforts  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, during  the  ten  years  preceding  the 
war,  railroad  lines  and  transportation  facilities 
in  general  were  materially  enlarged.     This,  in 

*See  Russia— Eer  Economic  Past  and  Futwe,  by  Dr.  Joseph  M. 
Goldstein,  New   York,   1919,  p.   80. 


66      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

turn,  had  a  stimulating  influence  upon  tlie 
tempo  of  economic  development  as  a  whole. 
With  all  that,  the  industrial  technique  continued 
to  be  backward,  especially  if  compared  with 
such  countries  as  the  United  States,  England 
and  Germany.  Under  these  conditions,  it  was 
idle  to  speak  of  the  ^^concentration"  of  capital, 
of  ''industrial  magnates"  controlling  Russian 
production,  of  the  "monopoly  of  capital,"  and 
similar  attributes  of  capitalistic  progress.  In 
Marx's  own  opinion,  however,  these  phenomena 
must  precede  the  social  decomposition  of  mod- 
ern civilization,  ultimately  substituting  for  it 
a  Socialistic  order.  Moreover,  orthodox  So- 
cialists, including  Marx  himself,  have  always 
contended  that  a  "successful"  social  revolution 
can  be  accomplished  by  no  other  class  than  the 
industrial  proletariat.  In  this  connection  Marx 
stated  as  follows: 

"Along  with  the  constantly  diminishing  num- 
ber of  the  magnates  of  capital,  who  usurp  and 
monopolize  all  advantages  of  this  process  of  trans- 
formation, grows  the  mass  of  misery,  oppression, 
slavery,  degradation,  exploitation;  but  with  this 
too  grows  the  revolt  of  the  working-class,  a  class 
always  increasing  in  numbers,  and  disciplined, 
united,  organized  by  the  very  mechanism  of  the 
process  of  capitalist  production  itself.  The  mo- 
nopoly of  capital  becomes  a  fetter  upon  the  mode 
of  production,  which  has  sprung  up  and  flourished 
along  with,  and  under  it.  Centralization  of  the 
means  of  production  and  socialization  of  labor 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES       67 

at  last  reach  a  point  where  they  become  incom- 
patible with  their  capitalist  integument.  This 
integument  is  burst  asunder.  The  knell  of  capi- 
talist private  property  sounds.  The  expropriators 
are  expropriated."* 

It  was  also  Marx  who  asserted  that: 

*'0f  all  classes  that  stand  face  to  face  with  the 
bourgeoisie  to-day,  the  proletariat  alone  is  a  revo- 
lutionary class. ' ' 

When  Lenin  and  Trotsky  started  to  advocate 
a  social  revolution  in  Russia,  there  was  no  pro- 
letarian class  in  the  Marxian  sense.  Russia 
was  and  still  remains  a  country  of  small  farm- 
ers, tenaciously  clinging  to  their  property 
rights,  their  farms  and  their  individual  house- 
holds. Out  of  the  pre-war  population  of  the 
Russian  Empire — ^that  is  to  say  out  of  160,- 
000,000— there  were  less  than  5,000,000  indus- 
trial workers.  But  out  of  this  number  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  still  kept  farms  which  were 
cultivated  by  their  relatives.  On  the  other 
hand,  many  workers  were  employed  in  indus- 
trial concerns  only  part  of  the  year,  while  pur- 
suing their  habitual  agricultural  occupation 
during  the  other  part.  Therefore,  even  from 
the  orthodox  Marxian  point  of  view,  there  was 
no  social  group  or  class  in  Russia  capable  of 
undertaking  and  bringing  to   a  ** successful" 

*  Capital  by  Karl  Marx,  Vol.  I.,  pp.  836  and  837.  Charles  H. 
Kerr  &  Company,  Chicago,  1919. 


68      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

end  the  destruction  of  the  capitalistic  system, 
erecting  on  its  ruins  a  model  Communist  State. 

Disregarding  these  fundamental  facts,  the 
Bolsheviki,  as  far  back  as  April,  1917,  suddenly 
broke  loose  with  violent  agitation  among  the 
workers  of  Petrograd  and  Moscow,  urging  them 
to  join  their  ranks  and  promising  to  put  them 
in  immediate  control  of  all  factories,  plants, 
mills,  railroads  and  other  industrial  assets. 
The  Marxian  formula:  '^All  wealth  is  pro- 
duced hy  labor.  To  labor  all  wealth  is  due/' 
was  over  night  accepted  by  the  toiling  masses 
who  were  unable  to  grasp  its  real  meaning.  Nor 
is  it  strange  that  the  *' Workers'  Control" 
should  have  appealed  to  the  proletariat,  espe- 
cially at  an  epoch  when  the  whole  country  was 
being  kept  in  a  state  of  constant  unrest,  and 
when  the  minds  of  the  people  were  put  out  of 
balance  by  the  trend  of  revolutionary  events. 
It  was  all  the  easier  to  enforce  the  nationaliza- 
tion program  as  hundreds  of  factories  were 
actually  deserted  by  their  owners  who  fled  be- 
fore the  terror  instigated  by  the  rebellious 
workers.  In  point  of  fact,  already  under  Ker- 
ensky's  regime,  wages  extorted  by  the  laborers 
grew  to  be  so  excessive  that  the  operation  of 
the  factories  became  next  to  impossible. 

The  Soviet  constitution  does  not  devise  an 
exhaustive  system  for  the  nationalization  of  in- 
dustry as  is  the  case  with  the  socialization  of 
land.    The  general  stipulation  therefor  is  con- 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES        69 

tained  in  Item  (c)  of  Clause  3  of  the  ''Declara- 
tion of  Rights  of  the  Laboring  and  Exploited 
People/'    It  reads  verbatim: 

"As  a  first  step  toward  complete  transfer  of 
ownership  to  the  Soviet  Republic  of  all  factories, 
mills,  mines,  railways,  and  other  means  of  pro- 
duction and  transportation,  the  Soviet  law  for  the 
control  by  workmen  and  the  establishment  of  the 
Supreme  Soviet  of  National  Economy  is  hereby 
confirmed,  so  as  to  insure  the  power  of  the  workers 
over  the  exploiters." 

In  this  Section  two  distinctly  different  prin- 
ciples are  set  forth:  first,  nationalization  from 
the  point  of  view  of  State  ownership;  and, 
second,  nationalization  in  the  sense  of  workers' 
management  of  industrial  concerns. 

The  seizure  of  industrial  plants  by  the  Sov- 
iets primarily  assumed  a  casual  character.  The 
earlier  decrees  nationalizing  such  concerns  were 
issued  in  consequence  of  the  opposition  mani- 
fested by  their  owners  and  managers  to  the 
Soviet  order  of  December  8,  1917,  introducing 
the  "Workers'  Control"  over  production. 

The  first  industrial  corporation  nationalized 
by  the  Soviets  was  the  Simsky  Mining  Com- 
pany. 

The  decree  thereto  of  December  12,  1917, 
reads : 

"In  view  of  the  refusal  of  the  Simsky  Mining 
Company  to  submit  to  the  decree  of  the  Council  of 


70      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

People's  Commissars,  relating  to  tlie  Workers' 
Control  the  Soviet  of  People's  Commissars  hereby 
resolves  to  confiscate  the  entire  property  of  the 
Simsky  Mining  Company,  of  whatever  it  may 
consist,  declaring  it  the  property  of  the  Russian 
Republic. ' ' 

The  same  motive  is  given  in  the  Soviet  de- 
cree of  December  19,  1917,  for  nationalizing 
the  well-known  Bogoslovsky  Mining  Company. 
It  was  not  until  February  1918  that  the  pro- 
gram began  to  be  carried  out  systematically. 
In  the  beginning  the  tendency  was  to  nation- 
alize key  industries,  especially  the  entire  metal- 
lurgical, textile  and  mining  output.  The  ear- 
liest attempt  to  take  over  the  famous  Donetz 
coal  region  was  made  on  December  28,  1917, 
when  a  regulation  was  adopted  ordering  that 
all  mines  located  in  this  district  be  placed  under 
Soviet  control,  and  their  output  monopolized  by 
the  State. 

On  the  22nd  of  April,  1918,  an  important 
measure  was  introduced  by  the  Soviets  nation- 
alizing foreign  trade  in  all  its  ramifications. 
According  to  this  decree,  commercial  transac- 
tions with  foreign  countries  were  made  the  ex- 
clusive prerogative  of  persons  duly  authorized 
by  the  Bolsheviki.  With  the  exception  of  spec- 
ial agents,  nobody  had  the  right  to  carry  on 
trade  relations  with  foreign  countries,  either 
in  the  way  of  export  or  import.  Gradually,  all 
economic  functions,  including  production,  trade 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES        71 

and  distribution,  came  under  Soviet  manage- 
ment. Finally,  in  December  1920,  industrial 
concerns  employing  only  five  workers  were  de- 
clared the  property  of  the  State. 

Among  the  more  drastic  phases  of  the  social- 
ization fever  was  the  decree  of  December  14, 
1917.  This  is  the  edict  on  the  seizure  of  pri- 
vate banks  which  were  monopolized  by  the 
State.  The  preamble  to  this  legislative  act  ex- 
presses that  the  nationalization  of  banks  is 
ordered 

"In  the  interest  of  the  regular  organization  of 
the  national  economy,  of  the  thorough  eradication 
of  bank  speculation,  and  the  complete  emancipa- 
tion of  the  workmen,  peasants,  and  the  whole  la- 
boring population  from  the  exploitation  of  bank- 
ing capital,  and  with  a  view  to  the  establishment 
of  a  single  national  bank  of  the  Russian  Republic 
which  shall  serve  the  real  interests  of  the  people 
and  the  poorer  classes,  *     *     *." 

All  assets  and  liabilities  of  banking  institu- 
tions, in  this  way,  were  taken  over  by  the  Sov- 
iets, while  all  existing  private  joint-stock  banks 
were  merged  in  the  State  Bank. 

Indeed  it  was  a  simple  matter,  by  one  stroke 
of  the  pen,  to  abolish — on  paper  at  least — the 
whole  Russian  banking  system;  but,  with  pri- 
vate banks  blown  up  in  the  air,  the  Soviets 
proved  thoroughly  incapable  of  solving  the 
vital  problem  of  credit.  The  barbarous  manner 
in   which   the   Communist   rulers   grabbed   all 


72      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

financial  assets  is  quite  typical  of  their  *' gov- 
ernmental" methods.  In  modern  economics, 
banking  is  an  organic  part  of  the  productive 
system,  its  prime  social  function  being  the 
financing  of  industrial  and  commercial  enter- 
prizes,  which  constitute  the  backbone  of  national 
existence. 

Prior  to  the  revolution,  Russia's  industries 
were  largely  dependent  upon  banking  capital, 
which  provided  the  necessary  means  for  the 
development  of  productive  resources.  The 
more  efforts  were  made  in  the  field  of  indus- 
trial research,  the  more  it  became  obvious  that 
extensive  banking  and  accessible  credit  were 
absolutely  indispensable  to  economic  progress. 
Accordingly,  during  the  ten  years  preceding  the 
World  War,  thousands  of  corporations  of  '^  mu- 
tual credit"  were  established  throughout  Rus- 
sia, rendering  prompt  and  efficient  assistance  to 
the  creative  efforts  of  the  people.  Petty  trade, 
which  had  a  far-reaching  significance  in  nation- 
al economics,  was  actively  supported  by  these 
institutions. 

The  nationalization  of  banks  did  not  entail 
the  abolition  of  money  as  a  mode  of  exchange. 
Money  continues  to  exist  in  the  Communist 
State.  Therefore,  all  industrial  concerns,  al- 
though nationalized,  have  to  have  money  for 
the  purchase  of  raw  materials,  to  pay  wages, 
and  to  carry  on  their  business  in  general. 
Leaving  aside  for  the  present  the  question  of 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES        73 

the  deflation  of  the  Eussian  ruble,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  point  out  the  peculiar  condition  which 
was  the  outgrowth  of  the  nationalization  of 
banks.  All  monies  and  collateral  in  the  posses- 
sion of  banking  corporations,  having  been  de- 
clared the  property  of  the  State,  it  became  the 
business  of  the  State  to  finance  all  such  indus- 
trial and  commercial  concerns  as  heretofore  had 
been  supported  by  private  banking  capital.  In 
other  words,  its  nationalization  threw  upon  the 
State  a  tremendous  burden  which  in  previous 
days  was  divided  between  thousands  of  credit 
institutions  and  the  State  itself.  The  effect  was 
most  harmful. 

In  the  current  Soviet  press  there  are  count- 
less complaints  about  the  inefficiency  of  the 
Communist  State  Bank,  its  failure  to  give  fi- 
nancial support  to  nationalized  enterprises,  and 
the  irritating  routine  required  to  obtain  credits 
for  industrial  purposes. 

The  Communists  took  over  almost  100  per 
cent,  of  Russia's  industries  but  they  did  not 
create  a  financial  organization  adequate  to  cope 
with  the  daily  needs  of  production.  In  conse- 
quence, hundreds  of  plants  and  mills  remain 
idle  without  a  remote  possibility  of  resuming 
operations.  Even  those  factories  which  are 
considered  by  the  Soviets  as  ^' shock  factories" 
— that  is  to  say,  the  operation  of  which  is  of 
paramount  importance  for  the  very  existence  of 
the  Communist  State — have  often  complained 


74      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

about  the  thorough  neglect  manifested  by  the 
''Gosbank"  (State  Bank)  in  relation  to  their 
financial  requirements. 

Lenin  and  other  Soviet  leaders  repeatedly 
insisted  upon  the  utmost  importance  for  the 
Communist  State,  in  the  first  place,  to  organize 
and  efficiently  exploit  the  huge  industrial  en- 
terprises, uniting  them  in  productive  agencies 
similar  to  American  trusts.  Voluminous  liter- 
ature was  produced  on  this  subject,  and  yet  the 
practical  endeavors  of  the  Soviets  to  establish 
such  trusts  have  resulted  in  a  complete  fiasco, 
not  only  in  the  sense  of  technical  management, 
but  also  from  a  financial  point  of  view. 

One  instance  described  in  the  Soviet  news- 
papers, referring  to  the  central  organization  of 
Russian  textile  industries,  may  give  a  general 
idea  of  the  prevailing  situation.  A  Soviet  of- 
ficial who  was  ordered  to  inspect  the  business 
of  this  "Centro-Textile"  made  the  following 
report  with  regard  to  its  financial  transactions : 

"The  Financial  Department  of  the  Centro- 
Textile  received  up  to  February  1,  1919,  the  sum 
of  3,400,000,000  rubles.  No  control  was  estab- 
lished with  resrard  to  the  apportionment  of  this 
fund.  The  money  has  been  given  away  to  the  fac- 
tories at  their  request,  and  this  was  made  in  the 
form  of  advance  payments  against  bills  of  lading. 
Due  to  this,  instances  were  frequent  where  monies 
were  paid  to  non-existent  factories.  From  Jan- 
uary 1st  up  to  December  1,  1918,  the  Central 
Textile  made  such  advance  payments  against  com- 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES        75 

modities  for  the  amount  of  1,348,619,000  rubles. 
At  the  same  time,  by  January  1,  1919,  commodi- 
ties which  would  serve  as  collateral  for  such 
advance  payments  were  amounting  only  to  143,- 
716,000  rubles,  that  is  eight  times  less  than  money 
paid  out  in  advance.  Moreover,  the  fact  of  the 
general  inefficiency  of  the  Central  Textile  must 
be  noted,  especially  in  connection  with  the  pur- 
chase of  wool.  Thus,  by  January  (1919)  only 
129,808  poods  were  purchased,  whereas  the  annual 
requirement  of  wool  is  calculated  at  the  amount 
of  3,500,000  poods."* 

Similar  is  the  condition  in  practically  every 
line  of  industry  and  commerce.  The  official 
Soviet  organ  Economicheshaya  Jisn,  in  its  issue 
of  the  26th  of  April,  1922,  reported  that  the 
Petrograd  hemp  trust,  formed  in  January  of 
that  year,  was  unable  to  start  operations  owing 
to  the  lack  of  funds  which  were  to  have  been 
supplied  by  the  Gosbank.  Information  of  the 
same  nature  is  given  regarding  the  Forest  and 
Textile  Trusts,  and  the  coal  mines  in  the  Don- 
etz  Basin. 

There  is  a  Russian  proverb:  ^'With  seven 
nurses  the  child  is  blind."  This  can  be  applied 
to  State  ownership  and  Soviet  Administration 
of  key  industries  and  their  ''shock  plants." 
Numerous  Soviet  institutions  and  Communist 
appointees  are  supervising,  managing,  control- 
ling and  auditing  their  operations.  Every  Com- 

*See  Prof.  Sheherbina,  Op.  Cit.,  p.  100.  Translated  from  the 
Eussian. 


76      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

missar  feels  it  his  right  and  duty  to  interfere 
with  their  work.  The  consequence  is  that  these 
basic  branches  of  production  have  been  ruined, 
possibly  even  to  a  greater  degree  than  the  aux- 
iliary agencies  which  are  less  annoyed  and  com- 
paratively more  free  to  pursue  their  own  pol- 
icies. 

An  equally  harmful  effect  upon  industrial  de- 
velopment was  caused  by  the  Soviet  invention 
known  as  the  *' Workers'  Control."  The  first 
decree  thereto  was  issued  on  December  8,  1917. 
The  object  of  this  measure  was  to  eliminate  in- 
dividual management,  but  primarily  the  man- 
agement of  those  who  owned  the  factories,  put- 
ting production  under  the  control  of  the  indus- 
trial proletariat.  The  Bolsheviki  were  firmly 
convinced  that,  after  all,  this  was  an  easy  task 
to  perform,  because  they  maintained  that  man- 
ual work  alone  is  the  creative  force  of  wealth. 
They  failed  to  grasp  the  economic  truth  that 
natural  resources  which  furnish  the  material 
substance  for  all  mechanical  processes,  and  the 
brain  work  of  experts  organizing  industries  are 
just  as  much  the  component  parts  of  production 
as  manual  labor  itself. 

The  destructive  phase  of  the  Worker's  Con- 
trol, namely,  the  elimination  of  the  legitimate 
owners,  was  not  difficult  to  achieve.  Most  brutal 
methods  were  used  to  compel  them  to  surrender 
their  factories  to  the  Worker's  Shop  Commit- 
tees.   The  technical  personnel  was  subjected  to 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES        ^^ 

both  psychical  and  physical  terror.  ''Down 
with  the  bourgeois  bloodsuckers!'',  for  a  time, 
was  the  real  order  of  the  day.  Thousands  of 
persons  who  formerly  supervised  the  mills  and 
plants  were  either  incarcerated  or  murdered  in 
cold  blood,  while  the  rest  were  forced  to  seek 
refuge  abroad.  According  to  a  statement  made 
in  1919  at  a  meeting  of  the  Moscow  Soviet  of 
Workers  and  Red  Armies  Deputies,  by  Mr. 
Nevsky,  former  Commissar  of  the  Department 
of  Railways  and  Communications,  ''No  less 
Phmi  25  per  cent,  of  the  trained  engineers  em- 
ployed in  the  management  of  railways  since  the 
revolution  were  murdered/'  while  about  50  per 
cent,  of  the  pre-revolutionary  engineering  staff 
had  fled  *'to  escape  murder."  Hence,  only  25 
per  cent,  of  the  entire  number  of  technically 
skilled  railroad  employees  nominally  remained 
in  the  ranks  of  the  former  personnel.  But  with 
regard  to  these  Nevsky  explained: 

*'I  pass  my  life  in  hunting  them  out  of  prison 
because  no  proper  management  can  go  on  with- 
out skilled  laborers."* 

This  condition  by  no  means  was  confined  to 
transport  alone.  It  existed  and  still  prevails  in 
all  branches  of  industry,  commerce  and  State 
banking. 

*  Mr.  Nevsky 's  report  quoted  in  the  London  Morning  Post,  May 
1,  1919,  in  an  article  entitled,  * '  Bolshevist  Transport  Muddle. ' ' 


78      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Such  was  the  primitive  manner  by  which  the 
first  taming  of  the  "exploiters"  was  accom- 
plished by  the  Soviets.  The  second,  or  con- 
structive, problem  relating  to  the  workers'  man- 
agement was  something  the  Bolsheviki  were 
unable  to  overcome.  They  started  out  on  the 
premise  that  all  the  delicate  functions  of  pro- 
duction could  be  properly  organized  and  con- 
trolled by  the  workers  themselves,  no  matter 
how  little  technical  experience  they  may  have 
had. 

The  decree  on  the  Workers'  Control  is  cer- 
tainly one  of  the  most  startling  exhibits  of  the 
"constructive  achievements"  of  Communism. 
The  merits  of  this  legislative  act  can  be  best 
appreciated  by  examining  its  more  fundamental 
provisions : 

"1.  In  the  interests  of  a  well-planned  regula- 
tion of  the  national  economy  in  all  industrial, 
commercial,  banking,  agricultural,  transport- 
ing, co-operative,  and  productive  associations 
and  other  enterprises  engaging  hired  workers 
or  distributing  work  outside,  "Workers'  Con- 
trol shall  be  introduced  over  production,  pur- 
chase, sale  of  products  and  raw  materials, 
their  storage,  as  well  as  over  the  financial 
part  of  the  enterprise." 

"2.  The  Workers'  Control  is  carried  out  by  all 
the  workers  of  a  given  enterprise  through 
their  elective  organizations  such  as:  factory 
committees,  aldermen's  boards,  etc.  These 
organizations  shall  include  representatives  of 
the  employees  and  the  technical  personnel." 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES        79 

"3.  In  every  large  town,  province,  or  industrial 
region,  a  local  Soviet  of  Workers'  Control 
shall  be  formed,  which,  being  an  organ  of  the 
Soviet  of  Workmen,  Soldiers  and  Peasants 
Deputies,  shall  be  composed  of  representa- 
tives of  trade  unions,  shop  and  other  labor 
committees,  and  co-operative  societies." 

According  to  the  subsequent  sections,  the 
organs  of  the  Workers'  Control  are  given  the 
right  to  supervise  production,  iixing  a  mini- 
mum ratio  of  output,  and  enabling  them  to  take 
all  necessary  measures  for  determining  the  cost 
of  production.  (Paragraph  6).  These  organs 
are  also  allowed  access  to  all  files  of  the  indus- 
trial enterprises.  Their  decisions  are  manda- 
tory on  the  owners  of  the  enterprises  and  may 
be  revoked  solely  by  a  resolution  of  the  higher 
organs  of  the  Workers'  Control.  (Paragraph 
8).  The  only  exemption  in  favor  of  the  owners 
is  contained  in  Paragraph  9,  reading: 

"The  owner  or  the  administration  of  the  en- 
terprise shall,  within  the  course  of  three  days,  have 
the  right  to  file  a  protest  before  the  higher  organs 
of  the  Workers'  Control  against  any  resolution 
passed  by  the  lower  organs  of  the  same  Control." 

An  analysis  of  this  decree  discloses  two  leadv. 
ing  features  of  labor  management  as  adopted 
by  the  Soviets: 

First:  the  so-called  collegiate  system  of  man- 
agement as  distinguished  from  and  opposed  to 


8o      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

individual  management  of  the  owner;  second, 
the  outspoken  domination  of  manual  labor  over 
technical  experts. 

The  former  principle  is  but  a  natural  feature 
of  Communism.  Socialism  has  never  fav- 
ored the  creative  force  of  individual  effort. 
On  the  contrary,  it  has  always  sustained  the 
policy 'of  ^'mass  action."  Whenever  it  comes 
to  actually  doing  something  requiring  brains, 
Marxian  followers  recommend  a  parliament 
with  scores  of  delegates  proficient  in  talking 
abilities.  Any  minor  measure  pertaining  for 
instance  to  the  purchase  of  spare  parts  for  a 
drilling  lathe,  or  selecting  the  nearest  ware- 
house, is  vigorously  debated  by  committees  and 
sub-committees  before  being  put  into  effect.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  most  complicated  indus- 
trial policies  have  to  be  brought  before  and  de- 
cided upon  by  large  bodies  of  manual  workers 
who  have  not  the  slightest  idea  as  to  what  man- 
agement means  or  how  it  should  be  conducted. 

Besides,  the  decree  establishes  an  extremely 
intricate  procedure  for  carrying  out  the  Work- 
ers' Control  through  four  different  groups  of 
Soviets : 

(a)  The  Factory  Soviet, 

(b)  The  City  Soviet, 

(c)  The  Regional  Soviet,  and  finally, 

(d)  The  All-Russian  Soviet  of  Workers'  Control. 

The  clumsy  make-up  of  the  Central  Soviet  is 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES       8i 

described  in  Paragraph  4  which  provides  that 
this  body  shall  be  composed  of  representatives 
of  the  following  institutions: 

1.  The    AU-Russian    Central    Executive    Com- 
mittee of  the  Soviets — 5  members. 

2.  The    All-Russian    Central    Executive    Com- 
mittee of  Peasants'  Delegates — 5  members. 

3.  The  All-Russian  Soviet  of  Trade  Unions — • 
5  members. 

4.  The  All-Russian  Center  of  Co-Operative  So- 
cieties— 2  members. 

5.  The  All-Russian  Bureau  of  Factory  Commit- 
tees— 5  members. 

6.  The   All-Russian    Union   of    Engineers   and 
Technicians — 5  members. 

7.  The   All-Russian   Union   of   Agronomists — 2 
members. 

8.  From  each  All-Russian  Labor  Union  with  at 
least  100,000  members — 1  member. 

9.  From   each  Trade  Union  whose  number  of 
members  exceeds  100,000 — 2  members. 

10.    The  Petrograd  Soviet  of  Trade  Unions — 2 
members. 

Now,  all  these  various  Soviets,  mutually  sub- 
ordinate to  each  other,  from  stage  to  stage,  are 
compelled  to  refer  their  decisions  and  regula- 
tions to  higher  organs  of  Workers'  Control,  un- 
til they  ultimately  reach  the  central  body, — 
moving  slowly  along  like  a  caterpillar  tank. 
It  is  only  here,  on  the  top  of  the  bureaucratic 
pyramid,  that  all  momentous  problems  of  na- 
tional production  are  finally  decided  upon. 


82      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Had  a  decree  of  this  kind  been  inaugurated  by 
the  Imperial  government,  or  any  of  the  would- 
be  bourgeois  governments,  Socialists  from  the 
four  corners  of  the  earth  would  have  burst  into 
an  uproar,  accusing  the  wealth-owning  classes 
of  every  possible  administrative  vice.  But,  be- 
cause the  decree  bore  the  stamp  of  Lenin,  lib- 
erals and  radicals  all  over  the  world  have  de- 
voted much  ^' study"  and  ''careful  research" 
to  the  relative  merits  of  this  "great"  Bolshe- 
vist discovery.  Obviously  it  is  impossible  to 
supervise  the  whole  range  of  industrial  func- 
tions with  a  bureaucratic  outfit  so  heavy  and 
so  inefficient.  Nevertheless,  Socialist  sponsors 
in  this  country  and  elsewhere  prayingly  whis- 
pered, ^'Oh,  give  them  a  chance!  Give  them 
only  a  chance!'^  And  the  chance  has  been 
given  to  the  Bolsheviki.  They  have  been  al- 
lowed to  carry  out  their  program  to  the  fullest 
extent. 

Not  even  a  year  had  passed  before  Soviet 
leaders  themselves  found  out  that  industry  was 
being  rapidly  brought  to  a  state  of  complete 
decay.  Much  to  their  surprise,  they  noticed 
that  the  Workers'  Control  in  reality  meant 
wholesale  graft,  willful  neglect,  and  the  high- 
est degree  of  incompetency.  The  simplest 
questions  of  management  were  hopelessly  be- 
fuddled. Urgent  problems  of  organization 
were  dragged  along  through  numerous  Soviet 
chanceries    until    finally    they    lost   their    mo- 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES        83 

mentous  significance.  Furthermore,  tlie  dif- 
ferent organs  of  Workers'  Control  came  in  con- 
flict with  the  Supreme  Board  of  National 
Economy,  the  task  of  which  is  to  elaborate  gen- 
eral standards  for  the  economic  life  of  the 
country,  serving  as  a  medium  between  the  work 
of  the  central  and  local  branches  of  the  All- 
Russian  So^det  of  Workers'  Control.  Finally, 
the  different  Soviet  agencies,  such  as  the  Fuel 
Board,  the  Metal  Board,  the  Transport  Board, 
the  Central  Supplies  Committee,  etc.,  acting 
upon  their  own  authority,  interfered  all  the 
time  with  the  orders  of  both  the  Supreme 
Board  of  National  Economy  and  the  All-Rus- 
sian  Soviet  of  Workers'  Control,  causing  ex- 
treme confusion  in  every  line  of  Russian  in- 
dustry. 

In  the  factories  all  discipline  was  abandoned. 
The  I.  W.  W.  slogan,  ''Strike  on  the  joh!''  be- 
came the  ruling  condition  of  the  work  in  na- 
tionalized concerns.  The  eight-hour  day  which 
was  decreed  at  the  very  outset  of  the  Bol- 
shevist advent  to  power  proved  nothing  but 
a  mji:h.  The  men  worked  as  long  as  they  chose 
to  stay  in  the  factories,  while  the  whole  course 
of  industrial  labor  was  converted  into  an  end- 
less meeting  at  which  Communist  ideas  were 
propagated  and  the  workers  incited  to  take  re- 
venge upon  the  "blood-thirsty  capitalists." 
But  these  were  no  longer  in  existence. 

Regulations  recommended  by  Workers'  Shop 


84      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Committees  were  deliberately  violated  by  the 
workers  themselves,  and  the  foremen  of  olden 
times  were  held  under  suspicion  and  openly  ac- 
cused of  being  *' bourgeois  sympathizers."  Un- 
der these  circumstances,  naturally,  the  entire  in- 
dustrial mechanism  went  to  pieces,  and  the  pro- 
letarian State  promptly  landed  outside  the 
broken  trough. 

The  scale  of  economic  disorganization  will  be 
understood  by  a  mere  comparison  of  the  out- 
put of  different  supplies  for  1913  or  1914  with 
that  of  1920. 

After  two  years  of  Soviet  management,  every 
branch  of  industry  presented  practically  the 
same  picture  of  degradation.  For  instance,  the 
textile  mills,  in  1914,  were  equipped  with  7,- 
285,000  spindles,  working  on  full  time,  while 
in  1920  there  were  only  385,000  spindles  work- 
ing on  part  time.  In  1920  only  125,000  workers 
were  employed  by  textile  manufacturers,  which 
is  75  per  cent,  less  than  during  normal  times. 

In  1913  Russia  had  37  cement  plants  working 
at  full  speed.  In  1920  there  was  only  one  ce- 
ment plant,  working  on  part  time. 

In  1913  there  were  140  blast  furnaces  as  com- 
pared with  12  in  1920. 

In  1914  there  were  275  glass  plants  and  20 
china  manufacturing  plants,  with  a  total  of  93,- 
000  workers.  In  1920  only  67  glass  plants  and 
11  china  manufacturing  establishments  were  in 
operation,  employing  a  total  of  32,000  workers. 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES        85 

TOTAL  OUTPUT* 

1913  1920 
Ores  of  different 

kinds     581,000,000  poods  8,000,000  poods 

Copper  ore    69,000,000       "  219,000       " 

Manganese  ore   ... .       17,377,000       "  216,000       " 

Chromide  ore   1,500,000       "  105,982       " 

(9  months) 

Salt,  Perm  region..       26,000,000       "  2,000,000       " 
Salt,  Baskunehak 

region     41,000,000       "  1,200,000       " 

Salt,  Donetz  Basin.       39,000,000       "  7,500,000       " 

1914 

Smelted  cast  iron  . .     257,000,000       "  6,000,000       " 

1913 
Oils  (vegetable) 

approximately    ..       25,000,000       "  500,000       " 

Paper    24,000,000       "  2,000,000       " 

1914 
Matches  (in  thou- 
sands of  boxes).,               3,808       "  632 

With  regard  to  precious  metals,  the  figures 

are  as  follows : 

1914  1920 
Gold,   Ural  region     103  poods    22  lbs.  11  poods   29  lbs 

"  West'n  Siberia       97       "       34    "  1       "      39  " 

"  East'n  Siberia  1,679       "      34    "  92       "      21  " 


Total  1,881       "      10    "     106       " 
Platinum 298       "  20.5    "t 

•  See  Pravda,  November  14,  1920,  and  Economicheskaya  Jisn, 
January   1,   1921. 

t  Compare  with  data  furnished  by  EeonomichesMya  Jisn,  Jan- 
uary 29,  1921. 


86      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

In  view  of  this  condition,  the  number  of 
workers  engaged  in  all  branches  of  industry 
had  been  reduced.  The  Economicheskaya  Jisn 
(No.  242,  October  20,  1920),  analyzing  this 
phase  of  the  economic  situation,  produced  the 
following  figures  relating  to  the  Moscow  indus- 
trial section,  which  formerly  was  considered 
the  Russian  Manchester: 

NUMBER  OF  WORKERS 

Per  Cent,  of 
Eegion  September  1,  1918  June  1,  1920  Decrease 

Ivanovo-Voznesensk  ..  146,300  30,600  79 

Vladimir 103,100  21,200  80 

Kostroma  17,600  8,100  57 

Moscow    368,100  216,400  41 

In  Petrograd  and  Moscow  the  number  of 
manual  laborers  has  decreased  as  follows: 

Petrograd,  1917 365,777 

1918 144,530 

1920 102,000 

Moscow,  August  1,  1918 147,424 

June  1,  1919 105,210 

June  1,  1920 *87,363 

The  British  Labor  Delegation  and  the  Ger- 
man Socialist  Commission  which  visited  Soviet 
Russia  in  1920  have  made  an  exhaustive  sur- 
vey of  the  industrial  conditions  in  that  coun- 
try.    Both  of  these  delegations  devoted  much 

♦  See  Tlie  Bussian  Economist,  Vol,  1,  No.  3,  p.  585,  April,  1921. 
These  tables  were  taken  from  the  oflSeial  Economicheskaya  Jisn,  ia- 
suea  of  October  1,  1920,  and  October  20,  1920. 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES       87 

attention  to  the  startling  decline  in  the  produc- 
tivity of  labor.  Mr.  Dittmann,  who  was  at  the 
head  of  the  German  Commission,  referring  to 
the  Kolomna  machine  plant,  stated: 

"The  Russian  employees  were  partly  men  who 
had  been  drafted  by  force  from  villages;  others 
were  volunteers  whose  motive  was  to  get  the  spe- 
cial food  ration  given  to  factory  workers.  Not 
one  of  them  showed  the  slightest  interest  in  his 
work;  quite  on  the  contrary,  there  was  universal 
disposition  to  sabotage,  which  extended  even  to 
some  of  the  higher  employees."* 

In  January,  1919,  the  Soviet  authorities  un- 
dertook an  investigation  regarding  the  number 
of  hours  worked  by  the  employees  in  railroad 
repair  shops.     The  following  was  found: 

Every  one  of  the  workmen  worked  during  January 
Year  Hours  Per  Cent. 

1916  254  100. 

1917  235  92.5 

1918  159  60.0 

1919  170  66.9t 

Owing  to  the  Workers^  Control,  the  Mitish- 
chi  machine  plant  near  Moscow,  in  pre-war 
times  one  of  the  model  industrial  concerns,  be- 
came utterly  crippled.  By  1919  the  produc- 
tivity of  that  plant  showed  a  decrease  of  60  per 

*  See  Mr.  Dittmann 's  report  published  in  the  Berlin  Freikeit,  ijBoea 
of  August  31st  and  September  1st,  1920. 

fSee  Sobolev's,  The  Present  Economic  Situation  in  Soviet  2t«- 
sia,  p.  20.    Kharbin,  1921. 


88   THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

cent,  as  compared  with  1916,  although  the  work- 
ing-day had  remained  the  same,  namely,  eight 
hours. 

The  Economicheskaya  Jisn,  describing  the 
deplorable  situation  in  the  textile  industry,  re- 
marked that,  on  the  average,  the  decline  in  the 
productivity  of  work  in  textile  mills  amounted 
to  35  per  cent.,  while  in  some  of  the  nationalized 
enterprises  it  fell  below  75  per  cent.,  as  com- 
pared with  the  pre-revolutionary  period. 

The  Bolshevist  newspaper  Trud,  in  its  issue 
of  April  28,  1919,  frankly  admitted: 

"Our  misfortune  consists  in  that  we  do  not 
know  how  to  use  such  means  as  are  in  our  posses- 
sion, namely,  labor.  The  productivity  of  labor  in 
the  textile  industry  experienced  an  amazing  de- 
crease. There  is  no  discipline.  Due  to  carelessness 
and  neglect,  the  machines  are  in  a  state  of  decay 
and  they  are  incapable  of  yielding  the  former 
amount  of  efficiency." 

An  interesting  account  of  the  manner  in 
which  Soviet  factories  were  and  still  are  oper- 
ated is  found  in  the  Moscow  Pravda  (January 
6,  1921).  This  paper  refers  specifically  to  a 
mill  called  ''Mars"  which  is  engaged  in  manu- 
facturing military  uniforms: 

**In  the  factory  Mars,  two  thousand  workmen 
are  engaged.  Theft  has  assumed  extraordinary 
proportions.  Those  identified  as  thieves  are  pun- 
ished and  compelled  to  perform  filthy  work  for  a 
period  of  one  or  two  weeks.     Those  upon  whom 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES        89 

this  punishment  is  inflicted  immediately  begin  to 
steal  again.  There  is  no  discipline  whatsoever  in 
the  factory.  Workmen  are  continuously  striking 
on  the  job.  The  quality  of  the  work  performed  is 
extremely  poor  and  70  per  cent,  of  the  goods  so 
manufactured  are  rejected  by  the  inspectors." 

For  the  present,  these  data  may  be  sufficient 
as  they  do  give  a  general  idea  of  the  extent  of 
industrial  disintegration  at  the  close  of  the 
initial  stage  of  Soviet  misrule. 

When,  after  two  years'  experimentation 
along  the  lines  of  collegiate  management,  the 
Soviet  leaders  became  thoroughly  convinced 
that  there  was  nothing  to  be  hoped  from  the 
Workers^  Control,  they  began  to  ring  the  alarm 
bells.  Lenin  and  the  other  Commissars  were 
forced  to  admit  the  disheartening  results  of 
their  industrial  policies;  but  in  their  usual 
hypocritical  manner,  they  sought  to  excuse 
their  failure  by  ascribing  it  to  reasons  beyond 
their  control,  and  more  particularly  to  general 
conditions  w^hich  turned  out  to  be  rather  im- 
favorable  for  the  Soviets. 

Speaking  before  the  Communist  Party  in 
March,  1921,  Lenin  tried  to  justify  the  econ- 
omic methods  of  the  Bolsheviki  by  setting  forth 
the  following  argument: 

"Our  system  was  dictated  to  us  by  military 
considerations  and  necessities  and  not  by  the 
needs  of  the  national  economy.  There  was  no 
other  outcome  in  the  conditions  of  unparalleled 


90      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

confusion  in  which  we  found  ourselves,  when, 
after  the  Great  War,  we  had  to  endure  a  series 
of  civil  wars.  Of  course,  in  the  methods  of  ap- 
plication of  our  policy,  we  made  a  great  number 
of  mistakes  and  exaggerations.  As  a  matter  of 
principle,  however,  this  policy  was  right  in  the 
conditions  of  war  which  were  wrought  upon  us." 

Another  Communist,  by  the  name  Varga,  an- 
alyzing the  proposed  ''changes"  in  the  econ- 
omic policies  of  the  Soviets,  remarked: 

"Urgent  needs  of  war,  the  resistance  and  the 
sabotage  of  the  bourgeoisie,  compelled  the  Soviet 
authorities,  contrary  to  the  will  of  the  Commun- 
ists  ( ?),  to  resort  to  nationalization,  adopting  the 
well-known  system  of  military  communism.  The 
bureaucratic  mechanism,  once  set  in  motion  in 
a  given  direction,  often  digressed  from  the 
aims  which  were  originally  devised.  This  sys- 
tem, the  social  foundation  of  which  was  the  mili- 
tary union  of  the  urban  workers  and  the  poorest 
strata  of  peasantry,  was  liable  to  cease  the  mo- 
ment the  war  terminated."* 

Again  we  encounter  the  ''sabotage  of  the 
bourgeoisie,"  the  "wicked  Kolchak,"  the  "in- 
human blockade,"  and  the  whole  battery  of  ac- 
cessories used  in  the  Communist  phraseology. 
But  whatever  excuses  were  offered  by  the  Bol- 
sheviki,  the  fact  remains  undeniable  that  the 
Workers'  Control,  as  a  concise  policy  of  in- 

*See  No.  18  of  the  Communist  Internationale,  Moscow-Petrograd, 
issue  of  October  8,  1921,  Varga 's  Article  "The  Turning  Point  in 
the  Economic  Policy  of  Soviet  Russia." 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INIXJSTRIES       91 

dustrial  management,  does  correctly  interpret 
the  idea  of  proletarian  dictatorship,  giving 
soap-box  leaders  of  manual  labor  the  upper 
hand  in  the  economic  life  of  the  State. 

Militant  proletarian  dictatorship  led  to  the 
complete  elimination  of  the  expert  from  the 
fields  of  industry.  Thus  the  historical  struggle 
between  muscles  and  brains  ended  in  a  victory 
for  the  former.  This,  however,  was  a  Pyrrhic 
victory,  for  conclusive  proof  was  given  that 
economic  progress  cannot  be  achieved  without 
the  aid  of  himian  intelligence  and  technical 
skill. 

When,  finally,  the  Bolsheviki  had  discovered 
this  truism,  they  began  to  frame  ''new"  econ- 
omic policies.  There  was  really  nothing  else 
to  do  since,  as  far  back  as  January,  1920,  the 
situation  was  described  by  Rykoff,  former 
President  of  the  Supreme  Board  of  National 
Economy,  as  ^^ catastrophic.'^ 

Here  are  some  of  the  measures  which  were 
proposed  for  the  solution  of  the  industrial 
crisis : 

First:  The  Abolition  of  the  collegiate  system  of 
management. 

Second :  Employment  of  experts  in  all  branches 
of  industry. 

Third:  Improvement  in  transportation. 

Fourth :  Compulsory  labor. 

Fifth:  Militarization  of  labor. 

Sixth:  A  resolute  campaign  against  labor  deser- 
tion. 


92      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

This  program  did  not  spring  into  existence 
fully  armed,  like  Minerva  from  the  head  of 
Jove.  On  the  contrary,  it  had  been  evolved 
after  protracted  and  weary  v^ord-duels  between 
the  two  main  factions  of  Soviet  "ideology." 
One  was  the  militant  group  of  Apfelbaum  and 
Trotzky,  advocating  bombastic  policies  and 
dreaming  of  world-power  conquered  by  fire 
and  sword;  the  other  was  Lenin's  party  which 
sought  to  attain  the  same  aims,  using,  however, 
more  ** diplomatic"  methods.  The  first  group 
refused  to  argue  with  anything  but  an  iron 
fist.  Lenin,  while  believing  in  the  iron  fist,  pre- 
ferred to  use  it  in  a  silk  glove.  Therein  lay 
the  difference.  Friction  between  the  two  wings 
of  Communism  at  one  time  grew  so  acute  that 
rumors  were  current  that  either  Trotsky  had 
conceived  a  plan  to  depose  Lenin,  or  that  Lenin 
had  made  up  his  mind  to  get  rid  of  Trotzky. 
Bolshevist  press  agencies  of  course  always  de- 
nied such  rumors,  trying  to  convey  the  impres- 
sion that  between  the  two  Soviet  autocrats  there 
existed  a  friendship  as  touching  as  between 
Castor  and  Pollux.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  dis- 
sension was  there. 

At  this  point  a  brief  characterization  of  these 
two  Communist  ringleaders  is  perhaps  not  out 
of  place. 

Both  Lenin  and  Trotzky  are  avowed  disciples 
of  Marx.  They  both  have  received  their  revo- 
lutionary training  in  the  backyard  of  Euro- 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES        93 

pean  politics.  Both  have  had  their  own 
grudges  against  civilized  society,  and  conse- 
quently it  is  not  surprising  that  they  should 
possess  embittered  mentality.  In  the  depths 
of  the  social  underground,  Lenin  and  Trotzky 
learned  the  whole  gamut  of  unscrupulous 
methods  for  fostering  political  mischief.  Rus- 
sia to  them  meant  nothing.  They  looked  upon 
that  country  as  an  arena  where,  owing  to  the 
darkness  of  its  populace,  silly  theories  and 
ideas  could  be  more  easily  propagated  than  in 
other  European  States.  Both  are  too  rebellious 
to  be  free.  They  are  obsessed  with  the  mania 
of  grandeur.  It  is  their  ambition  to  eventually 
become  Field  Marshals  of  world  revolution. 
But  while  Lenin,  in  the  past,  devoted  much  time 
to  the  study  of  economic  sciences,  Trotzky 's 
mental  luggage  is  as  light  as  down.  He  knows 
nothing  outside  of  the  Marxian  primer,  but  this 
he  knows  by  heart.  Due,  probably  to  his 
Semitic  origin,  Trotzky  has  a  speculative,  prac- 
tical mind,  while  Lenin  is  more  inclined  to 
theoretical  argumentation  and  dialectics.  He 
likes  to  be  called  the  *' Hamlet  of  World  Revo- 
lution." At  times,  Lenin  is  disposed  to  politi- 
cal meditation,  while  Trotzky  adores  parading, 
and  the  whole  ritual  of  Conununist  ceremonies. 
He  obviously  poses  as  a  Napoleon  when  he 
spends  his  leisure  hours  reviewing  mercenary 
troops  on  the  plaza  before  the  Moscow  Kremlin. 
Vengeance  upon  the  ** bourgeois  society"  is  the 


94      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

dominant  motive  in  Trotzky's  psychology.  He, 
therefore,  has  become  the  apologist  for  Ked 
Terror  and  the  tortures  of  the  Cheka.  Lenin, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  the  great  master  of  propa- 
ganda: he  believes  more  in  the  gradual  under- 
mining of  the  foundations  of  civilization  than 
in  high  explosive  methods.  In  the  Soviet  out- 
fit, Lenin  is  doing  the  thinking  part,  vi^hile  Trot- 
zky  represents  the  dynamic  element.  For 
Lenin,  destruction  is  what  he  describes  as  the 
** necessary  stage"  for  attaining  the  Communist 
millennium.  For  Trotzky,  destruction  is  an 
aim  in  itself,  a  leading  principle,  a  basic  policy. 
Trotzky  envies  Lenin  and  seeks  to  overshadow 
his  prestige  among  the  Communist  devotees  both 
within  and  outside  of  Russia.  Trotzky  is  av- 
aricious and  ''thrifty,"  which  has  enabled  him  to 
''save"  some  80,000,000  Imperial  rubles  in  gold. 
These  are  being  kept  safe — beyond  the  reach  of 
his  Bolshevist  brethren — in  one  of  the  South 
American  banks.  In  this  sense  Lenin  has  a 
"broader  character."  He  wantonly  dissipates 
Russian  State  funds  without  giving  much 
thought  to  the  final  outcome  of  the  Soviet  Dance 
Macabre.  Meanwhile,  however,  he  does  enjoy 
his  comfortable  little  home  in  the  Imperial 
Palace  at  Moscow,  with  a  number  of  senti- 
mental women  giving  a  touch  of  artistic  charm 
to  the  unparalleled  horrors  of  Bolshevism. 

Amidst  the  industrial   chaos  wrought  upon 
Russia,  the  two  heralds  of  Communism  had 


J 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES       95  . 

to  come  to  an  understanding  because  the  con- 
tinued disintegration  of  Russian  economics  in- 
evitably would  become,  as  it  actually  has  be- 
come, a  grave  menace  to  the  existence  of  Soviet 
rule  itself. 

Abolition  of  the  Collegiate  System  and  the 
Bourgeois  Experts 

In  the  controversy  over  the  collegiate  and 
individual  management,  Lenin  took  the  view 
that  the  reconstruction  of  industry  can  be  suc- 
cessfully carried  out  only  by  the  abolition  of 
the  Workers'  Control  and  the  restoration  of  the 
individualistic  principle.  At  the  Third  All- 
Russian  Congress  of  Transport  Workers,  he 
made  it  clear  that  he  was  in  favor  of  reversing 
the  whole  Soviet  policy  in  this  respect.     He 

said: 

"Was  it  possible  in  the  former  times  for  any- 
one who  considered  himself  a  defender  of  the 
bourgeoisie  to  say  that  there  should  not  be  any 
individual  authority  in  the  administration  of 
the  State  ?  If  such  a  fool  should  have  been  found 
among  the  bourgeoisie,  the  other  members  of  his 
class  should  Qiave  laughed  at  him.  They  would 
have  said  to  him:  'What  has  the  question  of  in- 
dividual or  collegiate  management  to  do  with  the 
questions  of  class?'  "* 

After  some  hesitation,  Trotzky  acceded  to 
this  viewpoint. 

*  Quoted  from  Leo  Pasvolsky  's  book  The  Economics  of  Com- 
mwfiism,   p.    234,    New    York,    1921. 


96      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Opposing  this  opinion,  a  large  group  of  Com- 
munists continued  to  defend  with  obstinacy  the 
principle  of  collegiate  management,  arguing 
that  the  restoration  of  individual  control  would 
inevitably  bring  the  bourgeois  expert  back  to 
the  footlights  of  economic  life.  This,  they  main- 
tained, would,  in  turn,  infringe  upon  the  sov- 
ereign rights  of  the  victorious  proletariat,  plac- 
ing it  in  a  role  subordinate  to  the  industrial 
managers.  Tomsky,  President  of  the  Execu- 
tive Committee  of  the  Trade  Unions,  was  the 
spokesman  for  the  latter  group.  After  pro- 
tracted deliberations,  the  Ninth  Congress  of  the 
Russian  Communist  Party,  in  April,  1920, 
passed  a  resolution  settling  the  controversy  by 
adopting  a  sort  of  middle  course.  The  idea  of 
collegiate  management  was  upheld,  but  the 
reservation  was  made  that  individual  manage- 
ment should  be  favored  in  the  executive  field. 
It  was,  therefore,  recommended  that  in  the 
higher  stages  of  industrial  mechanism,  collegiate 
forms  of  management  be  preserved,  with  the 
understanding,  however,  that  the  membership  of 
the  managing  committees  would  be  reduced. 

Yet  on  the  crucial  point  regarding  the  parti- 
cipation of  experts  in  organizing  industries,  the 
Communists  are  still  groping  in  darkness,  and 
no  uniform  policy  has  been  adopted  so  far. 
Instances  are  known  where  the  Bolsheviki  have 
tried  to  secure  the  services  of  bourgeois  experts. 
In  this  connection  Russian  engineers,  at  pres- 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES       97 

ent  residing  abroad,  have  been  approached  by 
Soviet  agents  with  a  view  of  inducing  them  to 
accept  responsible  positions  in  the  Communist 
State.  These  approaches  rarely  led  to  the  de- 
sired results  as  the  Eussians  are  fully  aware 
that  it  is  impossible  to  work  efficiently  under 
the  Soviet  regime.  Such  experts  as  did  accept 
Bolshevist  offers  found  themselves  in  a  very 
trying  position.  Theoretically  they  were  given 
a  free  hand  in  the  management  of  several  in- 
dustrial concerns.  Fat  salaries  were  paid  to 
them  and  they  were  placed  in  the  first  category 
as  far  as  food  rations  are  concerned.  But 
despite  these  privileges,  a  Soviet  spy  is  always 
watching  them  and  reporting  their  activities  to 
the  Cheka.  In  this  way  the  managers'  decisions 
are  actually  governed  and  over-ruled  by  highly 
ignorant  Communists  and  by  the  All-Russian 
machine  of  oppression.  So  far  the  new  tactics  ad- 
vocated by  Lenin  have  had  but  little  effect  upon 
the  general  industrial  status,  mainly  because 
the  policy  of  terror  was  chiefly  directed  against 
the  educated  classes.  The  result  was  that  a 
majority  of  technically  skilled  engineers  and 
scientists  were  either  murdered  or  otherwise  in- 
capacitated. The  truth  is  that  Russian  experts 
are  practically  unavailable. 

The  latest  information  from  Soviet  Russia 
seems  to  indicate  that  the  Workers'  Control  is 
being  rapidly  replaced  by  individual  man- 
agement.    If  Communist  statistics  are  to  be 


98      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

taken  for  granted,  already  by  January,  1921, 
only  17.3  per  cent,  of  all  industrial  concerns  in 
the  Petrograd  district  had  continued  to  remain 
under  the  control  of  Workers'  Boards,  while 
over  86  per  cent,  had  been  restored  to  individual 
management.* 

But  in  this  respect  the  Bolsheviki  have  gone 
from  one  extreme  to  another.  Wherever  they 
have  come  back  to  individual  methods  of  man- 
agement, a  policy  of  bureaucratic  centraliza- 
tion has  developed  and  factories  are  left  to  the 
mercy  of  illiterate  Soviet  appointees  acting  as 
officials  of  the  Socialistic  State.  Superinten- 
dents of  this  kind  certainly  are  incapable  of 
reinfitating  industrial  work  on  a  business  foot- 
ing. Accordingly,  the  results  of  centralized 
management  are  no  better  than  those  obtained 
under  the  Workers'  Control. 

The  following  extract  from  an  article  pub- 
lished in  the  Soviet  press  may  serve  to  corro- 
borate this  assertion: 

"On  November  4th,  1920,  at  a  meeting  of  the 
*  Special  Transport  Committee'  presided  over  by 
Comrade  Trotsky,  and  on  November  5th  in  the 
Council  of  Labor  and  Defence,  a  report  was 
made  by  an  expedition  of  the  Special  Transport 
Committee,  which  investigated  the  conditions  of 
the  'Shock  Group'  of  works  in  the  South.  The 
expedition  points  to  the  existence  of  bureaucratic 
centralization,  which  entirely  paralyzes  the  sup- 

*  See  EconomichesTcaya  Jisn,  December  22,  1920. 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES       99 

•  ply  of  the  works  and  of  the  railway  workshops; 
the  absence  of  competent  boards  of  management 
at  the  works,  resulting  in  a  fall  of  discipline,  an 
increase  in  the  loss  of  working  days,  which,  for 
instance,  at  the  Makeeff  works  has  reached  for 
certain  workshops  as  much  as  60  per  cent.;  the 
abnormal  position  with  the  supply  of  food-stuffs 
and  clothing  to  the  workmen  of  certain  concerns; 
the  failure  to  adapt  the  productive  capacity  of 
the  workshops  to  the  program,  put  forward  in  the 
order  No.  1043."* 

It  is  evident  that  the  Communists  are  toss- 
ing about  from  one  experiment  to  another  with- 
out being  able  to  find  their  way  out  of  the  eco- 
nomic labyrinth.  As  a  last  resort,  they  are  now 
seeking  to  improve  the  situation  by  means  of 
placing  Russian  factories  in  the  hands  of  for- 
eign experts. 

Recently  the  Soviets  started  negotiations 
with  German  industrial  firms,  giving  them  un- 
limited power  to  organize  the  work  of  recon- 
struction. So,  in  May  1922,  a  German  syndi- 
cate signed  an  agreement  with  the  Bolsheviki 
for  rebuilding  the  Kronstadt  docks.  It  is 
also  reported  that  a  German  banking  group  has 
undertaken  to  build  up  a  commercial  steamship 
line  between  Petrograd  and  Hamburg.  In  ad- 
dition, Polish  manufacturers,  through  Mr. 
Aschkinazi,   the   representative   of   Poland   in 

*  Economicheskaya  Jisn,  256,  Nov.  1920.  Published  in  The  Rus- 
sian Econ(ymist,  Journal  of  tlie  Eussian  Economic  Association  in 
London,  Vol.  I.,  No.  3,  April,  1921,  p.  599. 


100      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

the  League  of  Nations,  presented  a  memoran- 
dum urging  the  League  to  approve  a  scheme 
which  practically  means  a  technical  invasion  of 
Russia.  The  plan,  if  adopted,  will  enable  Pol- 
ish experts  to  organize  and  supervise  various 
branches  of  Eussian  industry  for  the  commer- 
cial benefit  of  Poland. 

These  and  similar  schemes,  however,  are 
nothing  but  palliatives  which  are  quite  in- 
adequate to  solve  the  Russian  industrial  cri- 
sis in  its  all-embracing  scope. 

Railroad  Transport 

The  present  aspect  of  Russia's  economic  life 
is  all  the  more  deplorable  as  transportation  has 
been  paralyzed  by  incompetent  Soviet  man- 
agement. 

The  railroad  problem  has  a  particular  sig- 
nificance in  Russia  because  of  her  enormous 
area.  The  grain  region  is  located  1,000  miles 
from  Petrograd.  The  Caucasian  oil  fields  are 
over  2000  miles  away  from  Moscow.  The  prin- 
cipal Black  Sea  ports,  as  well  as  Archangel  in 
the  North,  are  thousands  of  miles  removed 
from  both  Petrograd  and  Moscow,  while  the 
richest  mining  district,  the  Ural  Mountains,  is 
located  on  the  border  of  Asia,  and  in  former 
times  it  took  three  and  one-half  days  to  reach 
Cheliabinsk  in  an  express  train.  Therefore, 
Russian  economics  must  largely  rely  upon  a 
highly  developed  railroad  net,  which  can  be 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES      loi 

compared  with  blood-carrying  veins,  nourishing 
the  heart  of  the  organism. 

It  is  difficult  to  portray  authentically  the 
present  industrial  prostration  of  Russia  with- 
out touching  upon  the  question  of  transpor- 
tation. 

The  total  length  of  railroad  lines  through- 
out the  Empire  in  1916  was  approximately  78,- 
000  versts.*  The  Versailles  Treaty  took  Po- 
land, Finland  and  other  border  regions  away 
from  Russia  which  reduced  the  mileage  of  her 
railroads  to  some  55,000  versts. 

In  1914  there  were  20,057  locomotives.  In 
the  beginning  of  1920  their  nominal  number  in 
Soviet  Russia  was  18,612.  Out  of  these,  how- 
ever, 10,560  were  classed  as  disabled  and  only 
7,610  were  considered  in  running  order.  In 
1921  the  disabled  locomotives  constituted  59 
per  cent,  of  their  total  number  as  compared 
with  16  per  cent,  in  1914.  Besides,  in  Feb- 
ruary 1921,  the  number  of  engines  idle  owing 
to  fuel  shortage  was  over  1000.  According  to 
Soviet  statistics,  the  number  of  locomotives  by 
April  1,  1922,  was  19,048;  but  12,746  were  out 
of  commission  and  364  were  scheduled  for  re- 
pair, which  means  that  the  per  cent,  of  dis- 
abled locomotives  increased  to  68,  or  11  per 
cent,  since  the  beginning  of  1921.t  The  out- 
put of  new  locomotives  shows  the  following: 

*  One  verst  equals  approximately  three-quartera  of  a  mile, 
t  See  EconomichesTcaya  Jisn,  No.  92,  April,  1922. 


I02      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 


Year 

Output 

Year 

Output; 

1914 

816 

1917 

396 

1915 

903 

1918 

191 

1916 

599 

1919 

85* 

Addressing  the  Third  All-Russian  Congress 
of  Soviets  in  April,  1920,  Trotzky  stated: 

"We  do  not  produce  any  new  locomotives.  The 
real  enemy  which  we  have  to  face  is  hunger,  mis- 
ery, darkness  and  general  disintegration.  In  1916 
there  were  16,886  locomotives  in  working  order. 
In  1918  we  had  4,679 ;  in  1919  only  2,411." 

Early  in  1920  Rj^koff,  speaking  before  the 
Congress  of  Trade  Unions  delegates,  made  this 
outspoken  statement: 

"Before  the  war  the  percentage  of  disabled 
locomotives  *  *  *  even  in  most  difficult  times, 
did  not  surpass  15  per  cent.  To-day  the  percent- 
age is  59.9.  In  consequence,  out  of  every  100 
locomotives  in  Soviet  Russia,  there  are  60  which 
are  out  of  service  and  only  40  of  which  are  in 
working  order.  The  repair  of  the  disabled  loco- 
motives diminishes  with  extraordinary  rapidity. 
Before  the  war  8  per  cent,  were  repaired  every 
month.  After  the  October  revolution  of  1917  this 
percentage  was  reduced  sometimes  to  1  per  cent. ; 
at  present  we  have  been  able  to  raise  this  figure 
but  only  to  2  per  cent.  Under  the  present  con- 
dition of  railroads,  the  work  of  repairing  cannot 
keep  pace  with   the  destruction  of  locomotives, 

•  Quoted  from  Narodnoje  Khosiaistvo,  semi-monthly  organ  of  the 
Supreme  Soviet  of  National  Economy,  Nos.  5-6,  1920,  p.  5,  Moscow. 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES      103 

and  each  month  we  register  a  decrease  in  the  num- 
ber of  locomotives  at  our  disposal  as  compared 
with  the  preceding  month.  This  decrease  amounts 
monthly  to  200  locomotives/'* 

Professor  Lomonossoff,  one  of  the  Soviet 
Commissars  in  charge  of  the  Transportation 
Department,  estimated  the  minimum  number 
of  locomotives  urgently  needed  in  Eussia  at 
f)000.  This  is  probably  a  correct  calculation. 
But  it  must  not  be  overlooked  that  the  maxi- 
mum annual  output  of  all  Russian  locomotive 
plants  does  not  exceed  500,  and  it  would,  there- 
fore, require  at  least  ten  years  to  build  the 
lacking  number  of  engines. 

The  repair  of  locomotives  also  shows  a  back- 
ward tendency:  only  467  engines  were  repaired 
in  January,  1922,  as  compared  with  660  in 
December  1921,  and  701  in  January  1921.t 

The  same  desperate  condition  is  observed 
with  regard  to  railroad  cars.  In  1917  their 
number  was  574,486.  By  1921  it  was  reduced 
to  454,985,  out  of  which  only  350,000  were  in 
working  order.  On  April  1,  1922,  out  of  a 
total  of  392,000  freight  cars,  173,000  or  44  per 
cent  were  out  of  commission.  J 

*  See  pamphlet  Economic  Eussia  in  1920  by  Gregor  Alexinsky, 
published  by  the  Foreign  Affairs  News  Service,  May,  1920,  New 
York  City. 

f  See  Wirtschaftspolitische  Aufbau-Korrespondens,  May  5,  1922. 
No.  18,  published  in  Munich,  Germany.  Information  quoted  therein 
is  based  upon  data  furnished  by  the  EconomichesTcaya  Jisn,  No.  84, 
1922. 

■^  Compare  Commerce  'Reports,  published  by  the  U.  Si  Department 
of  Commerce,  issue  of  June  5,  1922,  p.  644. 


104      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

The  state  of  the  railroad  track  itself  is  also 
undergoing  rapid  decay.  It  is  estimated  that 
in  order  to  maintain  the  railroad  tracks  in 
serviceable  condition,  it  is  necessary  every  year 
to  replace  the  rails  on  a  mileage  of  3,500  versts. 
In  1920,  however,  only  240  versts  of  new  rails 
were  laid.  In  addition,  there  was  a  shortage  of 
some  18,000,000  railroad  ties  which  made  the 
rebuilding  of  the  tracks  practically  impossible. 

Out  of  38,000  railroad  telephone  apparatus, 
32,500  need  fundamental  repair.  Russian  rail- 
roads are  equipped  with  10,000  telephones,  but 
8,000  or  80  per  cent.,  are  out  of  commission. 
Finally,  in  order  to  restore  the  railroad  tele- 
graph system  to  pre-war  efficiency,  10,000,000 
new  poles  are  required. 

The  financial  side  of  railroad  operation  un- 
der the  Soviets  is  just  as  bad  as  its  technical 
status.  The  deficit  of  Russian  railways  for  the 
first  two  months  in  1922  amounted  to  14,100,- 
000,000,000  paper  rubles  (approximately  94,- 
000,000  gold  rubles).  Added  to  the  arrears  in 
wages  and  supplies  not  paid  for,  the  deficit 
reached  the  stupendous  mark  of  15,300,000,000,- 
000  Soviet  rubles.* 

In  brief,  such  is  the  deplorable  condition  of 
railroad  transport  under  Soviet  management. 

The  Communist  authorities  have  delivered 
countless  speeches  on  the  question  of  disinte- 
gration of  the  railroad  traffic.    At  every  Com- 

*  Compare  with  data  in  Commerce  "Reports,  June  5,  1922,  p.  644. 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES      105 

munist  Convention,  at  every  gathering  of  trade 
unions  and  other  labor  organizations,  the  sit- 
uation is  rehashed  again  and  again.  Lenin 
and  Rykoff  are  submitting  elaborate  reports 
on  the  subject,  inventing  new  reasons  for  the 
present  collapse  of  the  railroads.  Trotzky  many 
times  has  shaken  his  fist  in  anger  at  the  imag- 
inary enemy  hampering  the  work  of  Soviet  re- 
construction. Volumes  have  been  written  on 
this  problem,  and  yet  not  only  has  the  trans- 
portation system  failed  to  improve  in  the  least, 
but  from  month  to  month  Soviet  statisticians 
record  an  ever-growing  number  of  losses  in 
the  rolling  stock  and  a  further  disorganization 
in  the  railroad  service.  In  the  light  of  these 
facts,  the  Commissars  themselves  admit  that 
unless  a  radical  change  and  rapid  improvement 
in  transport  are  effected,  the  fate  of  the  So- 
cialistic State  is  doomed. 

Compulsory  Labor  and  Militarization  of  Labor 

The  universal  obligation  to  work  is  one  of 
the  cardinal  principles  proclaimed  by  the  Sov- 
iet State.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the 
Marxian  theory,  a  Socialistic  enterprise  is  a 
single  economic  unit  within  the  limits  of  the 
State,  having  a  standard  plan  of  production 
and  distribution  guaranteed  by  universal  labor 
service.  Such  an  organization  presupposes  an 
obligatory  distribution  of  human  labor  through- 


io6      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

out  tlie  different  branches  of  national  econ- 
omics, as  agriculture,  industry  and  transporta- 
tion. But  human  beings — at  least  in  civilized 
countries — ^have  become  accustomed  to  look 
upon  their  right  to  freely  dispose  of  their  work- 
ing energy  as  the  most  sacred  guarantee  of 
liberty  and  progress.  In  view  of  this,  for  a 
Socialistic  State,  it  becomes  necessary  to  in- 
troduce compulsory  labor  by  a  series  of  legis- 
lative acts,  the  enforcement  of  which  must  be 
supported  by  measures  of  a  compulsory  char- 
acter, or  in  the  last  analysis,  by  military  force 
of  the  proletarian  State.  Such  is  the  theory 
of  Socialism. 

In  practice,  the  Commissars  have  literally 
applied  these  abstract  premises  to  every-day 
intercourse  in  Russian  life. 

In  the  '^Declaration  of  Rights  of  tJie  Labor- 
ing and  Exploited  People''  the  principle  of 
compulsory  labor  has  been  proclaimed  but  in  a 
general  way.  However,  on  account  of  the  ag- 
gravation of  the  industrial  crisis,  and  because 
of  the  obdurate  resistance  of  the  citizens  to 
compulsory  regulations  prescribing  the  meth- 
ods and  amount  of  work  to  be  yielded,  the  Bol- 
sheviki  began  to  be  restive  over  their  ability  to 
put  the  Marxian  theory  into  effect.  Owing  to 
this  experience,  by  the  year  1919  they  saw  fit 
to  elaborate  a  number  of  regulations  on  com- 
pulsory labor,  enacting  them  in  the  ''Code  of 
Labor  Laws  of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES      107 

Soviet  Republic/'  The  opening  paragraph  is 
really  the  keynote  to  the  entire  document.  It 
reads ; 

''All  citizens  of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federal 
Soviet  RepuUic,  with  the  exceptions  stated  in  Sec- 
tion 2  and  3,  shall  be  subject  to  compulsory 
labor." 

Persons  exempted  from  this  general  rule  are 
those  under  sixteen  and  over  fifty  years  of  age, 
as  well  as  those  who  have  become  incapacitated 
by  injury  or  illness.  Even  students  in  colleges, 
according  to  Paragraph  4,  are  subject  to  com- 
pulsory labor. 

The  enforcement  of  this  law  is  secured 
through  the  Division  of  Labor  Distribution, 
Trade  Unions,  and  all  institutions  of  the  Soviet 
Republic.  The  assignment  of  workers  to  par- 
ticular jobs  is  made  through  the  Division  of 
Labor  Distribution,  or  the  so-called  ''Kom- 
trud."  (Paragraphs  15  and  16.)  Although 
the  Soviet  Labor  Code  declares,  as  a  general 
principle,  that  employment  must  be  based  upon 
vocation  or  natural  inclination  to  a  particular 
kind  of  work,  nevertheless,  according  to  Sec- 
tion 29,  an  "unemployed  person  who  is  offered 
work  outside  his  vocation  shall  be  obliged  to 
accept  it,"  at  least  as  a  temporary  occupation. 
Acceptance  of  workers  for  permanent  em- 
ployment is  preceded  by  a  period  of  probation 
of  not  more  than  six  days.     According  to  the 


io8      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

showings  of  the  test,  the  men  are  either  given 
a  permanent  position  or  rejected  with  pay- 
ment for  the  trial  period.  In  the  event  of  their 
rejection,  the  Labor  Code  establishes  an  oner- 
ous procedure  for  applicants  desiring  to  file  ap- 
peals. These  must  be  filed  with  the  respective 
trade  unions. 

Paragraph  27: 

"If  the  trade  union  deems  the  appeal  .... 
justified,  it  shall  enter  into  negotiations  with  the 
establishment  or  person  who  has  rejected  the 
worker,  with  the  request  that  the  complainant  be 
accepted. ' ' 

Paragraph  28: 

"In  case  of  failure  of  the  negotiations  .... 
the  matter  shall  be  submitted  to  the  local  Depart- 
ment of  Labor  whoee  decision  shall  be  final  and 
subject  to  no  further  appeal." 

Anyone  familiar  with  the  bureaucratic  rou- 
tine prevailing  in  Soviet  Russia  will  readily 
understand  what  these  provisions  actually 
mean.  In  practice,  instances  are  frequent 
where  a  person  assigned  by  the  Komtrud  to  a 
certain  work  is  thereupon  rejected  by  one  em- 
ployer after  another  so  that  the  ^'productive 
efforts"  of  such  an  applicant  are  restricted  to 
filing  appeals  with  and  lobbying  in  different 
Trade  Unions,  Soviets  and  Labor  Boards. 

Among  the  more  odious  features  of  the 
Labor  Law  is  the  right  of  the  State  to  trans- 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES      109 

fer  the  worker  not  only  to  another  enterprise 
situated  in  the  same  locality,  but  even  to  have 
him  sent  to  other  labor  districts  which  may  be 
far  removed  from  the  place  of  his  original  em- 
ployment. 

Human  labor  is  considered  the  property  of 
the  State  and  human  beings  are  shipped  like 
so  many  cattle  from  one  part  of  Russia  to 
another  without  the  slightest  regard  for  their 
personal  comfort  and  habitual  occupations. 

The  Soviet  Labor  Code  is  being  used  as  a 
means  of  oppression  against  the  unfortunate 
bourgeoisie,  while  the  privileged  Communist 
class  is  either  exempt  from  compulsory  labor, 
or  else  assigned  to  easy  jobs.  During  the  un- 
ceasing epidemics  ravaging  the  country,  the 
bourgeoisie,  on  the  strength  of  the  regulations 
of  the  Labor  Code,  are  being  forced  to  dig 
graves  and  bury  the  dead.  During  guerrilla 
periods,  under  the  pretext  of  the  same  rules, 
the  bourgeoisie  are  being  compelled  to  dig 
trenches  for  the  Red  Army.  When  the  Com- 
munists suddenly  decide  to  establish  some  kind 
of  a  new  ''front,"  for  instance  when  they  wish 
to  clean  up  their  filthy  cities,  again  it  is  the 
bourgeoisie  who  has  to  perform  the  job.  It  is  a 
cruel  and  relentless  mockery.  Eminent  phy- 
sicians and  jurists,  skilled  engineers  and  scien- 
tists, refined  women  and  ladies  of  society  are 
forced  to  work  as  grave-diggers  and  street- 
sweepers. 


no   THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Of  course,  these  drafted  workers  are  **strik' 
ing  on  their  jobs"  and  sabotaging  the  Com- 
munist State. 

Compulsory  labor,  as  an  avowed  policy  in 
Russian  economics,  was  introduced  not  only  in 
conformity  with  the  Marxian  stipulations,  but 
also  as  a  measure  to  increase  productivity. 
Soviet  decrees  recommending  methods  for  se- 
curing labor  efficiency  were  thoroughly  ignored 
both  by  the  workers  and  the  Communist  super- 
intendents themselves.  The  reason  therefor 
is  to  be  found  not  so  much  in  the  opposition 
of  the  masses  of  the  people  to  the  Bolsheviki,  as 
in  the  fact  that  their  legislation  has  always 
refused  to  deal  with  actual  conditions  and 
social  realities.  The  Communist  lawmakers 
try  to  squeeze  life  into  the  Procrustean  bed 
of  abstract  theories  and  dead  formulas.  Take 
this  rule: 

''Every  worker  must,  during  a  normal  worMng 
day  and  under  normal  conditions,  perform  the 
standard  amount  of  work  fixed  for  the  category 
and  group  in  which  he  is  enrolled/'* 

What  does  ''the  standard  amount  of  work" 
mean?  What  significance  have  the  "Valua- 
tion Commissions"  established  to  determine 
the  standard  output  for  workers  in  each  trade? 
They  are  merely  defunct  bureaucratic  bodies 
sapping    the    Soviet    treasury.      Any    consid- 

*  Paragraph  114  of  the  Soviet  Labor  Code. 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES      in 

eration  for  fixing  the  standard  output  must 
be  based  upon  *' normal  working  conditions," 
that  is,  satisfactory  conditions  of  machinery 
and  accessories,  timely  delivery  of  materials 
and  tools,  a  good  quality  of  materials,  and 
similar  factors  bearing  the  greatest  importance 
upon  the  tempo  of  industrial  production.  But 
what  is  normalcy  as  applied  to  Soviet  Eussia? 
Every  department  of  life  is  upset;  every  in- 
dustrial agency  is  broken,  and  the  whole  tech- 
nique of  production  is  brought  to  a  standstill. 
What  then  is  "the  standard  output"?  And 
what  is  the  object  in  putting  up  this  smoke 
screen  of  theoretical  dissertations  on  the  meth- 
ods for  increasing  labor  productivity  when  fac- 
tories have  nothing  to  keep  them  running,  no 
raw  materials,  no  fuel,  no  lubricants,  and  no 
food  to  feed  the  workers? 

Much  hope  has  been  placed  by  the  Commun- 
ists in  their  Labor  Code.  It  was  expected  that 
as  soon  as  these  cruel  regulations  were  put 
into  effect,  the  creative  faculty  of  the  people 
would  be  restored  and  the  citizens  of  the  So- 
cialist State  would  quickly  resume  tiieir  peace- 
ful labors.  But,  alas!  from  the  point  of  view 
of  industrial  returns,  the  year  1919  proved 
even  more  disappointing  than  the  preceding 
years.  The  immediate  effect  of  the  reinstitu- 
tion  of  slavery  was  that  workers  by  the  thou- 
sands began  to  desert  the  factories,  fleeing  to 
rural  districts.     Even  the  *' shock  plants"  in 


112      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

whicli  food  rations  were  somewhat  better  than 
in  ordinary  enterprises,  began  to  experience  an 
acute  shortage  of  workmen.  Labor  desertion 
assumed  colossal  proportions,  especially  in  the 
northern  and  central  industrial  districts.  The 
pressure  brought  by  the  Central  Soviet  upon 
the  Trade  Unions  in  order  to  arrest  further 
reduction  in  the  number  of  industrial  workers 
failed  to  bring  about  the  desired  effect.  Futile 
were  also  the  efforts  to  increase  production  by 
lengthening  the  labor-day  and  staging  the  ri- 
diculous ''Communist  Sabbaths."*  The  notori- 
ous "eight-hour  day"  was  given  up.  A  Soviet 
radio  dating  back  to  February,  1920,  stated: 

"The  toiling  masses  must  understand  that  it 
is  necessary  to  abandon  the  idea  of  an  eight- 
hour  day  in  this  time  of  disorganization  and  hard 
work.  They  must  work  ten  and  twelve  hours  a 
da/y  and  realize  that  they  are  working  for  a 
hrighter  future/^ 

But  babbling  about  "a  brighter  future"  did 
not  help.  No  one  in  Russia  places  any  credence 
in  Communist  promises. 

It  was  then  that  Trotzky  came  out  with  his 
nefarious  project  for  the  "Red  Labor  Army." 
In  short,  it  called  for  a  census  of  the  popula- 

*  In  order  to  increase  production,  Trotzky  began  to  advocate  the 
institution  of  the  so-called  "Communist  Sabbaths,"  which  means 
that  the  members  of  the  Communist  Party  were  urged  to  voluntarily 
work  on  Saturdays  and  holidays.  Much  boasting  has  been  on  foot 
about  the  wonderful  spirit  which  the  Communist  partisans  mani- 
fested toward  the  needs  of  the  ' '  Workers '  and  Peasants '  State, ' '  but 
the  actual  results  of  the  ' '  Communist  Sabbaths ' '  are  negligible. 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES      113 

lion  fitted  for  work  and  coincided  with  military 
conscription.  The  local  Commissars  of  the  War 
Department  were  instructed  to  act  as  agents 
for  labor  mobilization. 

At  the  Third  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets 
of  National  Economy,  Lenin,  on  this  point, 
quite  in  accord  with  Trotzky's  bestial  psychol- 
ogy, tried  to  justify  slavery  by  stating: 

"I  should  like  only  to  point  out  that  during 
the  transition  period  from  civil  warfare  to  new 
problems,  we  should  throw  everything  on  the 
front  of  labor,  and  concentrate  here  all  forces 
for  a  maximum  effort,  with  a  merciless  determina- 
tion. Just  now  we  shall  not  permit  any  evasion. 
Throwing  out  this  slogan,  we  shall  justify  that  we 
must  to  the  utmost  bend  all  the  vital  forces  of 
workmen  and  peasants  to  this  task  and  demand 
that  they  give  us  all  their  help.  And  that,  by 
creating  a  labor  army,  by  straining  all  the  forces 
of  workmen  and  peasants,  we  shall  be  carrying  out 
our  basic  task.  We  shall  be  able  to  collect  hun- 
dreds of  millions  of  poods  of  grain.  We  have 
them.  But  incredible,  diabolical  efforts  are  re- 
quired  "* 

In  further  elucidation  of  this  program,  the 
Moscow  authorities  on  March  11,  1920,  sent 
out  the  following  radio: 

"The  utilization  of  military  units  for  labor 
has  both  a  practical  (economic  and  social)  and 
educational  significance.  The  conditions  under 
which  the  utilization  of  labor  on  a  large  scale 

*  See  Izvestia,  issue  of  January  29,  1920.  Translated  from  the 
Bussian. 


114      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

would  be  commendable  are  as  follows :  "Work  of  a 
simple  nature  which  can  be  performed  by  any  Red 
Army  soldier,  adoption  of  a  system  of  stating  a 
clearly  defined  task,  which  when  not  accomplished 
leads  to  the  reduction  of  the  food  ration,  adop- 
tion of  the  premium  system,  the  employment  of 
a  great  number  of  Communists  in  the  same  work- 
ing district  so  that  they  may  set  Red  Army  units 
a  good  example  (?).  The  employment  of  large 
military  units  unavoidably  leads  to  a  great  per- 
centage of  Red  Army  soldiers  unemployed  direct- 
ly in  productive  labor.  For  this  reason  the  util- 
ization of  all  labor  armies,  retaining  the  army 
system  and  organization,  may  only  be  justified 
from  the  point  of  view  of  keeping  the  army  in- 
tact for  military  purposes." 

One  of  the  well-known  Communists,  Khodo- 
rovsky,  in  tlie  Moscow  Pravda,  advocated  the 
militarization  of  trade  unions  so  that  they  could 
be  used  as  agencies  for  enforcing  decrees  on 
militarization  of  labor.  To  cite  only  one  in- 
stance of  the  general  attitude  of  the  workers 
toward  labor  conscription,  an  article  published 
in  the  Bolshevist  Bed  Gazette  may  be  referred 
to.  A  Communist  reporter  gives  these  com- 
ments on  interviews  with  mobilized  workers  in 
Petrograd : 

"Not  all  of  them  speak  the  truth.  Some  one 
Bpread  the  rumor  that  all  unskilled  laborers  would 
be  permitted  to  return  to  their  villages  for  agri- 
cultural work,  while  the  skilled  were  done  for. 
.  .  .  When  asked  why  they  did  not  report  for 
the  first  draft,  they  seemed  to  hesitate.    They  in- 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES      115 

vented  all  sorts  of  excuses:  one  would  not  have 
finished  building  a  house;  another  would  plead 
some  family  cause.  In  one  way  or  another  it 
was  obvious  that  had  it  not  been  for  mobilization, 
the  Petrograd  factories  would  never  have  even 
got  a  glimpse  of  them."* 

The  Eussian  workers  tried  to  defend  them- 
selves as  well  as  they  could.  In  many  factories 
when  electing  Workers'  Shop  Committees,  they 
voted  down  all  the  Communist  candidates. 
Sometimes  they  consciously  elected  anarchists 
because  they  knew  that  these  were  opposed  to 
everything,  no  matter  what  it  was.  In  one  of 
the  issues  of  the  Economicheskaya  Jisn  an 
incident  referring  to  the  elections,  at  the  rail- 
way shops  near  Moscow  is  described: 

"The  workers" — thus  runs  the  account — 
"were  simply  frightened  at  the  introduction  of 
compulsory  labor  and  of  the  threats  of  labor 
discipline.  The  only  anarchist  in  the  work  shop 
(whose  head  is  a  perfect  jumble  of  ideas  and 
catch-words)  explained  to  his  fellow-workers  that 
this  is  nothing  more  than  the  reinstitution  of  serf- 
dom. The  result  was  that  this  anarchist  'with 
his  jumble  of  ideas'  was  elected  to  the  Soviet. 
He  will  make  short  work  of  them,'  they  said."t 

But  the  bitter  resentment  of  the  poor  Eus- 
sian proletarians  to  Bolshevist  inquisitionary 
methods  did  not  modify  them  in  the  slightest 
degree.     On  the  contrary,  Trotzky,  reiterating 

♦See  Krasnaya  Gaseta  (The  Red  Gazette),  No.  240,  October,  1920. 
t  Quoted  in  The  Eussian  Economist.  Vol.  I.,  p.  595. 


ii6      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Karl  Marx's  stipulation  (Communist  Mani- 
festo) went  so  far  as  to  urge  militarization  of 
all  agricultural  processes,  which,  if  put  into 
effect,  would  have  placed  100,000,000  Russian 
peasants  under  the  yoke  of  Red  Army  Com- 
missars. On  this  subject  Trotzky  came  out  with 
a  startling  explanation: 

"At  present  the  militarization  of  labor  is  all 
the  more  needed  because  we  have  now  come  to 
the  mobilization  of  the  peasants  as  a  means  of 
solving  the  problems  requiring  mass  action.  We 
are  mobilizing  the  peasants  and  orgamzing  them 
into  lahor  detachments  which  very  much  resemble 
military  detachm,ents.  .  .  .  We  have  in  the  im- 
portant branches  of  our  industry  more  than 
1,000,000  workmen  on  the  list;  in  reality,  how- 
ever, not  more  than  800,000  are  actually  en- 
gaged in  work.  Now,  where  are  the  remainder? 
They  have  gone  to  the  villages  or  other  divisions 
of  industry  or  into  speculation.  Among  the  sol- 
diers this  is  called  desertion  in  one  form  or  an- 
other. The  methods  used  to  compel  soldiers  to 
perform  their  duty  must  also  be  applied  in  the 
field  of  labor.  Under  the  unified  system  of  econ- 
omy, the  masses  of  workmen  should  be  moved 
about,  ordered  and  sent  from  place  to  place  in 
exactly  the  same  manner  as  soldiers.  This  is  the 
foundation  of  the  militarization  of  labor  and 
without  this  we  shall  be  unable  to  speak  seriously 
of  any  organization  of  industry  on  a  new  basis 
under  the  conditions  of  starvation  and  disorgan- 
ization existing  to-day."* 

*  Moscow  Izvestia,  March  21,  1920.  Further  details  on  labor  con- 
scription and  mobilization  of  labor  may  bo  found  in  Chapter  8  of 
Trotzky 'a  Book   The  Defence  of   Terrorism,  London,   1921. 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES      117 

Such  are — to  use  Lenin's  own  expression — 
the  ** diabolical  methods"  which  have  been  in- 
troduced by  the  Soviet  rulers,  ostensibly  for 
the  purpose  of  solving  the  industrial  crisis;  in 
reality,  however,  to  enslave  the  whole  nation,  tor- 
turing it  in  the  All-Russian  Cheka,  in  filthy 
Soviet  prisons,  and  in  miserable  Red  Guard 
armories.  Under  the  pretext  of  establishing  a 
dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  the  Communists 
have  imposed  a  horrid  dictatorship  over  the 
proletariat.  Indeed,  hell  they  have  attained. 
But  the  industrial  crisis  in  all  its  magnitude 
continues  to  be  the  nightmare  of  Russian  life. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  go  into  further  de- 
tails describing  the  extent  and  the  various 
phases  of  the  Russian  industrial  catastrophe. 
Incidentally  it  may  be  noted  that  all  Soviet 
measures,  culminating  in  the  restoration  of 
slavery  and  militarization  of  labor,  have  failed 
to  relieve  the  tragic  situation.  Production  con- 
tinues to  decrease  in  ever-growing  proportions. 
Here  are  a  few  additional  figures  bringing  the 
analysis  up  to  date: 

SOUTH    RUSSIAN    INDUSTRIAL    DISTRICTS 

December,   1921,   coal   output    7,500,000  poods 

January,  1922,  coal  output    4,600,000 

December,  1921,  cast  iron  smelted  491,000 

January,  1922,  cast  iron  smelted  347,000 

December,   1921,  smelted  in  furnaces    896,000 

January,  1922,  smelted  in  furnaces   724,000 

•See  Economicheskaya  Jisn,  No.  82,  April  12,  1922. 


Ii8      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

As  compared  with  December,  1921,  in  Janu- 
ary, 1922,  the  rolling  mills  reduced  their  opera- 
tions by  52  per  cent.  In  February,  1922,  there 
was  a  further  reduction  of  18  per  cent.  The 
most  significant  decrease,  however,  was  regis- 
tered in  smelting  cast  iron ;  of  the  two  furnaces 
in  the  South  Russian  District,  the  famous  Uzov- 
sky  furnace  was  extinguished,  with  the  result 
that  in  February,  1922,  only  8,000  poods  of 
cast  iron  were  smelted.* 

Similar  disintegration  is  observed  in  textile 
industries.  Here,  too,  the  production  of  manu- 
factured goods  infallibly  grows  less: 

November,    1921      1,518,000  arshinest 

December,   1921     2,179,000        " 

January,   1922     1,402,000        " 

February,   1922     ;,000,000        " 

Everywhere  the  picture  of  decay  and  despair 
is  the  same. 

As  a  general  remark  it  must  be  said  that 
wholesale  destruction  of  Russian  industries  is 
in  no  way  a  casual  phenomenon.  It  is  the  logi- 
cal outcome  of  the  nonsensical  and  brutal  poli- 
cies which  have  been  pursued  by  the  Commun- 
ists during  the  entire  period  of  their  incredible 
misrule. 

*  See  Eccmomicheskaya  Jisn,  No.  82,  April  12,  1922. 
t  One  arshine  is  equal  to  2.3  feet.    See  EconomichesTcaya  Jisn,  No. 
82,  AprU  12,  1922. 


THE  RUIN  OF  RUSSIAN  INDUSTRIES      119 

Marxism,  fallacious  as  it  is  in  theory,  when 
applied  to  practice  produces  dismal  conditions. 
Chaos,  Misery  and  Death  are  the  three  monsters 
— the  three  symbols  of  Bolshevism. 

Shall  civilized  mankind  bow  down  before 
these  monsters'? 


CHAPTER  IV 

TRADE  AND  FINANCE 

TV/f  ODERN  economic  life  is  a  complex  mecli- 
•*-■■•  anism,  the  integral  parts  of  which,  such 
as  agriculture,  industry,  trade  and  finance,  are 
so  closely  inter-related  that  the  functioning  of 
one  branch  is  conditional  upon  the  normal  and 
uninterrupted  operation  of  the  others.  With 
chaos  reigning  in  Russia's  agriculture,  and  dis- 
integration prevailing  in  her  industries,  it  was 
natural  that  both  trade  and  finance  could  not 
remain  on  a  sound  footing. 

In  the  preceding  brief  sketch  of  the  national- 
ization program  the  fact  was  emphasized  that 
trade,  in  the  same  way  as  industry,  was  placed 
under  Soviet  control.  Foreign  and  internal 
commercial  intercourse  were  monopolized  by 
the  Communist  State,  and  no  private  trade 
transactions  could  be  carried  on  no  matter 
whether  they  were  confined  to  Russia  proper  or 
extended  to  foreign  countries. 

By  the  end  of  1920  tlie  nationalization  cycle 
was  completed.  Distribution  of  commodities, 
and  trade  exchange  at  large,  were  entrusted 
to  bureaucratic  institutions,  while  even  petty 
trade  was  declared  a  crime  against  the  Soviet 
Republic  and  labeled  as  "speculation."  It 
was  due  to  this  policy  and  not  to  the  ** blockade" 

120 


TRADE  AND  FINANCE  121 

that  trade  relations  between  Soviet  Russia  and 
foreign  countries  have  almost  ceased.  Nothing 
was  exported  from  Russia  since  there  was  noth- 
ing to  export.  The  table  below  shows  the 
rapid  decline  in  shipments  to  foreign  countries : 

RUSSIAN  EXPORTS 

1913  23,017,500  tons 

1918  29,490     " 

1919  20,210     " 

1920  10,900     " 

1921  209,080     "* 

In  1921  the  Soviets  began  to  modify  their 
trade  policies,  and  commercial  relations  in  sev- 
eral lines  were  freed  from  Soviet  tutelage. 
This  explains  the  puzzling  increase  of  exports 
in  that  year.  But  the  improvement  did  not 
last  long.  In  January,  1922,  the  total  amount 
of  exports  did  not  exceed  16,600  tons  and  in 
February  it  was  again  reduced  to  only  13,300 
tons. 

The  stoppage  of  exports  produced  a  recipro- 
cal condition  regarding  imports.  According  to 
a  report  of  the  People's  Commissariat  for 
Foreign  Trade,  in  1921  the  imports  were  only 
916,666  tons,  including  charity  shipments  of  the 
American  Relief  Administration  and  kindred 
organizations.  The  value  of  these  goods  was 
approximately  248,557,000  gold  rubles  at  pre- 

*  EconomichesTcaya  Jisn,  issae  of  March  7,   1922. 


122      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

war  prices.     In  1910  Russia's  foreign  trade 
balance  showed  the  following: 

Imports 1,084,446,000  gold  rubles 

Exports 1,449,085,900  gold  rubles 

Comparing  these  figures  with  the  turnover  in 
foreign  trade  for  1921,  we  see  that  it  consti- 
tuted about  10  per  cent,  of  that  in  1910, 
while  with  regard  to  weight  is  was  only  2.8 
per  cent.* 

The  increase  in  imports  from  western  coun- 
tries, mainly  from  England,  took  place  during 
the  first  part  of  1920,  reaching  the  peak  (10,- 
000,000  poods)  in  the  month  of  September. 
But  beginning  with  October,  foreign  consign* 
ments  again  began  to  fall  off: 

O'Ctober,    1921,     7,800,000  poods 

November,   1921,    6,500,000      " 

December,    1921,    5,200,000      " 

January,    1922,    4,439,000      " 

In  February,  1922,  the  volume  of  imports 
showed  a  somewhat  livelier  tendency  owing  to 
larger  quantities  of  food  shipped  by  the  Ameri- 
can Relief  Administration. 

•  The  total  value  of  gooda  exported  from  Soviet  Eussia  in  1921  did 
not  exceed  20,000,000  gold  rubles.  Compare  these  figures  with  data 
furnished  by  the  EconomichesTcaya  Jisn,  issues  February  16th  and 
18th,  and  March  18th  and  21st,  and  the  Weekly  Bulletin  of  the 
Supreme  Monarchical  Council,  No.  39,  May  1,  1922.  Published  in 
Berlin  in  Bussian. 


TRADE  AND  FINANCE  123 

The  significance  of  these  statistics  will  be 
made  quite  clear  if  it  is  considered  that  even 
in  former  times  Russian  economic  life  had  to 
rely  upon  commodities  imported  from  abroad. 
The  following  table  indicates  the  percentage  of 
imports  in  proportion  to  domestic  production 
in  pre-war  times : 

Agricultural  machinery: 

(a)  Not  equipped  with  steam  engines    42  % 

(b)  Complex  machinery    72  % 

(c)  Scythes , 78  % 

Coal    25  % 

Mathematical  and  astronomical  instruments 70  % 

Medical   instruments 75  % 

Electrical  instruments 80  % 

Zinc 65  % 

Lead     ^ 98  % 

Cotton-wool     47  % 

♦Silk ., 90  % 

Nationalization  measures,  having  brought  to 
a  standstill  Russia's  commercial  intercourse, 
with  foreign  nations  had  an  equally  deleterious 
effect  upon  the  distribution  of  commodities 
within  the  country  itself.  The  Soviets  had 
private  stores  closed  and  their  merchandise 
seized  by  the  State.  Traditional  Russian  cus- 
toms of  bartering,  such  as  fairs  and  bazaars, 
were  prohibited  and  the  exchange  of  goods 
was  put  under  the  supervision  of  State  officials. 

*  See  A.  Raketoff,  Op.  Cit.  p.  70. 


124      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Nominally  every  citizen  of  the  Soviet  Repub- 
lic had  the  right  to  purchase  from  Soviet  stores 
everything  needed  for  the  daily  upkeep  of  his 
household.  It  was  the  prerogative  of  the  State 
to  regulate  prices.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was 
also  its  duty  to  supply  the  different  regions 
with  various  kinds  of  goods  in  sufficient  quan- 
tities. Such  was  the  theory.  The  practice 
was  entirely  different. 

When  the  trade  mechanism  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  State,  it  was  found  that  the  bureau- 
cratic organization  set  up  by  the  Soviets  was 
unequal  to  coping  with  the  task  of  furnishing 
the  people  vdth  the  necessary  commodities.  Un- 
derproduction, combined  with  the  elimination  of 
imports  from  abroad,  caused  an  acute  shortage 
of  merchandise  of  every  description.  The 
stocks  of  private  merchants  which  had  been 
confiscated  were  either  sold  out  or  appropriated 
by  Soviet  functionaries  themselves.  No  wonder 
prices  of  food,  fuel  and  other  daily  necessities 
became  prohibitive.  But  even  in  a  Soviet 
State,  and  under  a  Marxian  regime,  people  have 
to  live  somehow  or  other.  The  mere  fact  that 
the  Bolsheviki  dispensed  with  private  trade 
could  not  and  did  not  bar  commercial  inter- 
course among  private  citizens.  However,  the 
effect  of  the  Communist  program  has  been  two- 
fold: First,  hundreds  of  thousands  of  citizens, 
including  the  Commissars,  have  gone  into  specu- 
lation, making  regular  trips  to  rural  districts 


TRADE  AND  FINANCE  125 

to  procure  food,  linen,  and  other  necessities, 
which  were  thereafter  resold  in  the  cities  at 
extortionate  prices.  The  Bolsheviki  have  thus 
created  a  new  caste  of  society — the  speculators 
— who,  like  social  parasites,  are  looting  and 
snatching  whatever  there  is  left  in  the  posses- 
sion of  private  individuals.  Second,  the  colos- 
sal wealth  which  through  centuries  had  accumu- 
lated in  the  cities  has  been  gradually  smuggled 
out  to  rural  districts.  The  reason  for  this 
was  that  in  the  cities  the  greatest  need  was 
food.  Food  was  available  only  in  the  villages. 
Soviet  rubles  meant  nothing  to  the  peasants. 
They  flatly  refused  to  exchange  their  products 
for  rubbish  currency.  But  they  did  sell  them 
for  such  things  as  they  either  needed  in  their 
households,  or  wanted  to  keep  as  objects  of 
luxury.  In  view  of  this  situation,  the  urban 
residents  were  compelled  to  give  up  their  all, 
from  matches,  hammers  and  nails,  to  paintings 
by  Raphael,  rare  musical  instruments,  priceless 
libraries,  and  most  precious  gems. 

Like  conspirators,  the  poor  Soviet  citizens 
secretly  crept  to  the  'Hhief  markets"  where 
they  met  the  speculators.  It  was  there  that 
the  bulk  of  the  ** business"  was  carried  on.  It 
was  there,  and  not  in  Soviet  stores,  that  people 
procured  their  daily  bread.  Communist  spies 
and  agents  of  the  Cheka,  sneaking  around  these 
markets,  took  part  in  swindling,  stealing  and 
smuggling.    Meanwhile  the  things  belonging  to 


126      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

urban  residents  grew  scarcer  every  day.  Many 
have  already  sold  everything  they  had  and  now 
there  is  nothing  more  to  sell.  Theft  is  the 
only  solution,  the  only  means  of  making  a  live- 
lihood, and  they  become  thieves  in  order  to 
save  themselves  and  their  families  from  hunger 
and  death. 

One  of  the  most  pitiful  features  of  the  trad- 
ing practice  in  Soviet  Russia  is  the  large  num- 
ber of  children  at  present  engaged  in  specula- 
tive activities.  Boys  and  girls  between  the 
ages  of  eight  and  twelve  are  flocking  around 
bazaars  and  railroad  stations,  waiting  for  a 
chance  to  steal  a  loaf  of  bread  or  a  bundle  of 
vegetables.  Then  they  go  to  a  starving  ^'bour- 
geois" and  he  pays  for  the  stolen  morsels  with 
his  last  ring  or  overcoat. 

The  Moscow  Izvestia,  issue  No.  254,  for  1920, 
stated  that  between  the  months  of  February 
and  November  of  that  year  7,000  children  en- 
gaged in  speculation  and  swindling  were 
brought  before  the  Moscow  Commission  in 
charge  of  minor  criminals.  These  children, 
left  to  their  own  care,  lead  a  vagabond  life. 
All  of  them  are  morally  degenerate.  Easy 
money  is  all  they  are  after.  Venereal  diseases 
are  rampant  among  them.  What  drags  these 
little  ones  to  the  depths  of  the  social  inferno  ? 
Sometimes  it  is  the  unselfish  desire  to  help 
their  destitute  parents  who  are  starving  on  the 
Soviet  ration;   in   other  instances   it   is   their 


TRADE  AND  FINANCE  127 

greed,  or  the  sordid  instincts  of  their  elder 
relatives  who  seek  to  make  a  fortune  by  em- 
ploying children  to  do  the  actual  stealing.  The 
ranks  of  this  infantile  army  of  speculators  com- 
prise many  who  have  managed  to  escape  from 
Soviet  asylums  and  hospitals. 

The  socialistic  methods  of  distribution  pro- 
duced a  peculiar  type  of  speculators  known  in 
Russia  as  "hag-carriers"  (meshechniki) ,  mean- 
ing those  who  carry  in  their  bags  food  and 
other  things  for  sale.  In  Petrograd  and  in 
Moscow  these  traders  are  almost  unionized, 
forming  numerous  detachments,  with  foremen, 
treasurers  and  collectors  of  their  own.  Bag- 
carriers  journey  to  remote  rural  districts  where 
they  *' collect  their  crops."  They  return  to  the 
cities  in  railroad  cars,  often  occupying  places 
on  the  platforms  and  roofs.  As  a  general 
rule,  they  are  in  collusion  with  Soviet  officials 
who  get  the  lion's  share.  One  of  such  specu- 
lators tells  the  following  story  of  his  experi- 
ence in  the  smuggling  business. 

"I  made  trips  to  Ukrainia  where  I  paid  400 
rubles  for  one  pood  of  potatoes.  In  Petrograd  I 
charged  500  rubles  for  one  pound*  and  in  addi- 
tion I  insisted  upon  douma  rubles.]  I  was  aware 
that  the  buyer  was  giving  up  his  last  clothes  in 
order  to  purchase  my  potatoes  or  my  pound  of 
flour.     But  what  could  I  do? — I  was  employed 

•  1  Eussian  pood  is  equal  to  40  pounds. 

t  Eubles  issued  by  the  Provisional  Government.  They  are  valued 
higher  than  Soviet  rubles. 


128      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

in  the  Truck  Transportation  Department  as  as- 
sistant chauffeur.  I  was  fed  very  poorly.  I  did 
not  want  to  go  to  the  Commissar  and  beg  favors 
from  him.  Besides  I  had  a  grandmother  to  sup- 
port. She  had  nothing  to  eat.  In  the  meantime 
I  began  to  bloat  from  hunger.  So  I  made  up  my 
mind  to  desert  the  Truck  Department.  I  got  up  a 
gang,  and  once  a  month  we  would  go  to  Ukrainia. 
Really  it  made  no  difference  in  what  way  we 
died,  whether  by  starving  to  death  or  being  mur- 
dered. In  Ukrainia  we  would  buy  or  exchange 
for  calico,  matches  and  soap,  various  products 
and  take  them  back  to  Petrograd.  Now,  if  one 
carries  these  goods  as  a  bag-carrier  in  a  pas- 
senger car,  there  is  always  a  chance  that  he  may 
be  caught  and  his  goods  confiscated.  Therefore, 
we  usually  made  an  agreement  with  the  Train 
Commissar.  We  would  pay  him  20,000  rubles  and  he 
would  take  us,  along  with  our  bags,  into  a  freight 
car.  Then  this  car  would  be  sealed  up  and  from 
Bakhmach  to  Petrograd  we  would  be  carried  with- 
out being  disturbed.  There  were  several  such 
freight  cars  in  one  train.  The  oar  records  are 
kept  by  the  Commissar  and  no  one  among  the 
superiors  ever  checked  us  up.  A  single  trip 
gave  me  a  monthly  return  of  thousands  of  rubles, 
a,nd  in  addition  I  had  food  for  myself  and  my 
grandmother.  On  railroad  stations  speculators  of 
our  type  outnumbered  the  general  public.  Of 
course  everyone  of  us  had  an  official  pass  executed 
in  Petrograd  by  the  various  Soviets.  What  did 
they  care?  For  100  or  200  rubles  they  will  al- 
ways affix  a  seal.  Railroad  officials  are  well  aware 
of  this  procedure,  but  they  keep  quiet  as  all  of 
them  receive  their  'ration.'  They  charge  just 
as  much  as  they  like  because  our  lives  are  in  their 


TRADE  AND  FINANCE  129 

hands.  Now  and  then,  in  order  to  'raise  the  ex- 
change' they  execute  someone  among  the  less  ex- 
perienced. The  result  is:  If  a  Soviet  in  charge 
of  food  supplies  (Prodkom)  intends  to  ship  bread 
to  Petrograd,  no  cars  are  found  available,  where- 
as with  us  it  is  different.  Three  of  us  are  permitted 
to  occupy  an  empty  car  which  is  allowed  to  run 
to  the  place  of  destination  without  being  un- 
coupled. '  '* 

True  seems  the  new  proverb  originated  by 
the  Russians:  '^He  who  does  not  speculate 
shall  not  eat." 

From  a  sanitary  point  of  view,  the  bag-car- 
rying trade  turned  out  to  be  a  misfortune. 
Owing  to  the  scarcity  of  bags  and  the  difficulty 
of  laundering  them — for  practically  no  soap 
is  to  be  had — food  is  being  dragged  all  over 
Russia  in  filthy  bags  which  are  infested  with 
vermin.  This  indisputably  is  one  of  the  con- 
tributing causes  of  epidemics  and  the  terrible 
spread  of  infectious  diseases. 

Of  course,  this  kind  of  commercial  inter- 
course could  not  solve  the  distribution  problem. 
The  ill-feeling  harbored  against  trade  restric- 
tions grew  so  intense  that  finally  revolts  broke 
out  all  over  the  country,  culminating  in  the 
Kronstadt  uprising.  Urban  workers  assidu- 
ously protested  against  the  idiotic  Soviet  pol- 
icy relating  to  internal  trade.  The  mass  of  the 
population  was  steadfastly  opposed  to  the  Cheka 

*  See   Professor   Shcherbina  's  ' '  Laws  of   Evolution  and  Bolshe- 
vism," pp.  78,  79.    Belgrade,  1921.    Translated  from  the  Eussian. 


130      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

prosecution  of  petty  traders.  Even  the  specu- 
lators enjoyed  the  sympathy  of  the  majority 
of  the  people  because  everybody  knew  that 
without  speculation  and  bag-carrying,  no  food 
could  be  obtained  in  the  cities.  Therefore, 
among  the  essential  points  raised  by  the  Kron- 
stadt  rebels  was  the  demand  for  the  abolition  of 
all  trade  restrictions  and  the  reinstitution  of 
free  trade.  It  was  reported  that  Apfelbaiun 
(Zinoviev),  Chairman  of  the  Executive  Com- 
mittee of  the  Third  Internationale  (^'Komi- 
tern")  and  the  Eed  Dictator  of  Petrograd,  was 
one  of  the  most  ardent  opponents  of  this  move- 
ment. But  ultimately  the  Bolsheviki  were  com- 
pelled to  submit  to  the  unanimous  pressure  of 
the  people. 

Beginning  with  1921,  step  by  step,  conces- 
sions on  the  trade  issue  have  been  made  by 
Soviet  authorities.  In  the  first  place,  petty 
trade  was  nominally  freed.  Small  shops  were 
reopened  in  many  places,  and  retailers  given 
the  right  to  sell  certain  categories  of  goods. 
On  the  other  hand,  simultaneously  with  the 
adoption  of  Lenin's  project  known  as  the 
"  Prodnalog,  "*  the  peasants  were  permitted  to 
trade  in  their  "surplus"  grain  and  this  unfor- 
tunately was  bitter  irony.  In  addition,  there  is 
a  tendency  at  present  to  facilitate  the  pro- 
cedure required  for  the  opening  of  commercial 
concerns. 

•  See  Chapter  II. 


TRADE  AND  FINANCE  131 

Nevertheless,  general  trade  conditions  in 
Soviet  Russia  remain  intolerable.  The  All- 
Russian  Cheka  still  clings  to  its  aggressive 
policy  towards  private  commerce,  while  the 
Local  Soviets  deliberately  disregard  the  decrees 
ordering  reinstitution  of  free  trade. 

In  one  of  the  issues  of  the  Economicheshaya 
Jisn  is  published  an  interview  with  Jacob  Hal- 
perstein,  a  Communist  in  charge  of  a  Soviet 
department  store  at  Moscow.    He  stated: 

*'We  must  strive  to  organize  State  retail  trade, 
at  the  same  time  encouraging  individual  retail 
merchants.  State  stores  alone  cannot  satisfy  the 
requirements  even  of  Moscow,  not  to  speak  about 
the  provincial  districts It  is  to  be  re- 
gretted, however,  that  the  common  view  is  dif- 
ferent: Private  trade  both  wholesale  and  retail 
as  considered  a  grave  sin."* 

Another  Communist,  by  the  name  of  Eismona, 
recently  admitted  that : 

*'Due  to  the  guilt  of  the  local  organizations 
which  have  been  destroying  private  petty  trade  in 
everj^  possible  way,  and  burdening  it  with  unbear- 
able taxes,  it  still  remains  to  a  large  extent,  a 
'shyster'  profession. "f 

But  Moscow  Soviet  authorities  are  hardly 
any  better  than  their  provincial  colleagues. 
Professor  Terne  gives  the  following  account  of 

*  See  Economicheslcaya  Jisn,  No.  92,  issue  of  April  27,  1922. 
flbid,  see  article,  "The  Struggle  Against  the  Industrial  Crisis." 


132      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

the  procedure  for  obtaining  a  license  to  open 
a  store: 

"First  of  all,  the  Soviets  require  that  a  person 
desiring  to  open  a  trade  concern  shall  produce  a 
certificate  from  the  so-called  'Kvartkhoz'  (The 
Soviet  in  charge  of  economic  activities  in  a  given 
block),  to  the  effect  that  premises  therefor  are 
available.  This,  of  course,  means  that  the  partic- 
ular Commissar  has  to  be  bribed.  After  having 
received  such  a  certificate,  the  prospective  mer- 
chant must  procure  another  permit  to  actually  oc- 
cupy the  space  allotted  to  him,  which,  in  turn, 
necessitates  another  and  higher  bribe.  The  next 
step  consists  of  filling  out  an  application  giving 
exhaustive  answers  as  to  the  nature  of  trade,  the 
profession  of  the  applicant  prior  to  the  revolution, 
his  attitude  toward  the  Soviet  Government,  etc. 
At  the  prevailing  bribing  rates,  the  approval  of 
such  an  application  costs  anywhere  from  2,000, 
000  to  3,000,000  rubles.  In  addition,  there  is 
always  a  danger  that  the  information  thus  fur- 
nished in  the  application  might  serve  the  Cheka, 
with  the  result  that  the  daring  merchant  would 
finally  land  in  a  Soviet  prison."* 

Such  was  the  condition  early  in  1922. 

The  reinstitution  of  free  trade  has  become 
all  the  more  difficult  as  practically  all  suitable 
buildings  are  requisitioned  by  the  Soviets  and 
used  for  official  purposes.  At  the  same  time, 
space  for  temporary  wooden  sheds  in  open  mar- 
kets is  being  auctioned  off  at  prohibitive  prices. 

•  See  Prof.  A.  Terne  's  In  the  Realm  of  Lenin,  pp.  256,  257. 
Berlin,   1922.     Publiahed  in  Russian. 


TRADE  AND  FINANCE  i33 

For  instance,  in  May,  1922,  the  renting  of  such 
space  for  one  year  was  46,000,000  rubles.* 

Furthermore,  the  decree  of  July  26,  1921, 
established  a  special  trade  tax  levied  by  the 
State.  The  new  law  divides  trading  into  three 
classes.  The  price  of  a  six  months'  license 
for  the  first  class  is  60,000  rubles;  the  second, 
180,000  rubles;  and  the  third,  600,000  rubles. 

It  is  evident  that  only  the  privileged  class 
— that  is,  the  Communists,  ex-convicts  and 
Soviet  officials— can  afford  to  pay  such  prices 
and  taxes. 

In  view  of  these  conditions,  it  is  not  surpris- 
ing that  the  prices  of  commodities  have  reached 
a  fabulous  level.  In  December,  1918,  after 
twelve  months  of  Communist  practice,  food 
was  sold  in  Moscow  at  these  rates: 

Potatoes    10  rubles  per  lb. 

Salt  Fish  9  to  10 

Bread  (in  open  markets)   18  to  20 

Pork  50 

Beef    23 

Sugar 80 

Tea  100 

Butter    80 

'A  suit  of  clothes  could  be  bought  for  800  to 
900  rubles,  and  a  pair  of  shoes  for  400  rubles.f 

*  See  Russian  paper  The  Last  News,  issue  of  May  5,  1922.  Pub- 
lished in  Reval. 

fSee  A  Collection  of  Beports  on  BolsJievism  in  Bussia,  presented 
to  Parliament  by  command  of  His  Majesty,  April,  1919,  p.  67. 


134 


THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 


These  prices  were  justly  considered  exorbi- 
tant at  that  time.  After  four  and  one-half 
years  of  Soviet  mismanagement,  in  April,  1922, 
the  market  prices  were  fixed  by  the  Soviets  as 
follows : 


April  1,  1922  April  14,  1922 

Rubles  per  Rubles  per 

Barley    4,400,000  pood  6,000,000  pood 

Millet  5,200,000  pood  6,000,000  pood 

Fish  (large  cans) . . .        500,000  can  800,000  can 

Fish  (medium  cans)        250,000  can  400,000  can 

Fish  (small  cans) . .        140,000  can  220,000  can 

Raisins 10,000,000  pood  14,000,000  pood 

Refined  sugar 16,000,000  pood  17,000,000  pood 

Raw  sugar 9,000,000  pood  10,500,000  pood 

Honey 10,000,000  pood  16,000,000  pood 

Preserves 175,000  lb.  250,000  lb. 

Caramel  sugar 275,000  lb.  440,000  lb. 

Salt 1,400,000  pood  1,600,000  pood 

Vinegar   3,000,000  pood  3,300,000  pood 

Soap  (good  quality)     8,000,000  pood  10,000,000  pood 

Soap  (poor  quality)     5,000,000  pood  7,000,000  pood 

Toilet  soap   175,000  cake  225,000  cake 

Matches   4,000  box  4,500  box 

Swedish  matches  . .           4,500  box  5,500  box 

Tea  1,200,000  lb.  1,500,000  lb. 

Coffee 140,000  lb.  200,000  lb.* 

The  price  folly  reigns  not  only  in  Petrograd 
and  Moscow  but  throughout  all  Russia.  Accord- 
ing to  Soviet  data,  in  the  city  of  Rostov-on- 

•  See  EconomichesTcaya  Jisn,  No.  89,  issue  of  April  23,  1922. 


TRADE  AND  FINANCE  i35 

the-Don,  the  cost  of  a  monthly  ration,  at  3,600 
calories  per  day,  on  March  1,  1922,  was  10,265,- 
000  rubles,  whereas  on  March  15,  1922,  it  had 
risen  to  16,500,000  rubles,  or  in  two  weeks  the 
prices  had  advanced  60  per  cent.* 

Commenting  upon  market  conditions  in  Mos- 
cow, the  Economicheskaya  Jisn  (No.  91,  April 
26,  1922)  stated: 

"Prices  of  all  products  without  exception  have 
advanced  considerably.  The  proportion  of  in- 
crease with  regard  to  several  products  was  40  per 
cent,  (butter),  55  per  cent,  (buckwheat  flour  and 
cabbages),  and  even  91  per  cent.  (beef).  Calcu- 
lating the  cost  of  the  monthly  food  ratio  at  3,600 
calories,  which  by  April  23rd  reached  the  level 
of  30,269,000  rubles,  we  notice,  as  compared  with 
April  15th,  when  it  was  only  21,107,000  rubles, 
an  increase  of  43  per  cent.,  while  for  the  whole 
month  the  advance  is  94  per  cent.  Comparing 
the  prices  for  the  month  of  October,  1921,  when 
the  ratio  was  529,000  rubles,  we  see  an  incre- 
ment of  more  than  57  times." 

The  present  trade  muddle  in  Soviet  Russia 
comes  as  a  consequence  of  the  general  economic 
collapse.  The  fact  that  the  Communist  authori- 
ties were  forced  to  make  minor  concessions  to 
the  Russian  people  on  the  question  of  commer- 
cial intercourse  did  not  bring  the  expected  re- 
lief. Sovietism  is  so  insane  in  its  foundations, 
so  corrupt  in  its  workings,  that  secondary  im- 

*  See  Economicheskaya  Jisn,  No.  82,  issue  of  April  12,  1922. 


136      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

provements   and   insignificant   changes    cannot 
restore  the  country  to  normal  conditions. 

There  was  a  time  when  liberals,  lamenting 
over  Russia's  economic  plight,  argued  that  it 
was  caused  by  the  Allied  blockade  and  the  ego- 
tistic attitude  of  capitalism  towards  the  re- 
sumption of  trade  relations  with  the  Soviets. 
Mass  meetings  were  held,  radical  organizations 
formed,  and  newspaper  campaigns  engineered 
with  the  exclusive  aim  of  inducing  the  western 
world  to  start  trade  with  the  Soviets.  This 
agitation  assumed  a  virulent  form  especially  in 
Anglo-Saxon  countries.  In  England  where  the 
Labor  Party  is  thoroughly  Sovietized,  and 
where  Lloyd  George  manifests  a  sort  of  natural 
proclivity  toward  the  oppressors  of  the  Rus- 
sian people,  a  trade  agreement  with  Soviet  Rus- 
sia was  signed  on  March  16,  1921. 

Bolshevik  sympathizers  on  the  Thames  antici- 
pated that  the  resumption  of  trade  with  the 
Bolsheviki  was  rather  a  measure  of  political 
self-defense  than  a  constructive  economic  pol- 
icy. The  gentlemen  of  Downing  Street,  short- 
sighted as  they  may  have  been,  placed  but  little 
faith  in  Krassin's  assurance  that  Russia  pre- 
sented *' wonderful  opportunities"  for  the  Eng- 
lish merchant.  The  underlying  motive  for  deal- 
ing with  the  Soviets  was  and  still  remains 
England's  dread  of  Communist  propaganda  in 
British  Asiatic  Dominions.  The  Bolsheviki 
agreed  all  the  more  readily  to  the  clause  to 


TRADE  AND  FINANCE  137 

refrain  from  propaganda  as  they  knew  that 
they  would  never  fulfill  their  promise. 

In  the  fall  of  1921  Lord  Curzon  openly  ad- 
mitted before  Parliament  that,  from  a  politi- 
cal standpoint,  the  Anglo-Saxon  Treaty  has 
been  shamelessly  broken  by  the  Bolsheviki, 
while  in  the  way  of  economic  advantage,  Eng- 
lish merchants  and  manufacturers  have  gained 
very  little. 

The  same  applies  to  other  countries  which 
were  moved  either  by  greed  or  political  con- 
siderations to  sign  commercial  treaties  with  the 
Moscow  Communists.  These  "scraps  of  paper" 
have  proved  of  no  help  to  Russia  or  to  western 
countries. 

Some  light  was  shed  on  the  whole  problem 
of  trade  with  Soviet  Russia  when  Mr.  Finkel- 
stein  (Litvinoff)  advised  the  members  of  the 
Credits  Sub-commission  of  The  Hague  Con- 
ference that: 

''There  should  he  no  question  of  confidence  ty 
shippers  in  the  Russian  Oovernment,  because  the 
shippers  should  not  look  to  Moscow  for  the  money, 
hut  to  their  own  governments."* 

This  certainly  must  have  come  as  a  great 
disappointment  to  the  political  flappers  of  both 
continents.  All's  well  that  ends  well!  Now,  at 
least,  the   world   knows  what  the   Bolsheviki 

*  See  The  New  TorTc  Times,  June  28,  1922.  article  entitlea  ^TTus- 
sians   at   Hague   Held   to   Business." 


138      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

mean  when  they  refer  to  Soviet  Russia  as  the 
land  of  *' commercial  opportunities." 

Soviet  sympathizers  have  also  tried  to  make 
it  appear  that  the  resumption  of  trade  with 
the  Marxian  State  would  overnight  cure  the  un- 
employment situation.  They  knew  that  what 
they  were  telling  was  nonsense,  for  Russia  had 
nothing  to  trade  with  and  any  orders  placed 
by  the  Soviets  with  western  manufacturers 
would  inevitably  be  fake  orders.* 

"LABOB  LEADS  IN  SENATE  FOB  SOVIET   TBADE. 
Spokesmen    of    3,000,000    Toilers    Demand    Eussia    of    Workers 
Have  Same  Privilege  as  Russia  of  Czars.     Besumption  of  Com- 
merce Necessary   to  Believe   Unemployment,  Leaders  say." 

And  still  these  idealistic  creatures  agitated, 
babbled,  lobbied  and  otherwise  labored  to  the 
utmost  of  their  limited  ability  to  force  their 
respective  governments  into  shameful  deals  with 
the  usurpers  in  the  Kremlin.  It  was  hoped 
that  this  would  bring  about  the  first  step 
toward  the  recognition  of  the  Soviet  regime. 

Much  in  the  same  way  the  notorious  Soviet 
campaign  for  "concessions"  had  but  a  remote 
connection  with  trade  policies  and  financial 
openings.  People  with  common  sense  did  not 
fail  to  understand  that  Washington  D.  Van- 
derlip  would  never  receive  Kamchatka  as  a 
Christmas  gift  from  '* comrade"  Trotzky.   Nor 

*  Compare  this  with  the  headlines  in  the  New  York  Call,  the 
oflBcial  organ  of  the  American  Socialist  Party,  in  its  issue  of 
January  27,  1921: 


TRADE  AND  FINANCE  139 

was  it  difficult  to  grasp  that  promises  made 
by  Lenin  to  "Bill  Haywood"  and  his  I.  W.  W. 
pals  to  give  up  the  Kouznetzk  mines  were 
merely  a  political  move  designed  to  place  the 
"American"  beneficiaries  under  the  control  of 
the  Third  Internationale.  Nevertheless,  parlor 
agitation  in  favor  of  such  and  similar  "con- 
cessions" is  in  full  swing.  At  this  point  it 
may  be  well  to  recall  the  statements  made  by 
Communist  leaders  regarding  the  matter. 

Milutin,  who  is  among  the  "foremost"  Bol- 
shevist economists,  addressing  the  Petrograd 
Soviet  in  December,  1920,  declared: 

"We  have  seized  the  means  of  production  from 
our  own  bourgeoisie.  At  present  we  are  de- 
termined to  seize  the  means  of  productions  from 
the  foreign  bourgeoisie.  Because,  however,  we 
are  unable  to  nationalize  the  plants  of  Vanderlip 
and  Krupp,  we  must  give  them  concessions  and 
thus  take  possession  of  the  technique  of  theii; 
means  of  production."* 

Significant  is  also  Lenin's  statement  made 
before  the  Moscow  District  Conference  of  the 
Communist  Party  on  November  23,  1920: 

"The  differences  between  our  enemies  have  re- 
cently increased,  particularly  in  connection  with 
the  proposed  concessions  to  be  granted  to  a  group 
of  American  capitalist  sharks,  headed  by  a  multi- 
millionaire, who  reckons  upon  grouping  around 

*  Quoted  from  Bulletin  No.  1  of  the  Kussian  National  Society, 
issue  of  February  3,  1921,  p.  4,  New  York  City. 


140      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

himself  a  number  of  other  multi-millionaires. 
Now,  all  the  communications  coming  from  the  Far 
East  bear  testimony  to  the  fact  that  there  is  dis- 
satisfaction in  Japan  regarding  this  agreement, 
although  the  latter  has  not  been  signed  yet,  and  is 
so  far  only  a  draft.  Nevertheless,  Japanese  public 
opinion  has  been  brought  to  the  boiling-point  and 
I  have  read  to-day  a  communication  to  the  effect 
that  Japan  accuses  Soviet  Russia  of  planning  to 
embroil  Japan  Vi^ith  America.  We  have  rightly 
estimated  this  imperialist  rivalry  and  we  have 
made  up  our  m^nds  as  to  the  7iec4ssity  of  sys- 
tematically utilizing  this  rivalry  in  order  to  make 
their  fight  against  us  difficult." 

Lenin  further  explained: 

"There  can  be  no  better  proof  of  the  material 
and  moral  victory  of  our  Soviet  Republic  over 
vs^orld  capitalism  than  the  fact  that  the  powers 
which  went  to  war  against  us  on  account  of  our  ter- 
rorism and  on  account  of  our  new  order  ( ?)  were 
compelled,  in  spite  of  their  own  wish,  to  enter  into 
relations  with  us,  knowing  full  well  that  they 
are  thus  strengthening  us."* 

But  then  the  reply  of  the  parlor  Bolshevik 
to  this  outspoken  argument  of  Lenin's  is  classi- 
cally simple:   ^^Ee  really  doesn't  mean  it/' 

Finance 
It  is  next  to  impossible  to  speak  seriously 
of  the  Soviet  '* financial  system"  for  this  is  a 
case   where   there   is   no   method   in   madness. 

*  Quoted  from  The  Workers'  Challenge.  See  issue  of  January  16, 
1921,  p.    6. 


TRADE  AND  FINANCE  141 

Imperial  Russia  bequeathed  to  Soviet  Russia 
a  gold  fund  amounting  to  1,350,000,000  rubles. 
Communist  activities  as  far  as  finances  are 
concerned  consisted  mainly  of  two  things:  (a) 
the  dissipation  of  the  gold  fund,  and  (b)  un- 
restricted issuance  of  paper  currency.  In  both 
tasks  they  have  succeeded  splendidly.  After 
one  year  of  Bolshevist  management,  the  gold 
fund  was  reduced  to  825,000,000  rubles.  By 
1919    it    amounted   to    410,000,000    rubles;    by 

1920,  to  200,000,000  rubles,  and  by  the  end  of 

1921,  to  only  70,000,000  rubles.  There  is  no 
way  of  determining  the  exact  sum  of  gold  left 
in  Russia  for  no  reliable  statistics  are  avail- 
able. According  to  the  American  press,  soon 
after  the  Genoa  Conference,  the  Bolsheviki  ad- 
mitted that  their  regime  would  collapse  within 
six  months  unless  large  sums  of  cash  were 
obtained.* 

The  latest  advices  from  Russia  seem  to  in- 
dicate that  out  of  the  original  Imperial  fund 
there  is  practically  no  gold  left,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  a  certain  minimum  allotted  for 
foreign  propaganda. 

The  infamous  pillage  of  the  Russian  Church 
was  undertaken  by  the  Bolsheviki  with  the 
object  of  increasing  their  gold  reserve  and  by 
no   means    for   the   purpose    of   relieving   the 

*  See  cable  from  The  Hague  to  The  New  York  Times,  issue  of 
June  7,  1922,  article  entitled,  "Bolsheviki  Said  to  Admit  Cash 
Alone  Can  Save  Soviet." 


142      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

starving  population.  This  vandalism,  accord- 
ing to  The  Journal  of  Commerce^  yielded  con- 
siderable booty,  amounting  to  314,000,000  gold 
rubles.    The  correspondent  of  the  paper  added : 

"These  are  absolutely  the  last  reserves  of  the 
Soviet;  nothing  else  remains  with  which  to  make 
international  payments. ' 


»»* 


This  information  was  not  quite  correct,  for 
a  few  days  later  news  came  from  Petrograd 
that  the  Bolsheviki  had  desecrated  the  Imperial 
tombs  in  the  St.  Peter  and  Paul  Cathedral. 
This  abominable  crime  was  committed  for  the 
purpose  of  appropriating  the  jewels  which  were 
placed  in  the  sarcophaguses  wherein  the  corpses 
of  the  late  emperors  repose. 

Russia's  gold  has  been  lavishly  spent  by  the 
Communists  for  propaganda  abroad.  Immense 
sums  were  also  appropriated  by  them  and  smug- 
gled over  the  border.  The  time  has  not  yet 
come  to  tell  a  comprehensive  story  regarding 
the  dissipation  of  Russian  gold  reserves.  This 
much,  however,  can  be  asserted:  Colossal  graft 
has  been  freely  practiced  by  the  Marxian 
disciples,  who,  disguised  in  proletarian  over- 
alls, have  managed  to  make  huge  fortunes  at 
the  expense  of  the  Russian  people. 

Simultaneously  with  the  scattering  of  the 
gold  fund  came  the  issuance  of  paper  currency 

*  See  Journal  of  Commerce,  May  16,  1922. 


TRADE  AND  FINANCE  143 

in  ever-growing  quantities.     Paper  circulation 
in  Russia  increased  as  follows: 

January  1,  1917 9,103,000,000 

October     23,  1917 18,927,000,000 

January  1,  1918 25,200,000,000 

January  1,  1919 55,000,000,000 

January  1,  1920 194,000,000,000 

June  1,  1920 455,000,000,000 

November  1,  1920 855,000,000,000 

January  1,  1921 1,168,000,000,000* 

The  precise  quantity  of  rubbish  rubles  can- 
not be  calculated.  At  the  time  of  The  Hague 
Conference,  however,  some  light  at  least  was 
thrown  upon  the  general  chaos  prevailing  in 
Soviet  treasury  matters.  The  fact,  for  instance, 
was  made  known  that  for  the  first  four  months 
of  1922  the  expenses  of  the  Soviet  Republic 
reached  130,000,000,000,000  paper  rubles  and 
104,000,000,000,000  of  new  paper  was  issued. 
Two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  billion  new  pa- 
per rubles  have  been  printed  during  the  first  six 
months  of  1922.  Analyzing  these  figures,  Ed- 
win L.  James,  New  York  Times  Special  Cor- 
respondent at  The  Hague,  remarked: 

**The  best  comment  on  the  Russian  budget  is 
that  while  the  covering  letter  makes  a  general 
claim  that  only  20  per  cent,  of  the  expenses  have 
been  met  by  paper  money  issue,  the  actual  figures 
they  themselves  give,  show  that  the  expenditures 

•Eaketoff,  Op.  Cit.,  p.  67. 


144      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

in  June  this  year  were  130,000,000,000,000  rubles 
paper  with  a  money  issue  of  85,000,000,000,000. 
This  represents  53  per  cent.  The  Russian  claim  of 
20  per  cent,  must  be  a  lie  or  else  the  Treasury  De- 
partment shows  a  default  of  some  40,000,000,000,- 
000  rubles  for  one  month."* 

As  a  matter  of  guesswork,  it  was  estimated 
that  on  July  1,  1922,  there  were  approximately 
280,000,000,000,000  paper  rubles  in  circulation. 

In  these  circumstances,  it  is  idle  to  speak 
about  a  *' budget  system,"  or  a  State  balance, 
as  far  as  Soviet  Eussia  is  concerned. 

All  figures  appearing  on  Soviet  balance 
sheets  are  quite  fictitious  since  the  actual  ex- 
penditures are  much  larger  and  the  revenues 
much  smaller  than  originally  estimated  in  the 
budgets.  Attempts  to  analyze  these  annual 
and  semi-annual  statements  are  futile  for  the 
disbursements,  according  to  the  allocations  to 
the  various  Commissariats,  if  added  up,  do  not 
coincide  with  the  grand  total.  Thus,  for  the 
year  1920,  the  specific  allocations  give  a  total 
of  504,500,000,000  rubles,  which,  however,  is 
only  48  per  cent,  of  the  total  disbursements. 
The  question,  of  course,  arises:  What  has  be- 
come of  the  remaining  52  per  cent  ^ 

Referring  to  the  revenues,  it  must  be  borne 
in  mind  that  such  consist  almost  exclusively 

*  See    article    *  *  Soviet    Budget    Staggers    Experts,  * '    New    York 
Times,  July  5,  1922. 
f  See  Economicheskaya  Jisn,  September  21,  1920. 


TRADE  AND  FINANCE  145 

of  new  paper  issues.  The  Soviet  printing  office 
is  probably  the  only  Soviet  factory  the  output 
of  which  has  increased  tremendously. 

Things  have  gone  so  far  that  a  special  Soviet 
Commission  was  appointed  in  1920  to  devise  a 
plan  for  the  acceleration  of  the  output  of  paper 
money. 

Owing  to  the  perturbed  conditions  of  Com- 
munist finances,  Soviet  rubles  have  lost  all 
value  on  the  international  exchange.  On  April 
22,  1922,  the  *'Gosbank"  (State  Bank)  fixed 
the  following  rates  for  foreign  currency: 

1  pound   sterling,  4,100,000  rubles  (April  21,  3,300,000) 


1  American  dollar 

900,000      " 

708,000) 

1  Canadian  dollar 

850,000      ** 

700,000) 

I  French  franc . . . 

85,000      " 

60,000) 

1  Swedish   krona. 

245,000      " 

190,000) 

1  German  mark. . 

4,000      ** 

*3,000) 

Low  as  these  quotations  are,  they  do  not 
nearly  represent  the  actual  devaluation  of 
Soviet  rubles.  According  to  The  Netv  York 
Times  of  June  13,  1922,  3,300,000  Soviet  rubles 
could  then  be  bought  for  $1.00. 

The  bankruptcy  of  the  Communist  regime 
has  become  so  obvious  that  Soviet  officials  them- 
selves have  admitted  it  on  many  occasions.  As 
the  last  resort  to  save  the  situation,  they  have 
adopted  a  new  system  of  swindling  the  people 
by  marking  100,000,000  ruble  bills  as  '*  10,000 

•See  EconomicTieslcaya  Jisn,  No.  89,  April  23,  1922. 


146      THE  BAL'ANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

rubles."     In  this  way  they  hope  to  fool  the 
public,  eventually  forcing  a  deflation. 

Here  is  what  Mr.   Walter  Duranty  relates 
about  this  affair: 

**The  authorities  hope  that  when  the  latter 
(high  denomination  bills)  are  retired  the  new 
figures  will  be  adopted  as  written,  which  will  have 
the  effect  of  reducing  the  internal  debt  10,000- 
fold.  This  is  deflation  with  a  vengeance,  as  if  the 
value  of  the  dollar  were  suddenly  fixed  at  one- 
tenth  of  a  mill.  Yet  such  deflation  will  quite 
probably  be  accomplished  as  the  result  of  the  ex- 
traordinary 'bread  loan'  which  the  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment is  now  floating.  As  the  price  of  a  pood 
of  flour  is  now  around  5,750,000  rubles,  the  propo- 
sition might  seem  to  be  most  advantageous  to  the 
public.  In  reality  the  whole  affair  is  a  gigantic 
gamble  in  futures;  for  if  the  harvest  is  good,  as 
is  now  hoped,  the  price  of  flour  in  December  will 
probably  be  less  than  3,000,000  rubles.  In  that 
case  the  result  will  be  that  the  Grovernment  will 
kill  two  birds  with  one  stone — retire  the  old  high- 
denomination  paper  and  reduce  inflation  directly 
to  the  benefit  of  its  currency."* 

What  Mr.  Duranty  chooses  to  call  "a  gi- 
gantic gamhle*'  should  properly  be  described  as 
a  gigantic  swindle. 

Spectacles  of  wisdom  are  not  needed  to 
see  how  completely  Marxian  disciples  have 
wrecked  a  great  and  wealthy  country.    At  pres- 

•See   article   "Unique   Soviet   Plan   to   Force   Deflation,'*    The 
Hew  Yorlc  Times,  June  13,  1922. 


TRADE  AND  FINANCE  147 

ent  it  is  only  the  incurable  imbecile  of  the 
sentimental  type  who  is  still  hoping  for  better 
days  to  come.  In  his  phraseology,  however, 
there  always  is  a  little  **but"  to  be  added — 
namely,  his  pious  desire  that  the  Soviets  be 
given  a  further  chance.  This  means  perhaps 
that  the  entire  world  should  yield  its  cash  to 
^* comrade"  Lenin,  thus  making  his  task  ''more 
comfortable  and  easy." 

Paraphrasing  Heine's  remark  about  the  Ger- 
mans, it  may  be  said  to  these  ''Friends  of 
Soviet  Russia": 

"People  have  the  right  to  he  stupid,  hut  you, 
gentlemen^  abu^e  this  right." 


CHAPTER  V 

RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL 

TN  no  land  have  revolutions  ever  been  found 
pleasant.  Forcible  destruction  of  civil  order 
and  political  organizations  inevitably  leads  to 
grave  perturbances  in  the  national  organism.  It 
is  an  error  to  imagine  that  peoples  who  have  be- 
come infected  with  the  revolutionary  disease 
recover  from  it  as  easily  as  philosophers  and 
politicians  have  written  books  which  paved  the 
way  for  social  cataclysms  in  various  countries. 
Smooth  are  the  theories  but  rough  the  events 
that  form  the  substance  of  revolutionary  up- 
heavals. Cromwell's  epoch  in  England  and 
1793  in  France  have  many  bloody  episodes  on 
their  records.  The  fact  that  we,  in  our  day, 
are  viewing  them  from  misty  historical  dis- 
tances and  through  the  prism  of  all-pacifying 
Time,  makes  them  no  less  abhorrent,  for  tears 
shed  by  mourning  nations  do  leave  ineradicable 
traces  in  their  hearts.  When  human  multi- 
tudes are  dragged  through  furnaces  of  suffer- 
ing and  grief,  how  is  tragedy  to  be  eluded  ?  We 
may  not  exactly  understand  it,  but  we  always 
have  the  right  to  presume  that  behind  the 
veil  of  Space  and  Time  things  have  happened 
that  would  have  made  us  quiver  had  we  wit- 
nessed them. 

148 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       149 

And  yet  how  insignificant  and  paltry  the 
deeds  of  the  Convention  do  appear  compared 
with  the  boundless  despair  pervading  Russia  of 
the  present.  The  great  French  Revolution  seems 
like  a  mere  rehearsal,  a  children's  masquerade, 
in  the  face  of  the  crushing  catastrophe,  under 
the  debris  of  which  the  Northern  Giant  lies 
buried. 

Only  those  who  have  actually  lived  through 
the  agony  of  the  disaster,  through  all  its  mani- 
fold phases,  the  shameful  wretchedness  and 
vulgar  misery  of  Communism,  who,  them- 
selves, have  lost  their  homes,  their  Motherland, 
and  all  they  held  sacred  in  their  lives,  only 
they  who,  themselves,  have  undergone  the  tor- 
tures of  the  Cheka,  the  base  humiliation  of 
cruel  serfdom — only  they  are  capable  of  grasp- 
ing the  full  meaning,  the  hopeless  aspect  of  an 
existence  which  is  neither  life  nor  death,  but 
a  slow  process  of  dying. 

It  is  not  the  object  of  this  volume  to  render 
exhaustive  account  of  the  intolerable  condi- 
tions prevailing  in  every-day  experience  under 
the  Soviet  yoke.  The  most  that  can  be  at- 
tempted is  a  general  sketch  of  the  fundamental 
features  characteristic  of  the  present  State. 
Nor  is  it  possible  to  focus  attention  on  any 
individual  plight,  no  matter  how  deep  our 
sjnnpathy  may  be  for  this  or  that  person  sub- 
jected to  torment  and  death.  From  time  to 
time,  civilized  humanity  is  staggered  by  news 


I50      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

coming  from  the  depths  of  that  unfortunate 
country,  and  then,  for  a  day  or  two,  newspaper 
columns  are  filled  with  dreadful  stories  depict- 
ing the  inhuman  conduct  of  the  Soviet  tyrants. 
Thus  it  was  when  the  shocking  Ekaterinburg 
crime  was  revealed  to  the  world,  and  the  details 
learned  about  the  detestable  murder  of  the 
martyred  Emperor  Nicholas  II  and  his  whole 
family,  including  the  young  Czarevitch  and  the 
Grand  Duchesses. 

The  grim  background  of  Russia's  agony  is 
Terror  which  penetrates  all  the  pores  and  fibres 
of  the  nation,  keeping  it  in  a  state  of  constant 
fear  and  depression.  It  is  true  that  the  first 
stage  of  red  outrages  has  passed,  when  slaughter- 
ing was  openly  practiced  in  squares  and  market 
places,  and  when  the  corpses  of  victims  were 
found  lying  around  on  street  corners.  At 
present,  terror  is  no  longer  a  public  demonstra- 
tion of  cynical  criminals  against  the  peaceful 
population.  It  has  assumed  an  organized  and 
"orderly''  form.  It  is  less  obvious  but  just  as 
ruthless  as  in  those  days  of  the  past.  While 
in  1918,  during  the  bright  spring  days  of  Bol- 
shevism, Red  Guard  soldiers  and  drunken 
Kronstadt  sailors,  whom,  incidentally,  Kerensky 
called  *Hhe  beauty  and  pride  of  the  Russian 
revolution/'  on  their  own  initiative,  were  plun- 
dering, raping  and  butchering  the  ''liberated 
people" — now  the  terroristic  procedure  is  regu- 
lated by  hundreds  of  decrees  and  elaborate  in- 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       151 

structions  of  the  AU-Russian  Cheka  to  its 
agents  scattered  throughout  the  country.  At 
present  Terror  is  a  closely  devised  plan,  a  care- 
fully laid  out  system  of  murder  combined  with 
espionage  and  provocation.  As  Mrs.  Snowden, 
the  liberal  British  laborite,  remarked  when 
she  got  out  of  Soviet  Russia: 

"The  people  are  afraid  of  the  police  and  spies, 
spies  are  afraid  of  one  another.  All  dwell  in  an 
atmosphere  of  suspicion  and  the  Red  Terror  is  a 
dreadful  reality."* 

What  is  the  Cheka  ?  Peters,  one  of  the  most 
sinister  types  of  Bolshevik  Jacobins  gave  the 
following  definition  of  this  slang  word: 

* '  The  All -Russian  Cheka  with  its  local  branches 
must  be  the  organ  of  the  proletarian  dictatorship, 
of  the  merciless  dictatorship  of  one  party,  "f 

'^The  Cheka  is  the  sentinel  of  the  revolution," 
says  the  Bolshevik  paper  The  Red  Sword. 
Paraphrasing  Kerensky's  remark  about  the 
drunken  sailors,  Apfelbaum  (Zinoviev)  de- 
clared : 

''The  heauty  and  glory  of  our  party  are  the 
Red  Army  and  the  Cheka." % 

'Mrs.  Philip  Snowden,  Through  Bolshevist  Russia,  p.  161.  Castle 
&  Company,  Ltd.,  London,  1920. 

fSee  the  weekly  of  the  Extraordinary  Committee,  No.  27,  1918. 
Translation  from  the  Eussian. 

4:  See  an  important  volume  entitled  ' '  Cheka, ' '  published  by  the 
Central  Bureau  of  the  Social  Eevolutionajy  Party,  p.  15,  1922. 


152      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

In  other  words,  the  Cheka  is  the  machine 
of  oppression,  a  terrible  weapon  which  the 
Communists  wield  to  keep  the  Russians  in 
obeisance.  A  Lettish  Bolshevik,  by  the  name 
of  Latzis,  who  at  one  time  was  considered  the 
guiding  spirit  of  the  Cheka,  gave  this  instruc- 
tion to  his  subordinates: 

"We  do  not  conduct  war  against  individuals. 
We  exterminate  the  bourgeoisie  as  a  class.  "When 
investigating,  do  not  take  the  trouble  to  gather 
material  and  evidence  to  the  effect  that  the  de- 
fendant by  word  or  deed  opposed  the  Soviets. 
The  first  questions  which  you  must  propound  to 
him  are :  To  what  class  does  'he  belong  ?  What  is 
his  birth  ?  How  was  he  brought  up  ?  What  is  his 
education,  and  to  what  profession  does  he  belong  ? 
These  questions  shall  determine  the  fate  of  the  de- 
fendant. Therein  lies  the  meaning  and  the  sub- 
stance of  Red  Terror."* 

But  these  Lettish  Robespierres  of  the  Com- 
munist State  indeed  are  merely  tame  sheep  in 
comparison  with  a  Dzerjinsky  who  is  the  grand- 
master of  the  Cheka.  An  ex-convict  of  Polish 
descent,  he  rose  to  power  which  is  even  greater 
than  that  of  Trotzky,  because  he  justly  enjoys 
the  reputation  of  a  man  with  a  stony  heart. 
In  the  whole  range  of  human  feelings,  mercy 
is  the  one  which  he  completely  lacks.  For 
him,  Red  Terror  not  only  is  *'cold  business, '^ 

*See  the  Bolshevist  publication  Bed  Terror  October  1,  1918. 
Tranalation  from  the  Eussian. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       153 

but  to  a  greater  extent  perhaps,  it  is  poesy  in 
which  he  finds  depraved  delight.  Like  a  real 
connoisseur,  he  relishes  every  manifestation  of 
other  peoples'  suffering,  every  new  form  of 
inquisition.  In  inventing  the  most  refined 
methods  of  torturing  the  victim,  Dzerjin- 
sky's  imagination  has  no  limits.  It  is  prob- 
ably only  his  companion,  the  Jewess  Braude 
of  the  Moscow  Cheka,  who  can  compete  with 
him  in  these  fields.  For  a  psychologist,  it 
must  be  an  instructive  sight  to  watch  Dzer- 
jinsky,  with  his  pale  face,  with  his  thin  nos- 
trils always  trembling,  with  his  drowsy  gaze 
expressing  mortal  fatigue,  and  his  constantly 
weeping  eyes,  while  interrogating  the  panic- 
stricken  defendant  who  knows  that  there  is  no 
hope  for  him  who  enters  the  gate  of  the  All- 
Russian  Cheka.  Dzerjinsky  is  a  clever  actor. 
He  has  scrupulously  learned  all  those  catty 
little  gestures,  those  shades  of  mimicry,  some- 
times conveying  the  impression  that  he  is  ani- 
mated by  condolence  or  overcome  by  emotion 
of  sincere  sympathy  for  the  victim.  There  are 
moments  when  a  mysterious  flame  may  be  ob- 
served in  his  usually  dull  eyes,  a  symptom 
which  leaves  no  further  doubt  as  to  the  out- 
come of  the  deadly  game. 

The  Cheka  is  located  in  one  of  the  crowaed 
quarters  of  old  Moscow.  The  Bolshaya  Loubi- 
anka  Street,  where  in  former  times  the  biggest 
insurance  companies  had  their  offices,  has  be- 


154      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

come  a  huge  prison  in  which  all  sections  of  the 
Cheka  are  located.  People  go  far  out  of  their 
way  to  avoid  passing  these  places  full  of  horror. 
The  immense  building  heretofore  occupied  by 
the  insurance  company  ** Russia"  is  now  the 
headquarters  of  the  All-Russian  Cheka,  and 
it  is  there  that  its  ** inner  prison"  has  been 
established.  At  No.  13  on  the  Loubianka  there 
is  a  club  for  Cheka  employees  who,  by  the  order 
of  Dzerjinsky,  are  being  **  educated  in  aes- 
thetics." Once  a  week  the  best  Moscow  artists 
are  summoned  to  deliver  lectures  at  the  club, 
and  entertain  the  distinguished  audience  with 
dramatic  performances. 

In  the  evenings,  when  Moscow  sinks  into 
darkness  owing  to  the  lack  of  fuel,  it  is  only  on 
the  Loubianka  that  electric  lights  twinkle,  warn- 
ing the  citizens  that  the  Cheka  is  at  work  and 
that  nothing  can  be  concealed  from  it  even 
under  the  mantle  of  night. 

Connected  with  the  main  building  of  the 
Cheka  is  an  annex  facing  the  backyard,  where 
the  "Death  Ship"*  is  situated. 

To  the  right  of  the  entrance  there  is  a  big 
room  with  a  balustrade  extending  along  the 
four  walls.  In  the  center  there  is  an  open 
space  with  a  spiral  stairway  leading  down  to 
the  cellar  in  which  those  condemned  to  die  are 
kept.    In  one  of  the  stone  walls  of  the  "hold" 

*  The  ' '  Death  Ship "  is  a  part  of  the  Cheka  prison  where  those 
sentenced  to   die  are   confined. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       155 

small  cells  are  cut  out.  These  are  the  so- 
called  ^^  Chambers  of  departing  souls/' 
Therein  the  victims  are  left  to  live  their  last 
hours.  Profound  silence  reigns  there  for  no 
noise  from  the  outside  can  reach  the  under- 
ground. Here  every  link  with  life  is  severed. 
In  the  evenings,  after  sunset,  the  death  num- 
bers are  called  out  from  upstairs,  and  the  cells, 
when  vacated,  are  immediately  re-occupied  by 
those  who  are  **next"  on  the  Cheka  execution 
list.  A  man,  who  by  a  miracle  managed  to 
escape  from  this  sombre  tomb,  gives  the  follow- 
ing simple,  yet  heart-breaking  story,  which 
throws  a  ray  of  light  in  the  dark  realm  of 
the  Communist  inferno: 

"At  the  end  of  January,  1921,  I  was  thrown 
into  the  '  Ship '  where  there  were  two  others  await- 
ing their  turn  to  die.  *  »  *  Those  who  were 
tried  by  the  *TroyJca'*  usually  were  executed 
on  Wednesdays  and  Saturdays.  Therefore,  on 
"Wednesday,  January  26th,  they  clearly  realized 
that  this  was  their  last  day.  Still  they  were  ap- 
parently very  quiet,  and  even  at  dinner  they 
applied  to  the  foreman  with  the  request:  'Pour 
us  some  thick  stuff!  Mind,  you  are  feeding  us 
to-day  for  the  last  time.'  *  *  *  Around  six 
o'clock,  the  man  on  duty  appeared,  giving  in- 
structions to  evacuate  all  those  who  had  been 
casually  thrown  into  these  cells.  Then  it  became 
apparent  that  in  a  few  minutes  the  remaining 
ones  would  be  taken  out  for  execution.    Our  two 

*  The  Cheka  Council  of  three  who  deal  with  the  important  of- 
fenses against   Soviet  rule. 


156      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

single  cells  were  open  but  there  was  no  chance 
to  converse  with  the  men  in  the  adjoining  cells 
as  the  jailer  closely  watched  every  move  of  theirs. 
In  spite  of  this,  they  succeeded  in  hastily  destroy- 
ing some  pencil  notes.  However,  an  hour  later 
the  executioner,  Pankratov,  accompanied  by  the 
commandant,  Rodionov,  came  down  to  the  cellar. 
Persons  sentenced  to  death  were  called  out  of  their 
cells  and  ordered  to  undress.  They  took  off  their 
overcoats,  suits,  and  even  their  shirts.  They  un- 
dressed very  quickly  as  though  they  were  in  a 
great  hurry.  Their  faces  were  very  pale.  Their 
emotion  was  so  strong  that  some  of  them  proved 
unable  to  stand  firmly  on  their  feet,  and  then 
they  would  fall.  But  once  more  they  would  get 
up.  They  smoked  one  cigarette  after  another  and 
kept  deadly  still.  After  that,  also  without  saying 
a  word,  promptly,  almost  running,  the  six  began 
to  mount  the  spiral  stairway.  *  *  *  "We  were 
as  though  paralyzed  on  the  spot.  Benumbed,  we 
watched  them  leave.  I  was  struck  by  the  thought 
that  the  same  fate  was  awaiting  me.  Soon  after- 
ward the  guards  came  in  and  took  the  belongings 
of  the  victims.  The  food  was  immediately  divided 
among  them,  while  some  of  their  clothes  were 
later  observed  on  the  executioner,  Pankratov. 
Twenty  minutes  later  a  truck  passed  through  the 
gates  of  the  Moscow  Cheka.  *  *  *  It  was  the 
truck  which  carried  away  the  dead  bodies  of  the 
executed,  taking  them  to  the  Lefort  morgue  for 
postmortem  examination  and  burial  in  a  common 
grave.  The  judgment  against  the  executed  was 
rendered  in  default.  For  six  weeks  they  had  been 
waiting  to  be  executed."* 

*  Cheka,  pp.  33  and  34.     Translation  from  the  Russian. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       157 

Practically  every  city  of  importance  has  a 
Cheka  of  its  own.  Some  of  the  provincial 
branches  exercise  even  more  cruelty  than  the 
central  body  itself.  The  infamous  activities  of 
the  Odessa,  Kharkov  and  Don  Chekas  are 
known  all  over  Russia,  having  assumed  legen- 
dary proportions. 

The  Rev.  R.  Courtier-Forster,  late  British 
Chaplain  at  Odessa,  who  in  1919  witnessed  a 
reign  of  terror,  gives  this  vivid  description: 

"The  house  in  the  Catherine  Square  in  which 
I  was  first  in  captivity  afterwards  became  the 
Bolshevists'  House  of  Torture  in  which  hundreds 
of  victims  were  done  to  death.  The  shrieks  of 
the  people  being  tortured  to  death  or  having  splin- 
ters of  wood  driven  under  the  quick  of  their  nails 
were  so  agonizing  and  appalling  that  personal 
friends  of  my  own  living  more  than  a  hundred 
yards  away  in  the  Vorontsoffsky  Pereulok  were 
obliged  to  fasten  their  double  windows  to  prevent 
the  cries  of  anguish  penetrating  into  the  house. 
The  horror  and  fear  of  the  surviving  citizens  was 
so  great  that  the  Bolshevists  kept  motor  lorries 
thundering  up  and  down  the  street  to  drown  the 
awful  screams  of  agony  wrung  from  their  dying 
victims. 

"Week  by  week  the  newspapers  published  arti- 
cles for  and  against  the  nationalization  of 
women.  In  South  Russia  the  proposal  did  not 
become  a  legal  measure,  but  in  Odessa  bands  of 
Bolshevists  seized  women  and  girls  and  carried 
them  off  to  the  Port,  the  timber  yards,  and  the 
Alexandrovsky  Park  for  their  own  purposes. 
Women  used  in  this  way  were  found  in  the  mom- 


158      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

ings  either  dead  or  mad  or  in  a  dying  condition. 
Those  found  still  alive  were  shot.  One  of  the 
most  awful  of  my  own  personal  experiences  of  the 
New  Civilization  was  hearing  at  night  from  my 
bedroom  windows  the  frantic  shrieks  of  women 
being  raped  to  death  in  the  park  opposite.  Screams 
of  shrill  terror  and  despair  repeated  at  intervals 
until  they  became  nothing  but  hoarse  cries  of 
agony  like  the  death  calls  of  a  dying  animal.  This 
happened  not  once,  or  twice,  but  many  times. 
Never  to  the  day  of  my  death  shall  I  forget  the 
horror  of  those  dreadful  shrieks  of  tortured  women, 
and  one's  own  utter  powerlessness  to  aid  the  vic- 
tims or  punish  the  Bolshevist  devils  in  their 
bestial  orgies."* 

The  personnel  of  the  Cheka  employees  is 
composed  of  ex-convicts,  sexual  degenerates, 
political  crooks  and  similar  elements  who  go 
to  make  up  the  cream  of  the  Communist  Party. 
Their  behavior  is  outrageous.  Dressed  in 
leather  coats,  with  Brownings  hanging  from 
their  belts,  and  wearing  riding-boots,  they  can 
be  seen  everywhere — in  the  theatres,  at  labor 
meetings,  at  Conununist  Clubs,  and  in  various 
"educational  centers."  The  Cheka  pass  opens 
all  doors  to  them.  With  this  badge  they  have 
the  right  to  raid  private  apartments  at  their 
discretion.  Searches,  as  a  general  rule,  are 
accompanied  by  theft,  and  things  stolen  by  the 
Chekists  can  never  be  recovered,  for  there  is 

*Eev.  R.  Courtier-Forster,  "Bolshevism,  Reign  of  Torture  afc 
Odessa,"  reprinted  from  the  London  Times,  December  3,  1919,  pp. 
2,  3,  and  4. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       159 

no  institution  where  complaints  can  be  filed 
against  these  parasites  of  the  Communist  State. 
The  various  Soviets  themselves  are  terrorized 
by  the  Cheka.  Sometimes  a  mere  anonymous 
letter,  accusing  a  Soviet  official  of  pro-bourgeois 
leanings,  is  sufficient  to  cause  his  arrest  and 
have  him  "tried"  on  the  Loubianka.  Nobody 
feels  safe  under  the  Soviet  regime  because,  as 
adjuncts  to  the  official  agents  of  the  Cheka, 
there  are  innumerable  "volunteer  workers"  in 
its  employ.  Soviet  spies  are  everywhere.  Every- 
body is  watched,  and  Dzerjinsky  went  so  far  as 
to  declare  that  he  was  quite  willing  to  be  shad- 
owed by  dozens  of  Chekists.  "The  Workers' 
and  Peasants'  State"  has  set  up  a  model  dy- 
namo of  espionage  with  a  network  of  wires 
running  to  every  section  of  the  country. 

All  those  who,  as  a  result  of  Bolshevism,  have 
become  degraded  and  sunk  to  the  social  bottom, 
thieves  and  swindlers  of  former  times,  crimi- 
nals guilty  of  sexual  abuses,  prostitutes,  and  de- 
generate young  men  who  in  days  passed  be- 
longed to  the  idle  strata  of  society — ^they  all 
are  now  on  the  staffs  of  the  AU-Russian  Cheka. 

Russian  counter-revolutionary  organizations 
have  collected  albums  containing  pictures  of 
these  Communist  spies.  One  glance  at  their 
faces,  with  loose-lipped,  drooping  mouths,  flop- 
ping ears,  weary  eyes  with  not  even  a  spark  of 
will  or  courage  in  them,  is  sufficient  to  prove 


i6o      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

that  these  records  furnish  priceless  material  for 
the  future  criminologist. 

It  is  noteworthy  that,  while  general  science 
has  been  practically  abandoned  in  Soviet  Rus- 
sia, a  number  of  new  *' scientific  disci- 
plines," hitherto  unknown  to  civilized  man- 
kind, have  been  invented  by  the  Communist 
rulers.  Special  courses  pertaining  to  the  prac- 
tice of  espionage  and  its  "theoretical  founda- 
tions" are  being  given  in  the  Cheka,  with  spies 
and   executioners  in  attendance. 

In  the  beginning  of  1922,  on  the  Loubianka, 
lectures  were  given  on  the  following  subjects: 

(a)  The  general  aims  of  the  Extraordinary  Com- 
mittees. 

(b)  The  organization  of  espionage. 

(c)  Methods  of  investigating  counter-revolution- 
ary "crimes." 

(d)  The  organization  of  espionage  on  railroads. 

(e)  The   methods   for  struggling   with   counter- 
revolutionary activities  in  the  army. 

(f)  Methods  for  combating  speculation. 

(g)  The    inter-relation     between    the     different 
branches  of  the  All-Russian  Cheka. 

(h)    The  organization  of  searches  and  arrests. 

The  new  Communist  "learning"  is  rapidly 
replacing  the  old  bourgeois  science  of  the  New- 
tons,  Kants,  Lobachevskys,  and  Darwins.  These 
were  found  to  be  no  good,  at  least  compared 
with  a  Morozov,  author  of  The  All-Russian 
Cheka  and  the  October  Revolution,  or  a  Latzis 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL      i6i 

enlightening  the  world  with  his  booklet,  Two 
Years  of  Struggle  on  the  Internal  Front. 
Trotzky  himself,  envying  the  scientific  laurels 
of  his  Cheka  companions,  has  devoted  much  of 
his  precious  time  to  writing  a  volume  which 
bears  the  reassuring  title.  The  Defence  of  Ter- 
rorism. Therein  he  expatiates  at  length  on  the 
virtues  of  Terrorism  in  practice,  and  explains 
in  what  respect  Marx  would  have  sanctioned 
the  Communist  inquisition  had  he  been  alive 
to-day.  Trotzky 's  book,  as  a  whole,  is  a  glori- 
fication of  the  extreme  brutality  which  has 
marked  the  Socialist  regime  in  Russia.  His 
general  deduction  on  the  subject  is: 

**The  State  terror  of  a  revolutionary  class  can 
be  condemned  'morally'  only  by  a  man  who,  as 
a  principle,  rejects  (in  words)  every  form  of  vio- 
lence whatsoever — consequently,  every  war  and 
every  rising.  For  this  one  has  to  be  merely  and 
simply  a  hypocritical  Quaker."* 

Indeed,  Trotzky 's  vindication  of  Terror  does 
not  leave  much  ground  for  a  liberal  heart  to 
rejoice.    Take  this  passage,  for  instance: 

"The  press  is  a  weapon  not  of  an  abstract  so- 
ciety, but  of  two  irreconcilable,  armed  and  eon- 
tending  sides.  We  are  destroying  the  press  of 
the  counter-revolution,  just  as  we  destroyed  its 
fortified  positions,  its  stores,  its  communications 
and  its  intelligence  system.     Are  we  depriving 

•  Trotzky 's  The  Defence  of  Terrorism,  p.  55,  London,  1921. 


i62      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

ourselves  of  Cadet  and  Menshevik  criticisms  of 
the  corruption  of  the  working  class?  In  return 
we  are  victoriously  destroying  the  very  founda- 
tions of  capitalist  corruption."^ 


»* 


Or, 

"Without  the  Red  Terror  the  Russian  Bour- 
geoisie, t{^ether  with  the  world  bourgeoisie, 
would  throttle  us  long  before  the  coming  of  the 
revolution  in  Europe.  One  must  be  blind  not  to 
see  this,  or  a  swindler  to  deny  it."t 

In  this  respect  Trotzky  is  merely  reiterating 
such  statements  as  have  become  commonplaces 
in  the  Bolshevist  press.  As  far  back  as  1918 
the  official  policy  regarding  Red  Terror  was 
formulated  thus: 

"Only  those  among  the  representatives  of  the 
bourgeois  class  who  during  the  period  of  nine 
months  succeeded  in  proving  their  loyalty  to  the 
Soviet  rule  should  be  spared.  All  the  others  are 
our  hostages  and  we  should  treat  them  accord- 
ingly. Enough  of  mildness.  The  interest  of  the 
revolution  necessitates  the  physical  annihilation 
of  the  bourgeoise  class.  It  is  time  for  v^  to  start. "t 

The  important  point  about  this  and  similar 
utterances  is  that  the  Bolsheviki  do  mean  what 
they  say.    According  to  Latzis's  own  boast: 

"In  Petrograd  alone  as  many  as  five  hundred 

•Ibid,  p.  58. 
t  Ibid,  pp.  60  and  61. 

■j^Bed  Gazette,  editorial  article  in  the  issue  of  August  31,  1918. 
Translation  from  the  Bussian. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       163 

persons  were  shot  as  an  answer  to  the  shots  fired 
at  Lenin  and  Uritsky."* 

Nor  is  it  possible  to  determine  the  precise 
number  of  Soviet  victims — of  all  those  who 
have  been  murdered  either  in  the  cellars  of  the 
Cheka  or  in  the  course  of  open  banditism  car- 
ried on  by  Red  sailors  and  other  "beauties"  of 
the  Communist  Regime.  The  number  of  mar- 
tyrs is  unknown.  Their  names  oftentimes  have 
not  even  been  recorded  by  Soviet  chanceries. 

In  the  spring  of  1922,  a  member  of  British 
Parliament  put  the  question  to  the  Cabinet, 
whether  it  was  true  that  from  the  beginning  of 
Bolshevist  rule  up  to  July  1,  1921,  the  Soviets 
had  executed  the  following  number  of  people 
belonging  to  different  classes: 

Clergymen 1,215 

Bishops 28 

Professors  and  school  teachers 6,775 

Physicians  and  their  assistants 8,800 

Army  and  Navy  officers 54,650 

Soldiers 260,000 

Policemen  of  higher  ranks 10,500 

Policemen  of  lower  ranks 48,500 

Land  owners 12,950 

Belonging  to  the  intellectual  class 355,250 

Manual  Workers 192,350 

Peasants 815,100 

Total 1,766,118 

•  N.  Y,  Latzis,  Popular  Synopsis  of  Two  Tears'  Activity  on  the 
Extraordinary  Commissions,  quoted  from  Allan  J.  Carter's  article, 
"The  Bolshevist  Substitute  for  a  Judicial  System,"  in  the  Illinois 
Law  Review,  January,  1922. 


i64      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

The  answer  was  that  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment had  no  authentic  figures. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  subject  is  one  that 
precludes  astronomic  accuracy.  The  bloody 
reality  of  Red  Terror  stands  out  as  a  frightful 
indictment  of  Communist  rule.  The  slaughter 
of  the  Russian  Nation  has  not  ceased;  it  con- 
tinues with  uninterrupted  ferocity.  Lenin  and 
Trotzky  are  butchering  their  serfs  in  haste,  but 
systematically.  The  machine  of  oppression 
crushes  its  opponents  without  discrimination 
but  also  without  mercy. 

A  few  words  should  be  mentioned  about  the 
Bolshevist  judicial  institutions,  such  as  Revo- 
lutionary Tribunals  and  the  "People's''  Courts. 
Justice  in  the  most  elementary  sense  of  the 
term  does  not  exist  in  the  Marxian  State.  One 
of  the  leading  Soviet  "jurists"  frankly  ad- 
mitted : 

"The  task  of  Revolutionary  Tribunals  con- 
sists in  passing  judgment  swiftly  and  ruthlessly 
on  the  enemies  of  the  proletarian  revolution. 
These  courts  are  one  of  the  arms  for  the  suppres- 
sion of  the  exploiters  and  in  this  sense  they  are 
just  as  much  weapons  of  proletarian  offence  and 
defence  as  the  Red  Guard,  the  Red  Army,  the 
Extraordinary  Commissions."* 

Bolshevist  judicial  practice  is  as  much  of  a 
mockery  as  it  is  an  insult  to  the  conscience 

*  See  Soviet  Eussia,  issue  of  September,  1921,  p.  123.  Published 
in  New  York  City. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       165 

of  the  nation.  Illiterate  judges  are  turning 
over  their  decisions  like  so  many  pancakes, 
leaving  the  Soviet  citizens  in  a  state  of  per- 
plexity. At  times,  court  proceedings  are  con- 
verted in  a  real  "Comedy  of  Errors,"  where 
the  judge  fails  to  grasp  the  difference  between 
the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant,  while  the  liti- 
gants are  puzzled  over  the  distinction  between 
the  judge  and  the  witness. 

The  administration  of  justice  in  Soviet  Rus- 
sia does  not  differ  from  other  modes  of  oppres- 
sion, the  sole  purpose  of  which  is  to  safeguard 
the  proletarian  oligarchy.  Everything  is 
adapted  to  this  end.  This  is  particularly  true 
about  the  Red  Army,  which  grew  out  of  the 
original  Red  Guard  bands  and  small  Commun- 
ist detachments.  The  scattered  Red  Guard 
units,  however,  were  later  brought  under  uni- 
form management  and  centralized  command. 
When  Trotzky  became  War  Commissar,  he 
strove  to  build  up  a  formidable  Red  force  with 
two  objects  in  mind:  First,  to  use  it  as  a 
weapon  for  fostering  world  revolution;  and 
second,  as  a  deadly  tool  against  the  Russian 
people  themselves. 

At  an  epoch  when  all  civilized  nations  are 
concerned  about  the  problem  of  limitation  of 
armament,  Soviet  Russia  is  feverishly  increas- 
ing her  standing  army,  which  justly  causes 
grave  anxiety  to  her  neighboring  States.  While 
Russian  industries  are  at  a  standstill,  the  Soviet 


i66      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

munition  plants  are  working  at  full  speed. 
Rifles  and  machine  guns,  which  are  the  basic 
elements  of  modern  military  equipment,  are 
being  turned  out  at  a  rate  which  exceeds  the 
pre-war  output.  Beginning  with  1919,  approxi- 
mately 1,700,000  rifles  were  manufactured  per 
year;  at  present  their  total  supply  on  hand  in 
arsenals  is  not  less  than  19,500,000. 

Trotzky  is  continuously  agitating  in  an  en- 
deavor to  keep  the  militaristic  spirit  alive. 
His  inflammatory  speeches  always  refer  to  pre- 
paredness, and  ever-increasing  armaments  are 
urged.  By  January,  1922,  the  standing  army 
of  Red  Russia  was  approximately  700,000.  In 
the  army  ranks,  industrial  workers  represent 
scarcely  more  than  15  per  cent.,  the  rest  being 
made  up  of  peasants  who  are  unreservedly 
opposed  to  the  Soviet  Regime.  Still,  espionage 
in  the  Red  Army  is  so  developed  that  any 
attempt  to  turn  bayonets  against  the  oppressors 
must  necessarily  encounter  great  obstacles. 
Every  regiment  has  a  Communist  group  which 
attentively  watches  the  mood  and  behavior 
both  of  the  officers'  corps  and  the  privates. 
The  least  manifestation  of  disobeyance  leads 
to  immediate  execution.  Soldiers  do  not  dare 
to  form  counter-revolutionary  organizations  be- 
cause of  the  fear  that  Communist  spies  might 
get  into  them.  Furthermore,  mercenary  detach- 
ments composed  of  Chinese  coolies  and  Lettish 
Communists,    together    with    Jewish  Interna- 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       167 

tional  battalions,  are  there  to  quell  every  pos- 
sible uprising  against  the  Soviets.  Special 
military  training  is  being  given  to  members  of 
the  Communist  Party.  In  this  connection  the 
** younger  set"  of  Bolsheviks  received  the  fol- 
lowing instructions  from  their  superiors: 

"Every  Communist  must  learn  military  science ; 
must  learn  to  'handle  a  rifle,  a  machine  gun,  and 
a  trench  gun  and  drive  an  armored  motor  truck 
— in  general,  learn  military  science.  The  Central 
Committee  of  the  party  ordered  to  create  from 
all  Communists  in  good  health  regiments  for  spe- 
cial service,  with  regular  training  in  military 
matters,  and  to  organize  Communist  women  to 
study  sanitation.  *  *  *  The  young  Commun- 
ist must  pay  the  most  serious  attention  to  his 
studies  in  these  regiments.  He  must  know  that 
the  calling  of  a  Communist  imposes  on  him  a 
special  obligation  to  be  ready  at  any  moment,  on 
the  call  of  his  party,  to  come  to  the  defence  of 
the  Soviet  authority  against  the  attacks  of  its 
enemies — ^whether  it  be  an  internal  counter-revo- 
lutionary conspiracy  or  a  danger  on  external 
fronts.  We  must  say  then:  'Young  Commun- 
ists, learn  military  science  I '  "* 

Those  very  people  who  in  1917  persuaded  the 
Russian  soldiers  to  lay  down  their  arms, 
preaching   fraternization,    and   delivering   ser- 

*  Compare  Bed  Gazette,  September  27,  1919,  article  entitled  "The 
Duty  of  New  Members  of  the  Party,"  quoted  from  "Memorandum 
on  the  Bolshevist  or  Communist  party  in  Russia  and  its  Relations  to 
the  Third  or  Communist  International,"  p.  29.  Washington  Gov- 
ernment Printing  Office,  1920. 


i68      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

mons  on  ** eternal  peace,"  are  now  seeking  to 
convert  Russia  into  an  armed  camp,  and  propa- 
gate the  most  despicable  type  of  militarism 
which  thoroughly  ignores  the  idea  of  patriot- 
ism. To-day  the  sole  aim  of  Trotzky's  prepar- 
edness is  the  preservation  at  all  cost  of  his 
unscrupulous  regime  of  violence.  Things  have 
gone  so  far  that  universal  military  drilling  has 
been  decreed  not  only  for  men  but  women  as 
well.  Mrs.  KoUontay  has  boasted  that  begin- 
ning with  June,  1920,  all  girls  between  the 
ages  of  sixteen  and  eighteen  have  been  made 
to  drill  equally  with  young  men.  Those  under 
military  age  are  forced  to  attend  special  courses 
for  physical  training  and  preliminary  military 
drill.  In  Moscow  alone,  she  said,  six  thousand 
women  were  drilling  in  January,  1922.* 

Himgry  and  wretched  as  they  are,  the  Rus- 
sian people  have  no  other  choice  than  to  sub- 
mit, at  least  temporarily,  to  the  will  of  a  shame- 
ful clique.  Harried  by  the  Cheka,  menaced  by 
the  Red  Army,  their  most  sacred  beliefs  in- 
sulted and  debauched,  they  have  to  endure  the 
yoke.  But  in  their  hearts  the  Holy  Image  of 
Christ  still  shines  like  a  ray  of  hope. 

The  late  Alexander  Block,  the  Pierrot  of 
Russian  poetry,  who  in  years  gone  by  composed 
mellifluous  sonnets  to  the  ^* Azure  Dame,"  de- 
voted his  last  poem,  "The  Twelve,"  to  a  deeply 
pathetic  portrayal  of  Russia's  present  agony. 

*  Compare  Soviet  Bussia,  issue  of  January,  1922,  p.  27. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       169 

"The  Twelve"  is  a  symbol  of  the  Red  Army  in 
all  its  naked  ugliness  and  boundless  hooligan- 
ism. In  their  march  forward  they  tread  over 
the  strangled  body  of  their  Motherland,  while 
the  starving  people  lag  behind: 

"So  they   marcli   in    Sover'ign   manner, 
In  their  rear — a  hungry  hound, 
Leading — ^with  the  bloody  banner, 

*'From  the  Bullets'  touch  proteeted'. 
By  the  Tempest  undetected, 

"In  a  snow-like  gentle  pace, 
In  a  pearl-like  whirl  of  grace, 
"With  a  few  white  roses  crown 'd—* 
Leading — Jesus  Christ  is  found.  *'• 

Red  Terror,  in  its  various  ramifications,  is 
the  background  of  the  Russian  disaster.  Not- 
withstanding its  gigantic  scale  and  atrocious 
nature,  Bolshevism  has  failed  to  extinguish 
completely  the  flame  of  life.  Human  beings, 
labeled  as  Soviet  citizens,  still  continue,  if  not 
to  live,  then  at  least  to  vegetate  in  a  state  of 
incessant  apprehension,  their  psychology  hav- 
ing been  reduced  to  a  few  primitive  longings. 
Among  these  the  persistent  craving  to  eat  is 
the  propelling  force  which  drives  them  to  pur- 
sue their  every-day  business,  be  it  theft,  or 
speculation,  or  forced  labor  In  Soviet  factories. 

*  The  Twelve  by  Alexander  Block.    Author's  translation  from  the 
Bussian. 


J  70      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

From  a  narrow  biological  viewpoint,  such  a 
pitiful  existence  might  be  termed  life.  Yet  in 
a  broader  sense  the  life  of  man  cannot  be  re- 
stricted to  mere  physiological  functioning.  At 
the  dawn  of  history,  it  is  true,  wild  tribes  in 
their  mode  of  living  did  not  differ  much  from 
kindred  zoological  formations.  In  higher 
stages  of  civilization,  however,  the  animal  in- 
stinct gradually  became  subjugated  to  a  long 
range  of  loftier  aspirations,  which  since  then 
have  borne  a  strong  influence  upon  the  history 
of  mankind. 

In  the  case  of  Soviet  Russia  that  part  of  life 
which  lifts  man  above  the  ape  is  non-existent, 
or  else  it  exists  on  paper  only. 

Had  the  workings  of  Soviet  rule  been  con- 
fined exclusively  to  the  dissipation  of  material 
wealth,  the  defence  of  Sovietism  might  not  have 
been  a  task  so  hopeless;  but  utter  degradation 
has  permeated  all  the  manifestations  of  na- 
tional being.  Constructive  thought  as  a  guiding 
principle,  and  a  basis  for  intellectual  achieve- 
ment, is  killed. 

Charles  E.  Crane,  former  U.  S.  Minister  to 
China,  who  recently  visited  Soviet  Russia,  thus 
summarizes  his  impressions  regarding  general 
conditions  there : 

**Russia,"  he  said,  '*•  •  *  is  *  •  •  a 
vast  prison  and  the  people  are  living  under  prison 
conditions  *  *  *.  The  Terror  is  present  at 
all  times  and  everywhere.     The  new  bourgeoisie 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       171 

and  the  new  aristocracy  have  stolen  an  empire 
right  out  from  under  the  eyes  of  the  whole  world, 
and  not  only  have  reversed  all  natural  processes 
of  evolution,  but  as  regards  liberty  and  progress 
have  pushed  Russia  back  to  the  darkness  in  which 
she  lay  before  the  time  of  Peter  the  Great."* 

Every  country  has  lights  and  shadows  of  its 
own.  But  Russia  dwells  in  perpetual  mid- 
night. Filthy  and  diseased,  she  lies  helplessly 
in  her  rags  of  poverty.  The  mass  of  wreckage 
of  that  which  once  was  Holy  Eussia  impedes 
the  progress  of  reconstruction  everywhere. 

To  fully  comprehend  this  condition,  it  be- 
comes necessary  to  examine  some  of  its  out- 
standing features. 

Sanitary  Conditions 

Probably  one  of  the  most  horrible  aspects  of 
Russia's  tragic  plight  is  the  total  ruin  of  her 
cities.  Hitherto  flourishing  urban  communities, 
including  both  capitals,  Petrograd  and  Moscow, 
now  resemble  dreary  cemeteries.  The  streets 
which  in  days  past  gleamed  with  smiling 
crowds  and  happy  life,  now  are  found  de- 
serted. The  stores  are  closed  and  their  show- 
windows  either  smashed  or  boarded  up.  Here 
and  there,  one  finds  wooden  houses  partly  de- 
molished; sidewalks  and  pavements  are  in  a 

*  Compare  interview  with  Charles  R.  Crane  published  in  the  Chi- 
cago  Daily  News,  issue  of  October  25,  1921. 


172      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

state  of  decay;  street  traffic  has  been  aban- 
doned. It  is  on  rare  occasions  only  that  a  heavy 
truck  laden  with  a  score  of  Red  Guards  thun- 
ders down  a  deserted  boulevard.  The  rattling 
noise  produced  by  such  a  vehicle  tends  to  in- 
tensify the  deadly  silence  reigning  all  around. 

When  the  Bolsheviki  usurped  the  power, 
they  promptly  dissolved  all  municipal  institu- 
tions. In  their  place  various  kinds  of  Soviets 
were  set  up  with  ignorant  Communist  politi- 
cians managing  and  mismanaging  city  affairs. 
A  few  months  later  urban  life  at  large  was 
hopelessly  wrecked.  The  crisis  was  aggravated 
by  the  acute  shortage  of  food  and  fuel. 

Francis  McCuUagh  who,  in  1920,  for  several 
weeks,  was  detained  in  Moscow,  gives  a  glimpse 
of  his  pleasant  experiences  there: 

**At  first  I  lived  in  the  railway  carriage  in  which 
I  had  come,  and  I  found  that  other  people  were 
living  there  also.  On  these  people  I  managed  to 
'sponge,'  more  or  less  successfully,  but  for  some 
weeks  I  could  not  get  anything  to  eat  or  drink 
till  six  o'clock  in  the  evening.  What  this  means  I 
leave  the  reader  to  imagine.  One  can  live  without 
food  for  a  long  time  if  one  lives  quietly  in  a  warm 
room  and  drinks  plenty  of  water,  but  I  walked  a 
great  deal  about  Moscow  in  cold  weather  and  with 
the  streets  knee-deep  in  snow  and  slush.  Later  on, 
when  the  snow  melted,  great  pools  of  water  made 
some  of  the  principal  thoroughfares  almost  im- 
passable. In  some  places  there  were  stepping- 
stones,  or  one  could  creep  along  close  by  the  sides 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       173 

of  the  houses  where  there  was  a  broken  margin 
of  dry  land  about  an  inch  wide ;  and  it  was  strange 
to  see  long  queues  of  people  waiting  at  such 
places  till  they  could  negotiate  these  dangerous 
crossings  slowly  and  in  single  file.  As  my  own 
pair  of  boots  was  worn  out,  I  soon  began  to  suffer 
from  'trench  foot,'  which  I  had  never  known  when 
in  the  trenches.  My  hair  grew  long,  I  ceased  to 
shave,  I  could  not  even  wash  every  day ;  I  was  only 
able  to  clean  my  boots  once  during  the  course  of 
a  month;     *     *     *."* 

This  is  typical  of  the  conditions  prevailing  in 
that  country,  for  everybody  is  dirty,  starving 
on  Marxian  rations,  and  clothes  are  worn  until 
they  hang  in  tatters.  Whatever  food  abounds, 
is  filthy  and  rotten.  There  is  a  long  "bag-car- 
rying" experience  behind  every  Soviet  menu. 
On  this  point  our  English  author  has  this  to 
teU: 

"At  several  places  near  the  Kremlin,  women 
sold  a  sort  of  rough  porridge  for  one  hundred 
roubles  a  cup — equivalent  to  £10  in  the  old  cur- 
rency— and  I  used  to  stand  in  the  street  amid  a 
crowd  of  famished  derelicts  who  looked  almost  as 
disreputable  as  myself,  eating  out  of  a  wooden 
porringer,  with  the  aid  of  a  wooden  spoon  this 
grateful  and  comforting  food.  The  porridge  was 
kept  in  a  large  wooden  bucket  like  what  cattle 
are  fed  out  of;  and,  being  carefully  covered,  it 
was  always  warm,  though  there  was  very  little 
nourishment  in  it.'*t 

*  Francis  McCullagh,  A  Prisoner  of  the  Beds,  p.  206,  Nmr  York 
CSty,  1922. 

fUjld.,  pp.  206  and  207. 


174      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Deplorable  as  the  external  appearance  of 
Soviet  cities  is,  still  worse  are  the  housing 
conditions  which  the  Russians  have  to  endure. 

There  is  a  peculiar  institution  which  suppos- 
edly administers  all  dwelling-houses;  these 
are  the  notorious  ** Beggars'  Committees,"  elec- 
ted from  among  the  inhabitants  themselves. 
As  a  general  rule,  however,  a  Communist  spy 
always  plays  the  first  fiddle  in  such  institutions. 
Instead  of  taking  proper  care  of  the  house,  he 
exerts  his  energies  to  protect  the  ** Workers'  and 
Peasants'  State."  It  is  he,  in  fact,  who  reports 
to  the  local  Soviet  on  any  **  suspicious  indivi- 
dual" residing  within  the  boundaries  of  his 
jurisdiction.  It  is  he  who  leads  in  searches, 
which  from  time  to  time  are  decreed  by  the 
Cheka.  It  is  finally  he  who  decides  upon  the 
policies  of  the  ** Beggars'  Committees"  as  a 
whole. 

Owing  to  the  incredible  incompetency  of  the 
Communist  officials,  and  to  the  general  chaos 
reigning  throughout  the  country,  fuel,  which  is 
quite  indispensable  during  the  long  and  cold 
Russian  winters,  is  almost  unavailable.  Wood- 
yards,  where  in  previous  times  firewood  was 
purchased,  have  been  nationalized.  In  Petro- 
grad  some  of  the  sawmills  are  engaged  exclu- 
sively in  the  manufacture  of  coffins,  the  output 
of  which  is  over  30,000  per  month.  Yet  this 
quantity  proves  insufficient.  Fuel  is  so  scarce 
that  wooden  houses  are  razed  to  the  ground  and 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL      175 

block  pavements  torn  tip  and  used  for  heating 
the  apartments. 

Likewise  barges  in  which  timber  was  carried 
have  been  taken  to  pieces  and  added  to  the 
meagre  fuel  supply. 

The  municipal  transportation  system  has 
completely  broken  down,  since  all  horses  were 
requisitioned  for  food  and  other  purposes.  It, 
therefore,  became  impossible  to  remove  the 
dirt  from  the  streets,  and  garbage  from  the 
houses  which  are  being  dmnped  in  vacant 
lots  and  city  squares. 

In  December  1919,  an  amusing  convention  of 
** Beggars'  Committees"  deputies  was  held  in 
Petrograd.  Questions  pertaining  to  the  de- 
plorable condition  of  the  city  were  discussed. 
It  was  pointed  out  that  water  pipes  in  nearly 
all  houses  had  frozen  and  burst  and  apartments 
had  been  flooded  with  sewage. 

Governmental  buildings  are  in  no  better 
state.  Professor  Zeidler,  an  eminent  Russian 
surgeon  who  is  in  charge  of  the  Eed  Cross 
work  in  Viborg,  Finland,  some  time  ago  made  a 
lengthy  report  on  sanitary  conditions  in  the 
Russian  capital.    Here  is  what  he  says : 

"At  No.  11  Chemishoff  Street  one  can  visit  an 
institution  bearing  the  pretentious  title  'Commit- 
tee of  Sanitary  Welfare  of  the  City  of  Petrograd. ' 
In  this  building  the  central  heating  is  out  of  com- 
mission, despite  every  endeavor  to  put  it  in  order, 
and  notwithstanding  all  the  means  and  knowledge 


176      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

at  the  disposal  of  the  municipal  administration. 
Only  a  few  rooms  are  heated  with  small  iron 
stoves,  the  pipes  of  which  are  stuck  out  through 
the  windows.  In  the  same  institution  one  can  no- 
tice that  water  fixtures  and  toilets  are  completely 
out  of  repair."* 

Similar  is  the  condition  in  schools  and  other 
educational  centers  managed  by  the  Bolsheviki. 

"Generally  speaking,"  says  Dr.  N.  N.,  one  of 
Professor  Zeidler^s  informants,  **the  whole  school 
life  has  been  turned  into  a  continuous  caricature. 
If  one  attempts  to  visit  a  school  at  nine  a.  m.,  it 
might  be  observed  that  owing  to  the  absence  of 
lights,  it  is  x>ossible  to  walk  through  the  rooms 
only  by  groping  along.  In  the  classes  one  can  see 
small  shadows  grouped  around  one  big  shadow; 
those  are  the  children  wrapped  up  in  their  winter 
clothes  and  their  teacher  also  bundled  up  from 
head  to  foot  to  protect  herself  from  the  cold,  per- 
forming her  pedagogical  duties." 

Much  worse,  if  possible,  is  the  condition  m 
hospitals  and  other  medical  institutions.  In 
this  connection  Professor  Zeidler  gives  heart- 
breaking details.  Referring  to  one  of  the  ty- 
phus epidemics  in  Petrograd,  he  says: 

**  Without  exaggeration,  it  can  be  asserted  that 
a  majority  of  the  sick  with  spotted  or  intermit- 
tent typhus  were  taken  into  the  ward  covered  with 
lice.     They  infected  the  others  and  spread  the 

*  See  Prof.  Zeidler 's  report  on  Sanitary  Conditions  in  Petrograd. 
iViborg,  1920. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       177 

disease  amongst  the  medical  personnel  and  their 
assistants.  Hospital  inventories  are  in  a  chaotic 
state.  Patients  steal  night  clothes,  bed  linen  and 
blankets;  the  belongings  of  the  patients  are  like- 
wise stolen  from  lockers,  while  the  nurses  steal 
firewood  and  cany  it  to  their  homes.  *  *  • 
Medical  supplies  are  very  scarce,  and  there  is 
a  complete  absence  of  some  of  the  most  common 
and  indispensable  remedies.  Bicarbonate  of  soda 
is  not  available,  nor  is  there  any  castor  oil,  pyrami- 
don,  phenacetin,  etc.,  etc.  Quinine  and  camphor 
oil  are  given  in  minimum  doses.  *  *  *  Opera- 
tions are  performed  under  the  most  difficult  con- 
ditions, the  temperature  in  the  operating-rooms 
varying  from  3  to  6  degrees  R.  The  patients 
freeze  and  the  hands  of  the  surgeon  freeze  too. 
Almost  all  operations  are  followed  by  complica- 
tions, such  as  pneumonia  and  ulcers.  Water  pipes 
have  burst  and  toilets  are  out  of  order.  *  •  * 
Laundries  and  fumigating  plants  yield  very  in- 
efficient work,  partly  due  to  the  destruction  of 
the  pipes,  and  partly  to  the  lack  of  fuel.  In  the 
morgues  *  *  *  an  enormous  number  of  corpses 
are  piled  up,  and  there  are  no  coffins  to  bury 
them  in.  *  *  *  Physicians  are  overworked 
and  exhausted  in  the  extreme.  Every  doctor  has 
from  one  hundred  and  fifty  to  two  hundred  pa- 
tients to  attend.  *  *  »  Scientific  life  hafi 
stopped  entirely." 

All  this  relates  to  Petrograd,  but  tHe  same 
conditions  are  found  everywhere.  An  Amer- 
ican physician,  Dr.  Weston  B.  Estes,  who  in 
1921  was  kept  an  inmate  in  one  of  the  Soviet 
prisons  at  Moscow,  and  later  transferred  to  a 
hospital  in  the  same  city,  says  the  following: 


178      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

**The  surgeon  in  charge  of  the  barracks  where 
I  was  an  inmate,  was  a  very  hard-working,  able 
man.  The  operations  were  confined  largely  to 
patients  suffering  from  hernia,  appendicitis  and 
gun-shot  wounds.  *  *  »  Scarcely  ever  was  a 
clean  operation  carried  out  without  infection,  ex- 
cept in  isolated  cases  where  the  liberal  use  of 
bribe  money  obtained  better  work  from  the  at- 
tendants. In  connection  with  the  operating  room 
there  was  only  one  of  the  five  sterilizers  in  order 
when  I  was  there.  Consequently  the  field  of  work 
was  distinctly  limited,  especially  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  the  chief  surgeon  had'  no  assistant. 
*  *  *  Many  men  died  in  the  ward.  They 
never  received  any  helpful  attention.  Never  once 
did  I  see  a  laboratory  diagnosis  attempted.  In 
fact,  there  was  no  laboratory.  If  there  was  strych- 
nine in  the  hospital  I  never  saw  it,  and  I  do  not 
believe  there  was  any.  *  *  *  The  deaths  in 
the  ward  were  harrowing  because  of  the  lack  of 
opiates  and  anodynes,  so  relief  from  pain  was 
almost  impossible.  Men  died  like  sheep,  with  no 
more  self-consciousness  than  an  animal  would 
have.  In  fact,  animals  in  America  are  better 
treated  than  men  in  Soviet  Russian  hospitals  and 
in  prisons."* 

Life  in  Petrograd  apartment  houses  has  be- 
come a  real  torture.  Professor  Zeidler's  re- 
port reveals  the  following  details: 

**AU  the  filth  from  the  pipes  has  risen  to  the 
surface,   while   the   tenants  in   their   apartments 

*  Address  delivered  by  Dr.  Weston  B.  Estes  before  the  members 
of  the  Associated  Physicians  of  Long  Island,  "Prison  and  Hospital 
Ufa  in  Soviet  Eui»a,"  p.  10,  New  York  City,  1922. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL      179 

heap  up  dirt  to  the  last  degree.  Rubbish  and 
waste  water  are  thrown  out  anywhere:  on  stair- 
cases, in  yards,  and  even  through  the  windows  into 
the  streets.  None  of  this  is  being  removed.  Dirt 
accumulates,  converting  the  houses  into  rubbish 
piles.  In  many  apartments  the  temperature  is 
below  zero.  The  inhabitants  no  longer  undress; 
they  keep  on  their  fur  coats.  *  *  *  They 
sleep  with  their  clothes  on  covered  up  with  nu- 
merous sweaters  and  scarfs.  They  do  not  wash 
for  several  months,  nor  do  they  change  their  . 
underwear;  naturally,  they  become  infected  with 
lice.  The  slightest  illness  leads  to  most  serious 
complications.  As  a  result  of  hunger  and  cold,  in 
the  skin  on  the  hands  and  feet,  especially  among 
elderly  men  and  children,  there  appear  peculiar 
knots,  smaller  or  larger  in  size,  which  have  a 
tendency  of  being  converted  into  ulcers;  these 
practically  cannot  be  healed." 

In  some  of  the  big  apartment  houses  in  both 
Petrograd  and  other  cities,  the  tenants  throw 
out  their  dirt  onto  the  lower  floors  of  the 
buildings.  Gradually  these  floors  become  un- 
inhabitable; then  the  tenants  move  to  the  next 
floor  above,  until  finally  the  whole  house  be- 
comes a  horrible  depository  of  human  refuse. 
Such  houses  are  thereafter  abandoned.  They 
stand  out  as  monuments  of  the  dirty  Bolshevist 
rule  itself. 

No  wonder  that  under  these  circumstances 
epidemics  of  all  kinds  ravage  Soviet  Russia.  In 
1920-1921  spotted  typhus  killed  more  people  than 
the  Chekas  did.    In  1922  Asiatic  cholera  broke 


i8o      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

out  not  only  in  the  famine  stricken  districts, 
but  also  in  the  Northwestern  parts  of  Russia. 
The  sick  were  doomed  since  there  was  no  medi- 
cal help,  especially  in  rural  districts. 

There  has  been  a  staggering  decline  in  the 
urban  population.  In  pre-war  times  there  were 
about  two  million  inhabitants  in  Petrograd.  In 
January,  1921,  according  to  the  Bolshevist 
press  itself,  its  population  was  706,800.  This 
was  a  decrease  of  71  per  cent.  The  census  of 
Moscow  shows  a  decrease  of  50  per  cent,  since 
1917,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  all  gov- 
ernmental institutions  were  removed  from  Pet- 
rograd to  Moscow.  Odessa  which  before  the 
war  had  a  population  of  over  one  million,  at 
present  has  not  more  than  400,000.  Equally 
tragic  is  the  situation  in  Kiev,  Kharkov,  Kazan 
and  other  principal  cities. 

The  average  mortality  in  Petrograd  in  1911 
was  21.5  per  one  thousand,  while  in  1919  it 
was  74.9.  In  1921  conditions  had  grown  still 
worse.  The  birth-rate  in  Petrograd  for  1911 
was  29.4  per  one  thousand,  dropping  to  13  by 
1920. 

According  to  Professor  Shcherbina,  who  re- 
fers to  six  districts:  Penza,  Tamboff,  Orel, 
Kursk,  Chernigoff  and  Kharkov,  out  of  the 
total  number  of  newborn  in  1920  ninety  per 
cent,  died,  whilst  five  per  cent,  were  found  to 
be  affected  with  rachitis.  Out  of  the  1,200 
foundlings  registered  in  the  Samara  nurseries 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       i8l 

in  1920,  seventy-two  per  cent,  died  of  under- 
nourishment, and  twenty-five  per  cent,  of 
syphilis.^ 

Disregarding  all  these  facts,  Semashko,  the 
Bolshevist  Commissar  of  Public  Health,  hypo- 
critically stated: 

^'The  Workers'  and  Peasants'  State  attaches  the 
greatest  importance  to  the  physical  welfare  of  the 
children,  realizing  that  the  young  Communists 
are  the  foundation  of  future  Socialistic  Russia; 
for  it  is  only  a  generation  in  fine  mental  and 
physical  condition  that  wiU  prove  capable  of  con- 
solidating the  achievements  of  the  great  Russian 
Social  Revolution,  leading  the  country  to  the  ful- 
fillment of  its  final  aim,  that  is,  the  establishment 
of  a  Communist  Regime,  "t 

How  can  such  utterances  be  taken  seriously? 
What  value  is  there  in  various  Communist 
posters  bearing  camouflage  inscriptions: 

"Soviet  Russia  takes  care  of  her  children/* 

Or, 

"The  Socialist  State  protects  the  mother  and 
nourishes  the  child," 

and  so  on.  Propaganda  of  this  nature  does 
not  help.     Sanitary  conditions  remain  appall- 

•  Professor  Shcherbina,  Op.  Cit.,  p.  103. 

t  Communist  International  No.  9,  March,  1920,  p.  13.30.  Published 
in  Petrograd  and  Moscow.     Translation  from  the  Russian. 


i82      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

ing.    It  is  a  state  of  wholesale  putrefaction,  it 
is  the  rapid  decadence  of  a  great  nation. 

Education 

There  has  been  a  big  boom  in  liberal  quar- 
ters about  the  ** educational  achievements"  of 
Soviet  Russia.  Until  recently,  it  has  been 
maintained  that  the  conspicuous  ^*  revolt 
against  illiteracy,"  led  by  no  one  else  than  the 
illiterate  Commissars  themselves,  should  be 
taken  seriously.  A  comparison  was  always 
drawn  between  the  *' cruel"  Czarist  regime, 
when  the  Government  was  said  to  have  exerted 
every  effort  to  suppress  education,  and  the 
benevolent  Soviet  rule  which  is  purported  to 
be  engaged  in  enlightening  the  masses,  making 
science  popular  and  accessible  to  all.  This 
was  a  clever  way  to  present  the  case. 

Yet  the  fact  was  concealed  that  in  pre- 
war times,  particularly  during  the  decade  pre- 
ceding the  World  War,  tremendous  progress 
was  made  along  educational  lines.  The  labors 
of  the  Imperial  Government,  the  Zemstvos, 
and  the  municipal  institutions,  combined  with 
private  initiative,  succeeded  in  eliminating  the 
disease  of  illiteracy  in  urban  districts.  A  great 
portion  of  rural  Russia  had  been  also  covered 
with  a  network  of  primary  schools.  Long 
before  the  Bolshevist  coup  d'etat,  universal  edu- 
cation for  the  peasants'  children  had  been  put 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       183 

into  effect  in  the  Little  Russian  districts.  An- 
other fact  is  usually  forgotten  or  consciously 
ignored  by  Soviet  sympathizers,  namely,  that 
Petrograd  alone,  in  1914,  had  twenty-five  uni- 
versities and  colleges  with  a  total  number  of 
students  not  less  than  30,000  belonging  to  dif- 
ferent strata  of  society. 

Moscow  was  the  second  great  educational 
center,  with  its  world-famous  University  and 
the  unique  Institution  of  Eastern  Languages. 

The  progress  of  elementary  education  met 
with  almost  insurmountable  obstacles  in  the 
northern  part  of  the  Empire  because  of  its 
widely  scattered  population.  On  the  contrary, 
in  the  central,  southern  and  western  parts  of 
European  Russia,  there  were  but  few  among  the 
younger  generation  who  did  not  know  how  to 
read  and  write.  In  another  twenty-five  years 
illiteracy  in  Russia  probal^ly  would  have  be- 
come a  condition  of  the  past. 

After  the  November  revolution  of  1917,  the 
Soviets  started  their  educational  program  with 
the  destruction  of  all  educational  institutions 
on  the  ground  that  they  were  offshoots  of  the 
bourgeois  state,  and  consequently  serving  capi- 
talistic ends. 

Education,  like  everything  else,  overnight 
was  declared  the  monopoly  of  the  Communist 
State.  In  lieu  of  the  model  colleges  then  in 
existence,  nonsensical  institutions  in  the  shape 
of  "Karl  Marx  Universities"  have  been  estab- 


i84      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

lished,  in  which  the  educational  program  is 
limited  to  Communist  propaganda,  and  inciting 
class  hatred  under  the  cloak  of  science. 

The  majority  of  the  original  pedagogical 
personnel  fled  before  the  monster  of  Red  Ter- 
ror. Professors  who  were  unable  to  make 
their  escape  are  now  living  through  a  period 
of  apathy,  deprived  of  all  scientific  means,  such 
as  foreign  literature,  laboratory  instruments, 
every  kind  of  chemical  supplies,  and  sometimes 
even  paper,  pencils  and  ink.  Lunacharsky, 
who  is  reputed  to  be  the  great  educational 
genius,  confessed  in  an  interview  with  W. 
MacLane,  that  public  education  in  the  domain 
of  Lenin  has  a  few  shortcomings  of  its  own: 

*'We  are  terribly  short  of  appliances  for  physi- 
cal culture  and  for  the  ordinary  educational  work. 
We  can  only  supply  one  pen  point  for  every  one 
hundred  and  fifty  children,  one  pencil  for  the 
same  number,  one  exercise  book  for  every  two 
pupils.    The  situation  is  really  desperate."* 

Old  text-books  were,  of  course,  abolished  by 
the  Bolsheviki,  who  decided  to  found  the  teach- 
ing system  along  entirely  new,  proletarian 
principles. 

Much  in  the  same  way  that  destruction  was 
easy  to  "achieve"  in  Russian  economics,  the 
annihilation   of  the  firmly   established   eduea- 

*  See  Soviet  Bussia,  issue  of  January  1,  1921,  p.  14.  Article  en- 
titled, "The   Educational    Work   of    Soviet   Eusaia." 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       185 

tional  methods  was  found  a  trifling  task.  For 
what  msdom  was  needed  to  pile  up  old  manuals 
and  "bourgeois"  manuscripts,  turning  them 
into  a  splendid  auto-da-fcf  The  constructive 
phase,  however,  proved  a  task  immensely  more 
difficult* 

To  begin  with,  the  whole  educational  pro- 
gram had  to  be  laid  out  on  a  strictly  sectarian 
Marxian  basis.  The  Soviet  Commission  which 
was  entrusted  with  the  general  school  re- 
form, in  its  decree  of  December  8,  1920,  stated : 

"In  a  society  divided  into  classes  there  can  be 
no  freedom  or  neutrality  in  science.  The  scien- 
tific, artistic  and  philosophic  thought  reflects  the 
psychology  of  the  struggling  classes.  Russia,  hav- 
ing thrown  off  the  bourgeoisie,  is  now  living 
through  a  transition  period,  during  which  the 
struggle  against  the  remnants  of  the  past  must 
continue.  This  struggle  requires  the  utmost  effort 
on  the  part  of  the  people.  Under  these  circum- 
stances the  Soviet  Government  would  have  com- 
mitted suicide  had  it  proclaimed  freedom  of  scien- 
tific teaching  and  research.  The  Soviet  power 
during  its  present  phase  of  material  and  spiritual 
development  is  unable  to  grant  everybody  the 
right  to  teach  anywhere  subjects  in  whatever  way 
one  might  choose.  On  the  contrary,  having  pro- 
claimed the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  in  po- 
litical and  economic  fields,  the  Soviet  authority 
must  in  equal  manner  frankly  declare  that  this 
dictatorship  also  applies  to  science." 

The  principles  as  set  forth  by  the  Commis- 


i86      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

sion  were  literally  followed  out  by  Lunachar- 
sky.  At  present  in  Soviet  Russia  there  are  no 
private  schools,  for  both  teachers  and  pupils 
were  Sovietised. 

Whilst  nominally  on  paper  there  may  be 
more  school  buildings  than  in  the  Russia  of 
the  past,  still  the  effect  of  Communist  edu- 
cational policies  is  disastrous. 

School  life  is  utterly  vulgarized.  Co-educa- 
tion, which  is  so  ardently  advocated  by  Luna- 
charsky  and  Mrs.  Kollontay,  has  ruined  disci- 
pline and  undermined  morality.  Venereal  dis- 
eases are  spreading  among  school  children  to 
an  alarming  extent.  Undoubtedly,  this  is 
largely  due  to  the  fact  that  Communist  women 
of  Kollontay 's  type  are  daily  preaching  to  the 
young  principles  of  freedom  of  relationship 
between  the  sexes.  Special  courses  ''for  sexual 
enlightenment''  have  been  established  in  Soviet 
schools.  This  delicate  subject  is  handled  by  the 
Women's  Sections  of  the  Communist  Party. 

Mrs.  Kollontay,  addressing  the  Third  Con- 
gress of  Women's  Sections  of  the  Communist 
Party,  made  this  comment: 

"The  "Women's  sections  in  the  provinces  also 
must  enter  into  contact  with  the  national  edu- 
cators, in  order  to  push  into  the  foreground  the 
question  of  proper  provision  for  sexual  enlighten- 
ment in  the  schools.  In  addition,  a  number  of 
conversations  and  lessons  must  be  introduced,  of 
social,   scientific   or  scientific-hygienic   character, 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       187 

as  to  questions  of  marriage,  the  family,  the  history 
of  the  forms  of  the  relationship  between  the  sexes, 
the  dependence  of  these  forms,  and  of  sexual  mor- 
ality itself,  on  purely  economic,  material  causes."* 

In  order  to  realize  the  grave  danger  of  this 
obnoxious  project,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that  the  pedagogical  staff  under  the  Sov- 
iets has  become  morally  crippled.  Many  teach- 
ers have  secured  their  appointments  owing  ex- 
clusively to  their  membership  in  the  Commun- 
ist Party.  This  body,  however,  is  composed  of 
social  rubbish  which  has  risen  to  the  surface  of 
political  life  as  a  result  of  the  general  revolu- 
tionary upheaval.  In  the  hands  of  these  de- 
graded educators  the  ** sexual  enlightenment" 
of  Juvenile  Russia  has  been  placed. 

Furthermore,  the  old-fashioned  type  of  the 
experienced  teacher  has  entirely  vanished. 
This  has  been  specifically  admitted  in  the  Sov- 
iet press.  Thus  the  Red  Gazette  in  its  issue  of 
December  1,  1920,  printed  a  statement  which 
ought  to  be  learned  by  heart  by  all  admirers  of 
the  Soviet  experiment: 

"There  are  no  teachers.  The  ranks  of  the  old 
teachers  have  surprisingly  thinned,  whilst  there 
are  few  new  teachers.  There  is  a  regular  hunt  for 
them.  They  are  enticed  from  other  schools.  In 
one  place,  dinner  without  producing  a  food  card 
is   promised;   in   another,   full   board  is  the   in- 

*  Soviet  Eussia,  issue  of  September,  1921,  p.  120.  Alexandra 
Kollontay's  article  entitled  "The  Fight  Against  Prostitution." 


i88      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

ducement.  *  *  *  But  after  awhile,  waving 
all  considerations  aside,  people  take  the  first 
teacher  whom  they  come  across.  Thus,  an  in- 
structor in  French,  gives  lessons  in  mathematics; 
or  a  teacher  in  literature — in  natural  history.  The 
teachers'  problem  indeed  is  a  grave  one.  "We  must 
confess  that  the  schools  have  really  become  like 
almshouses.  They  are  places  for  casual  and 
played-out  people." 

Because  of  the  alarming  deficiency  in  tlie 
teachers'  personnel,  many  of  the  high  schools 
have  been  closed.  Lunacharsky,  in  one  of  his  re- 
ports to  the  All-Russian  Central  Executive 
Committee,  revealed  the  fact  that  only  seven  to 
eight  per  cent,  of  all  the  children  who  were  to 
attend  these  schools  were  actually  given  the  op- 
portunity to  receive  educational  instruction. 
What  is  the  fate  of  the  remaining  ninety-two 
per  cent.? 

The  slogan  ** Democratize  the  School"  af- 
fected college  life  in  a  most  harmful  way.  It 
will  be  recalled  that  in  1918  Lunacharsky  came 
out  with  his  insensate  decree,  according  to 
which  ''every  person,  regardless  of  citizenship 
and  sex,  who  has  attained  the  age  of  sixteen, 
shall  have  the  right  to  enroll  as  a  student  in 
any  educational  institution,  without  producing 
a  diploma  or  certificate  of  graduation  from  a 
high  school  or  any  other  school." 

The  immediate  effect  of  this  measure  was 
that  out  of  the  five  thousand  who  matriculated 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       189 

in  the  Moscow  University,  'Hhe  majority  were 
found  illiterate  in  the  rudimentary  sense  of 
the  term/"* 

It  can  be  easily  imagined  what  educational 
standard  must  have  been  maintained  to  match 
the  intellectual  level  of  such '  *  students. ' '  Would 
not  their  proper  place  have  been  in  a  kinder- 
garten 9 

In  their  attempt  to  pollute  everything  that 
has  the  appearance  of  decency,  the  Commun- 
ists have  not  only  ruined  the  schools,  but  in  an 
equal  manner  they  have  ruined  the  Russian  lan- 
guage, the  precious  heritage  of  Russia's  whole 
history.  Referring  to  its  deep  and  harmonious 
nature,  Turgenev,  the  great  Russian  novelist, 
spoke  thus: 

"In  days  of  doubt,  in  days  of  dreary  misgiv- 
ings on  my  country's  fate,  thou  alone  art  my  stay 
and  hope;  0,  mighty,  true,  free  Russian  speech! 
If  it  were  not  for  thee,  how  should  I  not  despair, 
seeing  all  that  is  at  home  ?  But  who  can  think  that 
such  a  tongue  is  not  the  gift  of  a  great  people?" 

After  five  years  of  Soviet  misrule,  the  Rus- 
sian language  has  been  partly  converted  into  a 
filthy  jargon  of  abbreviated  words  and  cut-in- 
half  sentences.  People  who  were  born  and 
brought  up  in  Russia,  when  they  pick  up  a 
Bolshevist  newspaper,  have  difficulty  in  de- 
ciphering the   Communist   argo   which   resem- 

*See  Izvestia,  No.  15,  of  the  Central  Executive  Committee  for 
1919. 


I90      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

bles  thieves'  Latin.  The  dignified  rhjrfchm 
of  classical  Russian  is  dead.  Now  the  of- 
ficial language  is  a  concoction  of  German,  Yid- 
dish and  Latin  words,  with  an  admixture  of 
the  old  Russian.  It  is  a  peculiar  kind  of  Esper- 
anto, through  the  medium  of  which  a  Bill  Hay- 
wood makes  himself  understood  when  address- 
ing a  Bela  Kuhn,  nee  Cohen,  of  Hungary,  or  a 
Katayama  from  Japan.  To  make  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  Russian  tongue  complete,  the  Com- 
munists introduced  a  jazz  spelling  which 
spelling  reform  enthusiasts  call  "Scientific 
Phonetic  Spelling."  The  result  is  that  the 
refined  beauty  of  the  Russian  printed  speech 
has  been  eliminated.  Many  words  are  quite 
senseless  since  their  ''simplified"  spelling  can 
have  many  meanings  at  one  and  the  same  time. 
To  make  this  point  comprehensible  to  an  Eng- 
lish-speaking reader,  it  may  be  of  interest  to 
reproduce  verbatim  a  few  lines  from  an  article 
under  the  caption,  "Aunt  Julia  Says": 

"That  woz  a  weiz  gie.  wozn'  it? — huu  sed 
'Foarmativ  eksersiez  ov  fakulti  aloan  iz  the  soars 
ov  awl  heuman  enjoiment.'  That  iz  whie  children 
halt  dishwoshing  and  skuul  and  dusting;  thai 
kahn't  see  a  bit  ov  eus  in  it;  and  that  iz  whie 
thai  will  work  twies  and  three  timez  az  hahrd  at 
sumtthing  that  eksersiezez  their  injeneuiti  and 
muslz  foar  it  deevlups  them." 

This  is  the  way  in  which  the  Soviets  are  en- 
lightening the  Russian  people. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       191 
Aet 

What  has  happened  to  Russia's  art?  On 
this  topic,  too,  insidious  propaganda  has  been 
on  foot  ever  since  Trotzky  ascended  the  Com- 
munist throne.  Of  course,  it  was  impossible  for 
his  Socialist  adherents  abroad  not  to  concede 
that  under  the  Imperial  regime  Russian 
thought  created  a  world  of  art  that  is  immortal. 
Consequently,  it  would  have  been  absurd  to 
start  out  with  the  premise  ** denying"  the  Rus- 
sian theatre,  or  denouncing  Tolstoy  in  litera- 
ure  and  Tchaikowsky  in  music.  Another  fact 
which  had  to  be  admitted  was  the  panic-flight 
of  Russian  artists  out  of  Soviet  Russia.  Only 
those  remained  there  who  were  unable  to  make 
their  escape.  For  a  while,  the  law  of  inertia 
enabled  some  of  them  to  continue  their  artistic 
occupations.  Gradually,  however,  the  great 
aesthetic  assets  of  Russian  culture  became  ex- 
hausted, while  the  ugly  features  of  the  Marx- 
ian regime  supplied  no  incentive  for  further 
creative  efforts.  The  old  masters  who  were 
forced  to  stay  there,  in  tlie  realm  of  Hunger 
and  Death,  slowly  used  up  their  impaired  ener- 
gies, and  now  they  drag  out  a  weary  existence 
under  a  gang  which  does  not  discriminate  be- 
tween a  pound  of  nails  and  a  painting  of  Mur- 
illo.  A  hint  of  what  the  artists'  life  in  Soviet 
Russia  is  like  was  furnished  by  H.  G.  Wells 
who,   during  his  short  sojourn  in  Petrograd, 


192      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

met  Glazounov,  one  of  the  foremost  Russian 
composers : 

"All  musical  people  in  England,"  says  Wells, 
**know  the  work  of  Glazounov;  he  has  conducted 
concerts  in  London  and  is  an  honorary  doctor  both 
of  Oxford  and  Cambridge.  I  was  very  deeply 
touched  by  my  meeting  with  him.  He  used  to  be 
a  very  big  florid  man,  but  now  he  is  pallid  and 
very  much  fallen  away,  so  that  his  clothes  hang 
loosely  on  him.  *  *  *  He  told  me  he  still  com- 
posed, but  that  his  stock  of  music  paper  was  almost 
exhausted.  'Then  there  will  be  no  more.'  I  said 
there  would  be  much  more,  and  that  soon.  He 
doubted  it.  He  spoke  of  London  and  Oxford ;  I 
could  see  that  he  was  consumed  by  an  almost  in- 
tolerable longing  for  some  great  city  full  of 
life,  a  city  with  abundance,  with  pleasant  crowds, 
a  city  that  would  give  him  still  audiences  in  warm, 
brightly-lit  places."* 

This  is  the  death  agony  of  a  great  artist. 
And  how  many  of  these  martyrs  have  passed 
away!     Lord  Byron's  tribute: 

"There  is  a  mourner  over  the  humblest  grave/' 

cannot  be  paid  to  them.    Forgotten,  they  have 
left  this  world  of  sorrow. 

How  many  more  among  them  have  sunk  to 
the  lowest  depths  of  abject  pauperism,  with  the 
last  spark  of  artistic  flame  extinguished!  The 
great  wreck  that  ruined  Russia  could  not  have 
left  intact  the  intellectual  life  of  the  old  order. 
Nationalized  artists  and  Sovietized  art  do  not 

*  H.  G.  Wells,  Bussia  in  the  Shadows,  p.  53,  New  York,  1921. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       193 

elevate  the  people  to  the  snowy  heights  of  har- 
mony and  perfection.  Quite  the  reverse:  art 
itself  is  dragged  down  to  the  level  of  self -con- 
ceited mediocrit}^ 

Much  has  been  rumored  about  Shakespear- 
ian plays  being  produced  in  Soviet  theatres; 
still  there  is  an  irreconcilable  contradiction  in 
this  antithesis:  There— a  Prince  Hamlet,  a 
King  Lear,  a  Julius  Caesar,  all  those  royal 
figures  of  the  past,  with  the  majestic  greatness 
of  their  passions, — and  here,  the  pigmy  Soviet 
rulers  of  the  present,  with  their  petty  greed, 
their  little  envies  of  everj'-thing  that  is  superb 
and  great.  Proletarian  audiences  made  up  of 
Eed  soldiers  and  unruly  sailors  may  listen 
to  a  performance  of  Griboyedov's  '*Woe  From 
Wit,"  but  certainly  they  do  not  appreciate  the 
delicate  weaving  of  rhymes  where  the  brilliant 
French  vocabulary  intermingles  with  the  Clas- 
sic Russian,  where  every  sound  has  its  precise 
meaning,  every  word  its  peculiar  shade  of 
thought.  Formerly  there  was  the  most  ap- 
preciative response  to  all  this  on  the  part  of 
the  Russian  public;  but  now  it  is  gone.  As 
Captain  Francis  McCullagh  remarked: 

"Some  provincial  delegates  with.  whom.  I  sat 
during  the  progress  of  a  delicate  artistic  operetta, 
reminded  me  of  cows  looking  at  a  railway  train."* 

It  is  only  the  refined  training  of  the  old  Rus- 
sian actors  that  still  enables  them  to  act  before 

*  Op.  Cit.,  p.  218. 


194      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

such  audiences  and  such  spectators.  Threat- 
ened by  Communist  reprisals,  they  still  act,  but 
the  very  spirit  of  creation  has  faded  away.  No 
longer  does  there  exist  that  charming  intimacy 
of  olden  times,  that  atmosphere  of  sympathetic 
understanding  between  the  achievements  on  the 
stage  and  the  vibrating  pulses  across  the  foot- 
lights. 

The  new  generation  of  Soviet  artists  is 
tainted  with  hooliganism.  Vulgar  is  Com- 
munist reality,  and  vulgar  is  their  work.  They 
have  no  use  for  the  sublime  masterpieces  of  the 
past  in  which  divine  inspiration  blended  with 
religious  zeal.  Of  what  value  to  them  is  the 
whole  school  of  Renaissance  with  Christ  and 
the  Madonna  the  guiding  motives  of  creation? 
What  ties  them  to  traditions  of  the  old  Russian 
school  with  its  magnificent  Byzantine  Icono- 
graphy? What  charm  is  there  for  a  true-bred 
Communist  versifier  in  the  melodies  of  Push- 
kin and  Fet  whose  hearts  and  souls  were 
boundlessly  devoted  to  old  Russia,  with  her 
beauty  and  splendor,  her  palaces  and  cathe- 
drals, her  fountains  and  dreamy  parks?  To- 
day the  most  prominent  Bolshevist  **poet," 
Serge  Yessenin,  writes  a  volume.  The  Confes- 
sion of  a  Hooligan,  (Moscow,  1921),  in  which 
he  says: 

"I  am  a  robber  and  a  serf, 
Horse-stealer's  blood  there  is  in  me." 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       195 
In  another  place: 

"On  purpose  I  march  with  my  hair  uncombed, 
With  a  head  that  resembles  a  kerosene  lamp." 

There  is  a  still  better  couplet  in  which  the  dig- 
nified desire  is  expressed — 

*' To-day  I  feel  awfully  eager 
To  spit  at  the  moon  through  my  window." 

Some  of  his  sonnets  are  so  obscene  they  are 
unfit  for  translation. 

The  destructive  spirit  of  Communism  is 
graphically  expressed  in  the  following  five  lines 
taken  from  one  of  Mayakovsky's  "poems": 

"If  you  find  a  White  Guardist 
Pin  him  to  the  wall! 
Has  been  Raphael  forgotten? 
The  time  is  ripe  for  bullets 
To  stick  in  the  museum's  walls." 

Sometimes  poetry  is  used  as  a  means  to  in- 
cite class  hatred.  Then  chef  d'ceuvres  of  this 
kind  are  produced: 

"We  will  not  spare  the  enemies  of  labor, 
Make  a  list  of  every  one  of  them; 
We  shall  exterminate  the  most  dangerous, 
They  have  lived  long  enough  in  comfort. 


196      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

"All  the  handmaids  of  capitalism, 

"We  shall  take  as  hostages, 

We  shall  not  forgive  them, 

But  we  shall  crush  them  like  dogs. 
And  throw  them  into  the  rubbish  ditch."* 

In  1922  the  Bolsheviki  themselves  inadver- 
tently admitted  the  absurdity  of  proletarian 
** aesthetics"  when  they  closed  the  Imperial 
Academy  of  Arts  in  Petrograd  following  an 
exhibition  held  there  by  a  group  of  **Neo- 
Cubists,"  ''Imaginists/'  and  **Cubo-Impres- 
sionists."  One  of  the  exhibits  produced  by 
these  insane  fanatics  represented  a  board  to 
which  a  round  plate  was  tied.  Below  the  plate 
there  was  a  braid  of  woman's  hair  hanging. 
That  was  all.f 

Art  is  dead. 

Women  in  Soviet  Russia 
In  civilized  society  for  centuries  the  family 
has  been  the  firm  foundation   of  civil  order. 
This  assertion  may  be  commonplace:  neverthe- 
less it  is  one  of  paramount  importance. 

Karl  Marx  was  the  first  to  openly  assail  the 
family  and  advocate  its  abolition.  In  his  Com- 
munist Manifesto  he  puts  it  in  these  terms : 

"Abolition  of  the  family!    Even  the  most  radi- 
cal flare  up  at  this  infamous  proposal  of  the  Com- 

*Eed  Gazette,  September  23,  1919,  Petrograd.  Translation  from 
the  Russian. 

fSee  The  Last  News,  Russian  daily  published  in  Reval,  issue  of 
June  2,  1922,  No.   124. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       197 

munists.  On  what  foundation  is  tlie  present  fam- 
ily, the  bourgeois  family,  based?  On  capital,  on 
private  gain.  In  its  completely  developed  form 
this  family  exists  only  among  the  bourgeoisie. 
But  this  state  of  things  finds  its  complement  in 
the  practical  absence  of  the  family  among  the  pro- 
letarians, and  in  public  prostitution."* 

Accordingly,  one  of  the  first  measures  adop- 
ted by  the  Bolshevik!  was  the  abolition  of  the 
bourgeois  family.  This  they  have  attained  by 
so  facilitating  the  divorce  procedure  that  in 
practice  it  has  become  a  matter  of  mere  form- 
ality, since  on  the  strength  of  Section  1  of  the 
Divorce  Law: 

**  Marriage  is  annulled  by  petition  of  both  par- 
ties or  even  one  of  them." 

The  only  technicality  required  by  this  decree  is 
that  the  judge  shall  ascertain  whether  the  peti- 
tion comes  from  the  party  who  wishes  to  be 
divorced.     Section  6   reads: 

*  *  Having  convinced  himself  that  the  petition  for 
the  annulment  of  the  marriage  really  comes  from 
both  parties,  or  from  one  of  them,  the  judge  per- 
sonally and  singly  renders  the  decision  of  the  an- 
nulment of  the  marriage  and  issues  a  certificate 
thereto  to  the  parties    *     *     *." 

It  is  also  the  judge  who  ''personally  and 
singly"  determines  with  which  of  the  parents 

*  Karl  Marx,  Communist  Manifesto,  p.  36. 


198      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

their  minor  children  shall  live,  and  who  of  the 
two  shall  bear  the  expense  of  the  maintenance 
and  education  of  the  children. 

No  legal  grounds  for  divorce  are  required 
by  the  decree  of  December  18,  1917,  which  es- 
tablished this  classically  simple  procedure.  Of 
course,  if  marriage  is  no  longer  considered  a 
lasting  and  mutual  obligation  between  husband 
and  wife,  and  if  divorce  is  granted  as  easily  as 
water  runs  down  hill,  then  family  ties  are  so 
loosened  that  marriage  ceases  to  be  a  basic  in- 
stitution, becoming  a  farce  which  can  be  ended 
any  time  at  the  discretion  of  either  party  or 
both. 

Such  is  the  legal  situation.  In  addition,  the 
Bolshevist  press — and  this  is  the  only  press 
that  exists  in  Soviet  Russia — has  been  carrying 
on  virulent  propaganda  against  what  is  termed 
the  reactionary  institution  of  the  bourgeois 
family.  The  very  conception  of  domestic  life 
is  being  daily  attacked,  while  in  its  place  Com- 
munist modes  of  living  are  recommended.  In 
relation  thereto  the  following  theses  on  the 
feminist  movement,  urged  upon  womanhood  by 
the  Second  Congress  of  the  Third  Internation- 
ale, are  to  be  borne  in  mind: 


* '  Endeavors  must  be  made  to  induce  the  house- 
wife of  the  traditional  family  (the  most  backward, 
ugly,  and  undeveloped  form  of  economic  me- 
diaevalism)    to  adopt  collectivism,  thus  convert- 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL       199 

ing  her  from  a  serf  into  a  free  worker  in  a  large 
Communal  household. 

"Endeavors  must  be  made  to  establish  model 
Communal  institutions  which  shall  take  charge 
of  the  domestic  problems  which  hitherto  have  been 
the  task  of  the  women  belonging  to  the  former 
bourgeois  family,  and  which  in  every  way  shall 
facilitate  their  maternal  duties. 

"It  is  necessary  to  explain  to  the  women  that 
the  individual  household  in  its  original  form  bears 
a  backward  character  and  causes  superfluous  waste 
of  time,  labor  and  money;  that  capitalism  uses 
individual  households  as  a  means  of  maintaining 
for  the  husband  a  low  level  of  wages,  relying  upon 
the  free  housework  of  his  wife,  and  in  order  to 
keep  his  wife  in  a  state  of  mental  and  political 
baekwardnass,  excluding  her  from  social  life."* 

The  insidious  meaning  of  these  pia  desideria 
amounts  to  the  following: 

1.  The  family  in  its  present  privacy  must  be 
abolished. 

2.  The  touch  of  loveliness  and  intimacy  that  is 
conveyed  to  family  life  through  the  care  of 
the  wife  must  be  abolished,  and  mechanical 
forms  of  Communal  life  substituted  therefor, 

3.  The  mother  must  be  relieved  of  the  care  of 
her  children,  and  they  be  entrusted  to  the 
eare  of  "model"  institutions  administrated  by 
special  appointees. 

Mrs.  Kollontay  puts  this  in  energetic  terms 
when  she  screams  from  her  pulpit: 

*  See  The  Communist  Internationale,  No.  15,  pp.  3464-3467,  Petro- 
grad,   December   20,   1920.     Translation   from   the  Eusaian. 


200      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

"Down  with  the  unproductive  labor  in  do- 
mestic life,  with  the  exploitation  of  children  in 
the  home!"* 

The  woman's  task  must  be  made  quite  easy. 
It  is  a  question  of  Communist  chivalry.  Now, 
therefore,  Soviet  legislators  enact  a  law  the 
first  article  of  which  reads: 

** Artificial  interruption  of  pregnancy  is  hereby 
permitted  provided  it  is  performed  in  Soviet 
hospitals  where  the  minimum  of  injury  is  as- 
sured. '  't 

Everything  is  allowed  and  a  real  bacchanalia 
inaugurated  in  the  range  of  sexual  relations. 

That  the  Communists  are  actually  struggling 
against  the  very  principle  of  the  family  is  best 
demonstrated  by  Mrs.  Kollontay's  own  state- 
ment. Addressing  the  Third  Congress  of 
Women's  Sections  of  the  Communist  Party, 
she  said: 

"We  are  ready  to  renounce  all  the  accustomed 
forms  of  life,  ready  to  hail  the  revolution  in 
every  field,  and  yet  we  are  afraid  to  touch  the 
family !  Only  do  not  touch  the  marriage  system ! 
*  *  *  It  is  necessary  to  declare  the  truth 
outright:  The  old  form  of  the  family  is  passing 
away.  The  Communist  society  has  no  use  for 
it  *  *  *."$ 

*  Mrs.  Kollontay's  address  is  published  in  full  in  Soviet  Russia, 
issues  of  August  and  September,  1921. 

f  See  Izvestia  of  the  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Conunittee, 
No.  259,  November  18,  1920. 

%  Mrs.  Kollantay  's  address  published  in  Soviet  Eussia,  issue  of 
September,  1921,  p.  121. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL      201 

In  the  concluding  paragraph  of  her  speech 
she  reiterated  the  same  thought  by  saying: 

"Comrades!  Our  task  is  to  destroy  the  roots 
that  nourish  prostitution.  Our  task  is  to  wage 
relentless  warfare  on  the  vestiges  of  individual- 
ism, which  has  hitherto  been  the  moral  basis  of 
marriage.  Our  task  is  to  revolutionize  thought  in 
the  field  of  marriage  relations  and  to  dear  the 
way  for  a  new,  healthy,  conjugal  morality  that 
shall  correspond  with  the  interests  of  the  work- 
ers'commonwealth.  *  *  *  Comrades!  In  the 
place  of  the  family  which  is  passing  away,  the 
family  of  the  past,  there  is  already  arising,  solidi- 
fying,  and  spreading,  the  new  family — the  great 
workers'  family  of  the  victorious  world  prole- 
tariat."* 

According  to  Soviet  usage,  a  bombastic  pas- 
sage of  this  kind  is  followed  by  singing  the 
anthem  of  the  Third  Internationale.  One  mon- 
strous project  after  another  is  being  handed 
out  as  liberally  as  Soviet  rubles.  In  this  sense 
Lenin's  proposition  to  electrify  Russia  is  just 
as  prodigious  as  Kollontay's  plan  to  national- 
ize family  life  at  large. 

However,  putting  aside  Kollontay's  revolu- 
tionary phraseology,  the  following  must  be  ob- 
served : 

In  Soviet  Russia  private  property  has  been 
done  away  with;  the  last  layers  of  bourgeois 

*Mrs.  Kollontay's  address  published   in   Soviet  Bussia,  issue  of 
September,   1921,  p.   121. 


202      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

strata  have  been  torn  out;  Communism,  in  its 
most  extreme  manifestations,  is  flourishing. 
But  what  about  prostitution  which,  according 
to  Marx — the  Great  Mogul  of  Socialism — is  the 
reverse  side  of  the  bourgeois  family  medal? 
Has  it  been  eliminated? — Were  one  to  quote 
data  furnished  by  opponents  to  the  Soviet 
regime,  volumes  could  be  produced  on  this  sub- 
ject ;  it  would  be  possible  to  prove  that  in  Marxia 
prostitution  is  freely  practiced,  having  become 
the  prevailing  form  of  relations  between  the 
sexes.  But  even  the  Communist  writers  are 
quite  outspoken  on  the  question.  Mrs.  KoUon- 
tay  narrates  as  follows: 

"We  know  that  prostitution  is  an  evil;  we  even 
understand  that  now,  in  this  extremely  difficult 
transition  period,  prostitution  is  assuming  large 
and  intolerably  extensive  proportions,  but  we  sim- 
ply wave  it  aside,  we  are  silent  on  this  phenome- 
non, partly  through  a  remnant  of  hypocrisy  that 
is  stUl  with  us  as  the  heritage  of  the  bourgeois 
view  of  life,  partly  through  inability  to  properly 
grasp  and  become  conscious  of  the  damage  which 
a  widely  developed  prostitution  is  inflicting  upon 
the  working  society."* 

Perhaps  it  is  only  the  wicked  remnants  of 
the  bourgeoisie  who  are  engaged  in  this  pro- 
fession?— Alas!  Even  that  is  denied  by  Mrs. 
Kollontay : 

•Mrs.  Kollontay 'b  address,  Soviet  Bussia,  August,  1921,  p.  42. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL      203 

"Prostitution,"  she  says,  "is  practiced  by  the 
Soviet  office  employees,  in  order  to  obtain,  by  the 
sale  of  their  caresses,  boots  that  go  up  to  the  knee; 
prostitution  is  resorted  to  by  mothers  of  families, 
working  women,  peasant  women,  who  are  out 
after  flour  for  their  children  and  sell  their  bodies 
to  the  manager  of  the  rations  division  in  order  to 
obtain  from  him  a  full  bag  of  the  precious  flour. 
Sometimes  the  girls  in  the  offices  associate  with 
their  male  superiors  not  for  manifestly  material 
gain,  for  rations,  shoes,  etc.,  but  in  the  hope  of  ad- 
vancement in  office.  And  there  is  an  additional 
form  of  prostitution- — 'careerist  prostitution' — 
which  is  also  based  in  the  last  analysis,  however, 
on  material  calculations.*'* 

In  truth,  the  author  immediately  admits : 

"The  freedom  of  relations  between  the  sexes 
does  not  contradict  the  ideology  of  Communism. 
The  interests  of  the  commonwealth  of  the  workers 
are  not  in  any  way  disturbed  by  the  fact  that  mar- 
riage is  of  a  short  or  prolonged  duration,  whether 
its  basis  is  love,  passion,  or  even  a  transitory 
physical  attraction. '  '* 

Nevertheless,  the  fact  that  prostitution  is 
assuming  colossal  proportion  in  Soviet  Russia 
seems  to  worry  Mrs.  KoUontay.  In  her  fear, 
however,  moral  considerations  play  no  part 
whatsoever,  for  she  makes  the  startling  asser- 
tion: 

"From  the  standpoint  of  the  worker's  collec- 
tive, a  woman  is  to  be  condemned,  not  for  selling 

*  Mrs.  Kollontay  's  address,  Soviet  Russia,  September,  1921,  p.  119. 


204      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

her  body,  but  for  the  fact  that,  just  like  a  legally 
married  idle  woman,  she  does  no  useful  work  for 
the  collective."* 

SHe  argues  further: 

"How  are  we  to  consider  the  professional  pros- 
titute from  the  standpoint  of  the  interests  of 
national  economy  ?  Only  as  a  deserter  from  work. 
In  this  sense  we  may  mercilessly  condemn  pros- 
titution."! 

Communist  ideology  is  fully  expressed  in 
these  quotations  from  Karl  Marx,  ^^The  Com- 
munist Internatimiale'^  and  Mrs.  Kollontay, 
*'The  Little  Grandmother  of  Communism." 
The  passages  referred  to  are  useful,  for  there 
are  many  women,  worthy  women  too,  who, 
without  any  idea  of  what  Communism  is  or 
what  it  stands  for,  merely  because  they  are 
emotional,  wish  to  put  themselves  *'on  record" 
as  being  **  certainly  in  sympathy  with  the  Sov- 
iet form  of  government." 

Bolshevism  and  Christianity 

Quoting  Karl  Marx,  the  Bolsheviki  inscribed 
on  the  wall  of  one  of  the  Moscow  churches: 

^'Religion  is  the  opium  of  the  people.** 

*  Tbid,  p.  46. 
t  Ibid,  p.  45. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL      205 

From  the  early  days  of  their  reign,  the  Com- 
munists have  manifested  a  distinctly  hostile 
attitude  towards  the  Christian  Church  in  gen- 
eral, and  the  Russian  Church  in  particular;  in 
addition,  they  have  treated  the  clergy,  and  es- 
pecially Russian  priests,  with  the  utmost 
cruelty. 

Soviet  tactics  as  regards  the  Church  are 
twofold:  First,  direct  aggression;  and  second, 
the  gradual  undermining  through  propaganda 
of  all  religious  devotion. 

From  the  dawn  of  their  history,  the  Ortho- 
dox Church  has  exercised  a  steady  and  benevo- 
lent influence  on  the  life  of  the  Russian  people. 
Religion  has  always  been  a  guiding  principle. 
During  the  two  and  a  half  centuries  under 
the  Mongol  yoke,  the  monasteries  stood  on 
watch  over  the  educational  work,  and  it  was 
in  them  that  all  historical  records  were  kept. 
In  the  seventeenth  century,  after  the  last  Czar 
of  the  Rurik  Dynasty  had  passed  away,  when 
the  country  was  brought  to  a  state  of  civil  war, 
it  was  the  Church  that  saved  the  unity  of  the 
nation.  In  the  popular  mind  the  Church  has 
always  been  associated  with  the  conception  of 
the  State  itself,  the  two  forming  a  harmonious 
ideal  of  divine  authority  and  civil  order.  The 
names  of  such  historical  figures  as  Saints  Serge 
Radonejsky,  Theodosy  Pechersky,  Nil  Sorsky 
and  Patriarch  Hermogen  are  deeply  rooted  in 
the  hearts  of  the  people.    Not  only  have  these 


2o6      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

men  attained  moral  perfection  in  private  life, 
but  also  they  have  shown  deep  wisdom  and  con- 
structive statesmanship  at  the  most  crucial  mo- 
ments of  Russia's  history.  Through  centuries 
the  Russian  prikhod  (parish),  with  priests  and 
villagers  united  by  bonds  of  friendship  and  the 
spirit  of  mutual  assistance,  served  as  a  solid 
foundation  for  State  existence  and  every-day 
intercourse  among  the  parishioners  themselves. 

When  the  Marxian  roughnecks  arrived  on 
the  field,  they  hurriedly  began  the  destruction 
of  this  simple,  and  yet  firmly  founded  organ- 
ization. In  December,  1917,  they  came  out 
with  their  decree  separating  the  State  from 
the  Church.  All  properties  of  existing  Churches 
and  religious  societies  were  nationalized.  These 
institutions  were  deprived  of  the  right  to  act 
as  juridical  persons  or  to  own  any  property 
whatsoever.  Buildings,  and  sacred  vessels 
could  be  given  for  the  free  use  of  the  congrega- 
tions only  by  special  decision  of  the  Local  or 
Central  Soviet.  The  teaching  of  religious  doc- 
trines in  State  and  public  schools  was  for- 
bidden. 

The  provisions  of  this  decree  have  been  vig- 
orously carried  out  by  the  Bolsheviki  who 
never  miss  an  opportunity  to  subject  the 
members  of  the  Christian  clergy  to  humiliation. 
When,  on  the  strength  of  the  Soviet  Labor 
Code,  the  bourgeoisie  was  drafted  and  as- 
signed to   forced  labor,   priests   were  always 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL      207 

made  to  perform  the  most  degrading  jobs. 
Disregarding  a  tradition  sanctioned  by  cen- 
turies, the  Soviets  have  compelled  ecclesiastics 
to  serve  as  privates  in  the  Red  Army. 

Lawless  Red  Guards,  acting  under  the  in- 
structions of  the  Commissars,  raided  the 
Churches  during  the  time  when  divine  service 
was  held.  Priests  were  dragged  from  the 
altars,  and  the  altars  desecrated,  while  those 
attending  the  service  were  locked  up  in  jails 
and  tortured  by  the  Cheka. 

When  the  dreadful  famine  came  the  Bolshe- 
viki  used  it  as  a  pretext  for  robbing  the  Church 
of  its  treasures.  The  whole  world  was  shocked 
when  the  decree  ordering  their  requisition  was 
made  known.  In  many  cities  the  priests  and 
parishioners  showed  organized  opposition  to 
the  new  barbarism  inflicted  upon  the  people. 
Tikhon,  Patriarch  of  All-Russia,  who  for  a 
long  time  was  kept  as  a  prisoner  de  facto  in 
the  Moscow  Kremlin,  faithful  to  his  religious 
duties,  not  only  refused  to  sanction  the  outrage- 
ous Communist  order,  but  forcibly  protested 
against  it.  In  consequence  of  this,  the  Soviets 
charged  him  with  high  treason.  His  fate  still 
remains  doubtful,  notwithstanding  unanimous 
protests  made  by  the  Christian  Church  in  both 
America  and  Europe. 

Patriarch  Tikhon,  a  venerable  man  of  sev- 
enty, with  his  vital  force  weakened  by  age  and 
privation,  is  the  only  person  in  Russia  who  dares 


208      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

to  openly  oppose  the  diabolical  rule  of  Trotzky. 
It  was  he  who  in  1918  excommunicated  the 
Bolsheviki  as  a  body,  and  it  was  upon  his  in- 
structions that  the  canon  of  anathema  was  read 
in  all  Churches.  While  under  arrest,  the  Pat- 
riarch issued  a  declaration  which  had  a  large 
circulation  all  over  Russia.  Vehemently  accus- 
ing the  Red  rulers  of  heinous  crimes,  he  stated 
therein : 

*'It  is  not  enough  that  you  have  stained  the 
hands  of  the  Eussian  people  with  the  blood  of 
their  brethren.  You  have  instigated  the  people 
to  open,  shameless  robbery.  You  have  befogged 
their  consciences  and  stifled  their  conviction  of 
sin;  but  under  whatever  name  you  may  disguise 
an  evil  deed,  murder,  violence  and  robbery  will 
always  remain  crimes  and  deeds  of  evil  that 
clamor  to  Heaven  for  vengeance.  Yea,  we  are 
living  through  a  dreadful  time  under  your  dom- 
ination, and  it  will  be  long  before  it  fades  from 
the  hearts  of  the  nation,  where  it  has  dimmed  the 
image  of  God  and  impressed  that  of  the  beast." 

Had  the  Russian  Cardinal  Mercier  the  right 
to  accuse  the  Soviets  of  all  these  crimes  ?  The 
answer  is  given  by  the  Reverend  R.  Courtier- 
Forster  who  thus  pictures  the  horrors  of  the 
persecution  of  Christians  in  Odessa: 

*'It  was  the  martyrdom  of  the  two  Metropoli- 
tans and  the  assassination  of  so  many  Bishops  and 
the  killing  of  hundreds  of  various  Christian  min- 
isters of  religion,  regardless  of  denomination  or 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL      209 

school  of  thought,  that  proved  the  undoing  of  the 
Scourge.  Russian  Orthodox  clergy,  Protestant 
Lutheran  pastors,  Roman  Catholic  priests,  were 
tortured  and  done  to  death  with  the  same  light- 
hearted  indiscrimination  in  the  name  of  tolera- 
tion and  Freedom.  Then  it  was  that  the  Scourge, 
seeing  the  last  remnants  of  Liberty  ground  under 
the  heel  of  a  tyranny  more  brutal  in  its  methods 
than  a  medieval  torture  chamber,  published  an- 
other full-page  cartoon  representing  Moses  des- 
cending from  the  Burning  Mount,  bringing  in 
his  arms  the  Tables  of  Ten  Commandments  to 
Humanity,  and  being  stoned  to  death  by  a  mob  of 
workmen's  and  soldiers'  delegates. 

"The  following  Sunday  afternoon  I  was  pass- 
ing through  the  Town  Gardens  when  I  saw  a 
group  of  Bolshevist  soldiers  insulting  an  Ikon  of 
the  Thorn-crowned  Face  of  Christ.  The  owner 
of  the  Ikon  was  spitting  in  the  pictured  Face, 
while  the  others  were  standing  around  watching 
with  loud  guffaws  of  laughter.  Presently  they 
tore  the  sacred  picture  into  fragments,  danced  on 
it,  and  trampled  and  stamped  the  pieces  into  the 
mud."* 

Shall  we  forget  Archbishop  Andronik  who 
was  buried  alive?  Or  Vassili,  Archbishop  of 
Chernigov,  who  had  come  to  Moscow  to  inquire 
about  the  fate  of  the  former,  and  who  was  cut 
down  and  killed  with  his  two  companions  ?  Or 
Bishop  Feofan,  who,  after  unspeakable  tor- 
tures, was  dipped  several  times  into  the  river 
through  a  hole  in  the  ice,  and  finally  drowned 

•  See  Eev.  E.  Courtier-Forster,  reprint  from  the  London  Times, 
December  3,  1919,  p.  4. 


2IO      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

in  the  Kama?  Shall  we  forget  the  latest  atro- 
cities committed  by  the  Bolsheviki  in  Petro- 
grad  when  Metropolitan  Banjamin  and  over 
ten  other  High  Dignitaries  of  the  Russian 
Church  were  sentenced  to  death  for  interfering 
with  the  seizure  of  Church  treasures?*  Shall 
we  forget,  the  long  list  of  other  martyrs  who 
have  been  murdered  in  cold  blood  for  no  other 
crime  than  worshipping  Christ? 

Was  Patriarch  Tikhon  justified  in  accusing 
the  Bolsheviki  of  all  these  abominations?  Can 
it  not  be  said  in  their  defence  that  all  this  is 
being  perpetrated  by  them  because  ^'They  know 
not  what  they  do"?  Perhaps  this  may  be  so 
in  the  case  of  a  rebellious  sailor  in  whose  per- 
verted mind  the  conception  of  sanctity  has  been 
artificially  destroyed.  But  what  justification 
is  there  when  Communist  poets  engage  them- 
selves in  the  defamation  of  Christ?  Or  when 
these  paid  '^ minstrels"  and  writers  compose, 
under  the  orders  of  the  People's  Commissars 
themselves  sacrilegious  prayers  designed  to  un- 
dermine those  precious  feelings  that  uplift  the 
human  soul  to  spiritual  heights,  where  this 
realm  of  tears  and  grief  ends  and  the  kingdom 
of  peace  and  infinite  love  begins. 

Read: 

1.   "In  the  name  of  Father — Socialism,  and  the 
Son  —  Communism,  and  the  Holy  Ghost  — 

*  See  Associated  Press  dispatch  of  July  6,  1922. 


RUSSIA  UNDER  THE  SOVIET  HEEL      211 

Marxism,  —  proletarians  of  all  countries 
unite." 

2.  "Mother  of  God,  Holy  Virgin — the  Commune, 

— blessed  be  thou,  mother  of  equality  and 
fraternity,  Lord — Labor,  be  with  thee. 
Blessed  be  thou  as  the  wife  of  the  proletariat 
of  the  whole  world,  and  blessed  be  the  fruit 
of  thy  motherhood — ^the   Internationale." 

3.  "The   Holy    Trinity — Socialism,    Communism 

and  Marxism — kill  the  tyrants.  Lord — 
Labor,  purge  us  from  the  sins  of  capitalism. 
God — proletariat,  forgive  the  crimes  of  the 
tyrants,  exploiters  and  parasites,  and  chain 
them  to  the  lathes  in  the  factories  and  to  the 
plows  on  the  soil."* 

Next  comes  Soviet  poetry  on  the  same  sub- 
ject. The  two  excerpts  given  below  are  taken 
from  the  Bolshevist  monthly  magazine  Yav, 
issue  of  October,  1920,  p.  7)  : 

"Stability,  Stability!    We  drag  thee  in  the  whirl, 
We  thrash  holiness  with  the  whip. 
We  torture  the  weak  body  of  Christ, 
We  torture  it  in  the  Cheka." 

"Now  then,  do  pardon  us  sinners! 
Save  us  as  thou  didst  the  robber  on  Golgotha. 
We  wildly  spill  thy  holy  blood. 
As  we  spill  water  from  the  washbowl." 

And  this: 
"Go  to  the  devil!    Splendid  is  our  obscene  dance 

*  This  blasphemous  prayer  was  reproduced  in  the  Russian  daily 
paper  The  New  Bussian  Life,  issue  of  April  8,  1921,  No.  79.  Trans- 
lated from  the  Russian. 


212      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

On  the  porch  of  the  Church. 

Christ  is  again  on  the  Cross,  while  we  have  taken 

Barabbas  for  a  walk  down  the  Tverskoi  Boulevard."* 

Mr.  Hillquit,  however,  asserts  that  the  Sov- 
iets represent  ^'The  best  spirit  of  the  Socialist 
movement  at  this  time."  Is  this  to  be  taken  as 
a  compliment  or  an  insult  to  Socialism? 

*  The  Tverskoi  Boulevard  is  one  of  the  main  streets  in  Moscow. 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE  ALL-RUSSIAN  FAMINE 

EInow'st  thou  the  land  where  all  with  plenty 
breathes?  *  *  *  Count  Alexis  Tolstoi 

So  now  prosperity  begins  to  mellow 
And  drops  into  the  rotten  mouth  of  death. 

Richard  III.,  Shakespeare 

Victor  Hugo  in  one  of  Ms  Parliamentary 
speeches  in  the  French  Chamber  made  this  re- 
mark: 

"When  men  forget  God,  Grod,  by  earthquakes, 
reminds  them  of  His  existence." 

The  Russian  famine  is  a  world-debated  topic. 
Everybody  is  alive  to  the  fact  that  Russia  is 
starving.  It  is  also  known  that  the  scale  of  the 
disaster  is  colossal,  embracing  all  parts  of  the 
former  Empire.  Therefore,  an  exposition  here 
of  this  situation  can  be  confined  to  a  brief  sum- 
mary of  its  main  features  and  the  general  out- 
look for  1923. 

A  few  lines,  however,  may  be  devoted  to  the 
cause  of  the  famine.  The  Soviet  press,  through 
all  its  foreign  agencies,  has  been  conducting 
a  strenuous  campaign,  the  object  of  which  was 
to  convince  Western  public  opinion  that  the 
acute  shortage  of  food  came  as  a  consequence 

213 


214      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

of  the  drought.  In  the  spring  and  summer  of 
1921,  it  is  true,  both  the  absolute  and  relative 
humidity  was  unusually  low  in  the  Volga  basin, 
which  to  a  certain  degree  tends  to  explain  the 
scarcity  of  crops  in  that  sector.  But  in  other 
parts  of  the  country  meteorological  conditions 
were  more  or  less  normal,  compared  with  the 
average  for  the  preceding  ten  years.  Still  the 
harvest  everywhere,  especially  in  the  most  fer- 
tile regions,  like  Little  Russia,  was  extremely 
poor.  For  this  reason,  agricultural  districts, 
outside  of  the  region  directly  damaged  by  the 
drought,  were  unable  to  come  to  the  relief  of 
the  hunger-bitten  population  in  the  Volga 
Provinces. 

Mr.  Nansen,  the  League  of  Nations  Commis- 
sioner for  relief  in  South  Russia,  an  extreme 
radical  himself,  referring  to  the  causes  of  the 
All-Russian  famine,  said: 

*'The  Soviet  principle  used  to  be  that  of 
requisitioning  from  the  peasant  all  the  surplus 
he  had  and  only  paying  him  in  paper  which  could 
not  buy  anything  for  him.  It  could  not  buy 
agricultural  machinery,  because  it  did  not  exist, 
and  it  could  not  buy  clothing.  Consequently,  the 
peasant  said:  'I  will  not  cultivate  more  than  nec- 
essary for  myself  and  my  family;  otherwise  it 
will  be  taken  away  from  me.'  "* 

Being  a  Soviet  sympathizer,  he,   of  course, 

•See  Fridtjof  Nansen's  report  to  the  League  of  Nations  pub- 
lished in  the  Provisional   'Record,  No.  17,  November  12,  1921. 


THE  ALL-RUSSIAN  FAMINE  215 

maintains  that  since  then  the  agricultural  poli- 
cies of  the  Soviets  have  changed  considerably, 
and  that  now  the  peasants  are  taking  a  more 
reasonable  attitude  toward  the  problem  of  cul- 
tivating their  lands.  The  Scandinavian  scien- 
tist argues  that  the  change  was  caused  by  the 
introduction  of  Lenin's  notorious  "Prodnalog," 
which,  as  will  be  recalled,  means  the  levying  of 
taxes  in  kind,  leaving  the  ^* surplus  crop"  for 
the  free  use  of  the  peasant.  That  such  a  con- 
tention is  wrong  is  evidenced  by  a  comparison 
of  the  acreage  sown  in  1920,  prior  to  the  adop- 
tion of  the  "Prodnalog,"  with  that  sown  in  the 
Autumn  of  1921,  after  the  new  form  of  tax 
had  been  in  operation  for  about  six  months : 

Percentage 
of  area  sown 
Name  of         Acres  sown    Acres  sown    compared 
Province  in  1920  in  1921      with  1920 

Samara    1,429,920  1,152,443  80.5 

Simbirsk   1,202,040  636,743  52.9 

Saratov   2,072,520  2,430,000  117.2 

Mari  Area 367,200  200,277  54.5 

Chuvash  Area. .      373,680  393,840  105.3 

Ufa 1,407,240  591,391  42.0 

Viatka  1,857,610  1,472,850          79.2 

Votiak   Area    ..      619,380  395,150          63.7 

Bashkir  Republic     408,780  66,744          16.3 

Tartar  Republic  2,284,470  969,734          42.4* 

*  Figures  taken  from  a  statement  issued  by  the  Soviet  Trade 
Delegation  in  London.  Published  in  Soviet  Bussia,  January,  1922, 
p.  7. 


2i6      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Thus,  in  spite  of  the  ^^Prodnalog,"  the  acre- 
age under  cultivation  has  been  steadily  de- 
creasing, with  the  result  that  in  the  spring  of 
1922  the  entire  country,  excepting  several  in- 
significant districts,  was  in  the  grip  of  King 
Hunger. 

The  underlying  causes  of  the  Russian  fam- 
ine are  to  be  sought  in  the  general  economic 
upheaval  brought  about  by  the  insane  Commun- 
ist experiment. 

In  1916  the  crops  were  good;  in  1917  they 
were  not  below  normal;  but  ever  since  1918 
Russia  has  been  living  through  an  agony  of 
starvation  whicii  first  affected  the  cities,  and 
then  gradually  spread  to  the  rual  districts.  It 
was  due  to  the  industrial  crisis  that  the  agricul- 
tural technique  from  year  to  year  has  been 
growing  less  efficient.  The  peasants  could  not 
be  blamed  for  this,  because  farming  implements 
were  unobtainable,  and  horses  were  either  re- 
quisitioned by  the  Soviets  or  killed  for  food. 
Without  horses,  the  land  could  not  be  cultivated, 
at  least  in  Russia,  where,  after  the  revolution, 
mechanical  methods  for  tilling  were  almost 
abandoned.  In  addition,  oxen  and  cows,  hav- 
ing also  been  eaten,  the  farmers  in  many  locali- 
ties were  obliged  to  draw  the  plows  themselves; 
this,  in  turn,  meant  that  deep  plowing  could 
not  be  done  and  the  soil  was  merely  scratched. 
Therefore,  the  slightest  unfavorable  atmos- 
pheric influence  inevitably  affected  the  matur- 


THE  ALI^RUSSIAN  FAMINE  217 

ing  of  the  seed.  In  this  connection  some  of 
the  figures  submitted  in  Mr.  Nansen's  report 
to  the  League  of  Nations  are  of  particular  in- 
terest. He  refers  to  the  harvest  of  1921  and 
compares  it  with  the  average  crops  for  the  nine 
years  between  1905  and  1913  in  the  wealthiest 
agricultural  region,  South  Russia,  including  the 
provinces  of  Kherson  and  Ekaterinoslav. 


Winter 

Pooda 

Poods 

Pooda 

Summer  Poods 

Wheat 

Eye 

Barley 

Oats 

Wheat      Com 

verage   per   1    42.1 

41.6 

42.7 

51.2 

26.3      70.5 

dessiatine  for      to 

to 

to 

to 

to 

9  yrs.  1905-13     42.6 

42.0 

50.4 

54.9 

32.5 

Returns  for  1921, 
Province  of  Kherson: 

Odessa  District.  4.0  1.5  2.0  2.0  1.5  5.0 

Tiraspol   Dist. .  5.0  3.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  10.0 
Yelisave  t  g  r  a  d 

District    ....  10.6  13.0  5.2  9.3  8.3  12.9 

Nickolev  Dist..  4.5  3.1  2.1  1.6  3.4  3.0 

Dneprovsk  Dist.  2.6  2.2  0.2  . .  0.5  2.3 
Province  of 

Ekaterinoslav    .  3.9  3.6  2.9  4.0  2.9  ..* 

Practically  the  same  returns  were  yielded  in 
the  Alexandrovsk  District,  which  at  present 
bears  the  name  ''Zaporoge." 

Among  the  contributing  causes  of  the  calam- 

*  Compare  this  table  with  figures  given  in  a  pamphlet  entitled 
'*La  Famine  en  UJcraine,"  League  of  Nations  Bulletin,  No.  22, 
Geneva,  April  30,  1922,  p.  5. 


2i8      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

ity,  the  wreck  of  transportation  cannot  be  over- 
looked. When  in  1891  the  Volga  region  suffered 
so  heavily  from  drought,  the  famine  situation 
was  solved  in  less  than  sixty  days.  At  that  time 
the  railroads  were  in  perfect  order,  and  it  took 
but  several  days  to  turn  the  whole  traffic  east- 
ward, the  first  carloads  of  wheat  arriving  in 
Samara  and  Simbirsk  ten  days  after  the  famine 
had  been  officially  registered.  At  present,  not- 
withstanding the  combined  efforts  of  the  Amer- 
ican Relief  Administration,  the  Nansen  organ- 
ization, and  the  British  volunteer  work,  the 
situation  is  becoming  more  and  more  menacing, 
largely  owing  to  the  lack  of  transportation 
facilities. 

The  various  causes  which  led  to  the  outburst 
of  the  famine  may  be  summed  up  as  follows ; 

1.  Nationalization  of  land. 

2.  Nationalization  of  trade,  and  more  particu- 
larly the  monopolization  of  grain  and  other 
food  supplies. 

3.  Systematic  decrease  in  the  acreage  under  cul- 
tivation. 

4.  The  general  industrial  crisis  with  a  sharp  de- 
cline in  the  manufacture  of  agricultural  im- 
plements. 

5.  General  deterioration  of  the  agricultural 
technique  in  peasants'  households  and  the  de- 
struction of  model  estates. 

6.  The  incompetent  manner  in  which  the  "Prod- 
nalog"  was  put  into  operation. 

7.  The  bitter  and  unanimous  resentment  of  the 
people  to  the  Communist  Regime. 


THE  ALI^RUSSIAN  FAMINE  219 

8.  The  complete  collapse  of  the  transportation 
system. 

9.  The  drought. 

Gigantic  events  are  never  the  outcome  of  one 
specific  cause  or  factor.  It  is  always  the  amal- 
gamation of  many  diverse  phenomena  and  their 
combined  functioning  that  produces  the  ulti- 
mate result.  Childish,  therefore,  is  the  attempt 
to  explain  the  All-Russian  famine  by  a  casual 
atmospheric  condition  which,  moreover,  affected 
only  one  section  of  the  country.  Still,  this  is 
precisely  what  Bolshevist  ** scientists"  have 
tried  to  prove. 

As  to  the  extent  of  the  famine,  Tchitcherin, 
the  Commissar  for  Foreign  Affairs,  in  August, 
1921,  made  an  estimate  that  18,000,000  persons 
were  affected  by  the  disaster.  This  number, 
however,  applied  to  the  Volga  region  alone.* 

The  vast  Ural  territory,  the  Northern  Cau- 
casus, the  Don  Region,  and  Little  Russia,  were 
not  included  in  the  original  Soviet  calculation. 
Adding  to  this  number  Hansen's  figures  for 
South  Russia,  5,500,000,  which  are  by  no  means 
complete,  we  have  a  total  of  23,500,000,  which 
leaves  out  both  North  Caucasus  and  the  Ural 
District. 

The  official  figures  hardly  represent  the  actual 
numher  of  starving  Russians  for  they  relate 
only  to  those  localities  which  are  classed  by  the 

*See  Tchitcherin 's  "Circular  Note  to  all  Governments/'  dated, 
Moscow,  August  3,  1921. 


220      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Central  Statistical  Bureau  as  *'f amine  strick- 
en." Hungry  cities,  such  as  Petrograd,  Mos- 
cow and  Kiev,  are  excluded  therefrom.  Be- 
sides, the  latest  available  information  dates 
back  to  May,  1922;  whereas,  the  famine 
is  assuming  ever-growing  proportions,  drawing 
in  its  deadly  clasp  larger  and  larger  masses  of 
the  people. 

The  spread  of  the  calamity  is  demonstrated 
by  the  two  following  tables  taken  from  Mr. 
Nansen's  report; 

Percen- 
Alexandrovsk  Number  of  tage  of 

District  starving  population 

November  1,  1921 175,000  14 

December  1,  1921 225,000  18 

January  1,  1922 400,000  31 

February  1,  1922 900,000  70 

March  1,1922 1,000,000  78 

April  1,  1922 1,075,000  82 

May   1,   1922 1,100,000  88 

Number  of 
Donetz  District  starving 

October  1,   1921 2,299 

November  1,  1921 48,297 

December  1,  1921 204,884 

January  1,  1922 274,060 

February  1,  1922 493,404 

March   1,   1922 654,749* 

*  Ibid,  p.  13. 


THE  ALI^RUSSIAN  FAMINE  221 

Mr.  Nansen  laconically  remarks: 

"If  formidable  relief  is  not  given,  it  is  almost 
certain  that  the  statistical  curve  relating  to  mor- 
tality will  follow  the  same  path.  In  fact,  thou- 
sands of  deaths  are  registered  daily.  Soon  these 
will  reach  tens  of  thousands."* 

Putting  the  number  of  Russians  who  are 
virtually  starving  to  death  at  the  modest  figure 
of  23,500,000,  it  is  essential  to  bear  in  mind 
that  by  July,  1922,  all  foreign  relief  organiza- 
tions combined  were  feeding  only  9,000,000 
adults  and  children.  As  to  the  Bolsheviki, 
their  schedule  of  relief  was  finally  endorsed 
by  the  Ninth  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets. 
The  plan  provided  for  a  gradual  expansion  of 
work;  it  was  intended  to  start  by  feeding  500,- 
000  sufferers  in  October,  1921,  bringing  the 
number  up  to  3,250,000  in  March  and  April, 
1922.  This  scheme,  which  incidentally  was 
never  carried  out,  stipulated  as  follows: 

Number  of  People  to  Be  Fed 


Month 

Children 

Adults 

Total 

October,     1921 

375,000 

125,000 

500,000 

November,  *' 

750,000 

250,000 

1,000,000 

December,    * ' 

1,125,000 

375,000 

1,500,000 

January,    1922 

1,500,000 

1,000,000 

2,500,000 

February,    '  * 

1,500,000 

1,500,000 

3,000,000 

March, 

1,500,000 

1,750,000 

3,250,000 

April, 

1,500,000 

1,750,000 

3,250,000 

May, 

1,500,000 

1,500,000 

3,000,000 

June,           " 

1,500,000 

750,000 

2,250,000 

*  Ibid,  p.  13. 

222      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

The  following  quantities  of  foodstuffs  were 
set  aside  (on  paper  only)  for  this  purpose: 

Name  of  To  be  used  To  be  used 

Foodstuffs       for  children  for  adults        Total 

Grain 70,313  tons  28,125  tons      98,438 

Groats    28,126 


Meat    35,160 

Potatoes 46,876 

Other  roots.  52,736 

Salt 8,128 

Sugar 2,350 


7,501    *'         35,627 

28,123    *'         63,283 

112,501     "       159,377 

56,251     "       108,987 

3,753     ''  6,881 

2,350* 


238,689  tons    236,254  tons    474,943 

In  carrying  out  their  proposition  the  Soviets 
met  with  utter  failure.  Up  to  December  1, 
1921,  they  had  succeeded  in  requisitioning  only 
44,000  tons  of  grain  and  other  food  supplies, 
which  was  but  a  little  over  9  per  cent,  of  the 
total.  Simultaneously  the  levying  of  the  ^'Prod- 
nalog"  evinced  an  ever-decreasing  tendency 
and,  according  to  the  Pravda  (No.  256,  1921), 
gave  the  following  returns: 

Collected  from  Poods 

October    1st  to  October  10th 10,932,000 

October  11th  to  October  20th 8,404,000 

October  21st  to  October  30th 7,644,000 

Nov.  1st  to  Nov.        10th 1,754,000 

Taking  the  most  optimistic  view,  it  can  be 
asserted  that  the  Soviets  succeeded  in  collect- 

*  See  Kalinin 's  report  to  the  Ninth  Congress  of  Soviets.  Quoted 
from  Soviet  Russia,  March  1,  1922. 


THE  ALL-RUSSIAN  FAMINE  223 

ing  only  26  per  cent,  of  food  set  aside  by  the 
Ninth  Congress  for  famine  relief.  Thus,  not 
more  than  800,000  are  being  actually  fed  by  the 
Soviets.  In  other  words,  foreign  charity,  to- 
gether with  Soviet  work,  gives  relief  to  not 
more  than  10,000,000  sufferers,  while  not  less 
than  13,000,000  are  doomed  to  die. 

Leaving  aside  the  Volga  region,  which,  since 
the  tragic  exodus  in  the  fall  of  1921,  resembles 
a  vast  cemetery,  brief  data  should  be  presented 
regarding  such  sectors  as  are  considered  com- 
paratively in  better  condition.  The  Econo- 
micheshaya  Jisn  in  an  article  entitled,  **  Hunger 
in  the  Urals,"  says: 

"People  eat  carrion,  different  kinds  of  refuse, 
and  food  substitutes.  Relief  for  the  starving  is 
organized  very  poorly.  The  satiated  districts  are 
quite  indifferent  to  their  hungry  brethren  and 
openly  refuse  to  help  them.  *  *  *  Clamors 
for  help  grow  stronger  every  day.  There  is  no 
time  to  waste.  We  have  to  face  the  sowing  sea- 
son. But  will  there  be  any  seeds?  In  the  Prov- 
ince of  Ekaterinburg  one  hundred  famine  coun- 
ties have  been  registered,  with  a  total  number  of 
350,000  starving,  of  which  children  form  60 
per  cent.  Hunger  is  becoming  extremely  intense. 
Everything  has  been  eaten  up.  According  to  the 
Commission  for  Famine  Relief  ("Kompomgol"), 
if  all  forces  and  means  are  mobilized,  it  will  be- 
come possible  to  feed  50  per  cent,  of  those  starv- 
ing; the  rest  are  doomed  to  death.  Peasants' 
households  are  destroyed.  Cattle  breeding 
has  practically  stopped.     *    *    *    Mortality  is 


224      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

enormous,  and  the  number  of  abandoned  children 
and  children's  crimes  is  rapidly  increasing."* 

Because  the  population  throughout  Russia  is 
using  food  substitutes,  the  rate  of  mortality  is 
rising  everywhere,  while  the  birthrate  is 
sharply  declining.  In  Little  Russia,  straw  is 
pulled  off  from  the  roofs  and  cut  up  into  very 
small  pieces,  which,  mixed  with  water  and 
refuse,  is  used  for  food.  Sometimes,  apricot 
seeds  are  pounded  up  and  added  to  the  meagre 
supply  of  flour.  Approximately  50  per  cent, 
of  those  who  eat  such  "bread"  die  almost  in- 
stantly. In  other  localities  acorns  constitute 
the  main  food  supply,  together  with  mice  and 
rats,  which  have  not  yet  perished  from  the 
famine.  Various  diseases,  like  swellings,  gan- 
grene and  ulcers,  are  rampant  among  the  popu- 
lation as  a  result  of  eating  such  ''food." 

Cannibalism  has  become  a  common  phenome- 
non. In  No.  20  of  the  Bolshevist  Pravda  for 
1922  this  report  was  published: 

"A  peasant  woman,  Providochina,  from  the  vil- 
lage of  Stary  Nachrantov,  in  the  Province  of 
Kazan,  has  almost  completely  eaten  up  her  dead 
son  who  was  19  years  old.  The  remnants  of 
his  corpse  were  buried.  A  peasant,  by  the  name 
of  Murzakov,  has  eaten  the  liver  and  lungs  of  his 
deceased  wife.  In  the  steppe  district  of  the  Sa- 
mara Province,  regular  nightmares  can  be  wit- 
nessed.   There  is  an  amazing  spread  of  cannibal- 

*  Economicheskaya  Jisn,  No.  92,  April  27,  1922. 


THE  ALL-RUSSIAN  FAMINE  225 

ism.  In  the  village  of  Lubimovka  a  peasant  dug 
out  of  the  grave  the  corpse  of  a  fourteen-year-old 
youth,  intending  to  cook  it,  but  he  was  arrested. 
The  Executive  Committee  of  the  same  village 
states  as  follows:  'Wild  cannibalism  assumes  mass 
proportions.  During  dark  nights  corpses  are  be- 
ing cooked  in  peasants'  huts.'  In  the  village  of 
Andreevka  the  head  of  a  sixty-year-old  woman 
is  being  preserved,  her  body  having  been  eaten 
by  a  peasant  in  the  same  village,  Andrew  Pirogov. ' ' 

Dr.  Francis  Rollins,  formerly  connected  with 
the  American  Relief  Administration,  in  an  in- 
terview with  the  correspondent  of  Rigasche 
Rundschau,  said  this: 

*'I  am  leaving  Russia  for  good,  since  I  cannot 
stand  the  horrors  which  I  have  been  witnessing 
for  the  last  months.  It  is  beyond  human  endur- 
ance from  day  to  day,  to  look  at  the  corpses  of 
those  who  have  died  from  starvation,  half-eaten 
up  dead  bodies,  sometimes  only  heaps  of  bones, 
indicating  that  once  a  corpse  lay  there  which  was 
devoured  by  other  sufferers  who  desired  to  drag 
out  their  existence  for  a  few  days.  Aside  from 
hunger  victims,  thousands  are  affected  with  differ- 
ent kinds  of  epidemics;  typhus,  measles,  dysen- 
tery and  tuberculosis;  recently  cholera  has  been 
added,  with  a  60  per  cent,  mortality,"* 

In  some  of  the  starving  areas  cannibalism  is 
menacing  those  who  have  managed  to  keep  up 

*  See  The  Last  News,  issue  of  May  5,  1922,  p.  2,  article  entitled, 
"  Eepresentative  of  the  'ARA'  on  the  situation  in  Soviet  Eussia." 
Published  in  Eeval.     Translation  from  the  Eussian. 


226      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

their  physical  constitution.  For  instance,  in 
the  Kazan  Province,  hungry  Tartars  lie  in 
ambush  along  the  roads,  waiting  to  lasso  the 
people  as  they  pass  by.  The  dreadful  feature 
about  this  habit  is  that  those  who  have  become 
accustomed  to  eat  human  flesh  do  not  seem  to 
care  for  any  other  kind  of  food.  Commissars 
in  Moscow  are  daily  receiving  inquiries  from 
the  local  Soviets  as  to  what  reprisals  should 
be  taken  against  the  troglodytes  of  the  twen- 
tieth century.  On  many  occasions  physicians 
and  nurses  refuse  to  visit  remote  villages  since 
there  is  always  danger  that  the  starving  peas- 
ants might  attack  and  devour  them. 

A  ghastly  episode  of  anthropohagy  is  de- 
scribed in  a  letter  sent  from  Moscow  on  May  18, 
1922.    It  reads  verbatim: 

"A  small  tradesman  with  great  difSculty  suc- 
ceeded in  collecting  a  little  supply  of  flour,  groats, 
sugar  and  tea,  and  went  to  see  his  brother  who 
was  living  in  a  village  in  the  Samara  Province. 
When  he  arrived  at  the  last  railroad  station,  he  met 
several  peasants  with  whom  he  was  acquainted.  He 
asked  them:  'How  is  my  brother?'  They  an- 
swered :  'Well,  he's  all  right,  but  you  better  not  go 
to  see  him.'  Defying  this  advice,  the  tradesman 
proceeded  to  his  native  village.  There  he  met  his 
brother  who  accepted  the  food  with  indifference. 
Soon  he  began  to  feel  his  flesh  and  remarked: 

"  *You  certainly  are  fat!' 

"  'But  where  are  the  children?' 

**  'They  are  in  the  cellar.' 

**  'And  your  wife?' 


THE  ALL-RUSSIAN  FAMINE  227 

**  'She's  there  too.' 

"After  a  while  the  wife  came  up  and  the  first 
thing  she  did  was  to  take  hold  of  the  visitor,  press- 
ing him  all  over;  then  she  also  dropped  the  re- 
mark: 'How  stout  you  are!'  In  the  meantime 
a  group  of  over  ten  peasants  had  gathered  out- 
side, gazing  through  the  windows.  They  all  came 
to  take  a  look  at  the  newcomer. 

"  'If  you  wish  to  see  the  children,  step  down 
cellar.' 

"  'I  would  rather  have  you  bring  them  up  here.' 
' '  '  They  are  living  there,  so  you  better  descend 
first  and  I  will  follow  you.' 

"The  tradesman  instinctively  felt  that  some- 
thing dreadful  would  happen.  Finally  he  per- 
suaded the  host  to  open  the  trap  door  and  show 
him  the  way  down.  The  moment,  however,  the 
host  did  this,  the  tradesman  slammed  the  door 
shut  and  fled  from  the  house.  Outside  the  peo- 
ple immediately  attacked  him,  and  it  was  obvious 
that  they  had  been  watching  him.  Fortunately 
these  men  were  as  weak  as  flies ;  it  was  sufficient 
to  touch  one,  and  he  would  fall  over.  In  this 
way  the  tradesman  was  able  to  make  his  escape 
and  he  hurried  back  to  the  railroad  station."* 

Additional  information  on  the  same  subject 
was  given  by  Mr.  William  Shafrotb,  son  of 
former  Governor  Shafroth  of  Colorado,  who 
in  June,  1922,  arrived  in  London  after  a  yearns 
work  with  the  American  Relief  Administration. 
In  an  interview  with  the  Associated  Press  he 
gave  the  following  shocking  story: 

*  This  letter  was  published  in  the  weekly  organ  of  the  Suprema 
Eussian  Monarchical  Council,  No.  44,  June  5,  1922,  p.  3. 


228      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

"The  desperate  people,"  he  said,  "are  eating 
human  beings,  diseased  horses,  dogs  and  cats. 
Cemeteries  are  being  dug  up  and  long-buried 
bodies  snatched  as  food.  In  their  hunger-mad- 
ness, the  people  are  stealing  bodies  from  morgues 
and  hospitals  to  eat.  *  *  *  A  Russian  mem- 
ber of  the  A.  R.  A.,  who  died  of  typhus,  was  dis- 
interred at  night  and  eaten  by  the  crazed  inhabi- 
tants. I  know  one  instance,"  said  Mr.  Shafroth, 
"where  a  distracted  mother  of  five  children  killed 
the  youngest  in  order  to  appease  the  pangs  of 
the  rest  of  the  flock;  but  the  oldest  boy  cried 
bitterly  when  he  saw  his  mother  sever  his  little 
brother's  head  and  place  the  body  into  a  pot. 
He  refused  to  eat  the  flesh.  The  famine  in  Russia 
is  unequalled  even  by  the  dreadful  famines  of 
India,  China  or  any  other  in  history.  In  some 
districts  the  people,  made  insane  by  hunger,  have 
gone  secretly  at  night  to  the  warehouses  where 
hundreds  of  dead  bodies  were  stored  because 
graves  could  not  be  found  for  them  and  have  car- 
ried off  these  cadavers  and  used  them  for  food. 
Ten  butcher  shops  in  Samara  were  closed  by  the 
authorities  because  it  was  learned  that  they  were 
selling  human  flesh.  The  melting  snow  has  dis- 
closed thousands  of  bodies  strewn  over  the  fields 
and  along  roadways.  It  was  impossible  to  bury  all 
these,  so  they  were  placed  in  warehouses  like  logs 
of  kindling  wood."* 

In  brief,   such   was   the   situation   in   July, 
1922. 

What  is  the  outlook  for  1923?    It  is  gloomy 

*  See  Associated  Press  cable  dispatch  as  published  in   the  New 
York  press,  June  9,  1922. 


THE  ALL-RUSSIAN  FAMINE  229 

in   the   extreme.     First   of    all,    the   "Bread 
Loan,"  which  was  so  much  heralded  in  the 
Soviet  press,  failed  completely.     The  scheme 
was  to  sell  State  Certificates  at  a  nominal  price 
of  380  rubles,  which  would  entitle  the  bearer 
to  receive  one  pood  of  rye  flour  between  Decem- 
ber, 1,  1922,  and  January  31,  1923.    The  "Prod- 
nalog,"  according  to  the  terms  of  the  loan,  can 
be  paid  by  surrendering  bread  certificates  equiv- 
alent in  sum  to  the  amount  of  tax  levied.    The 
Moscow  quota  was  fixed  at  10,000,000  poods  of 
rye.      The    subscription   in   that    city   gave    a 
return    of    only    several    hundreds    of    poods. 
Throughout  the  entire  country  the  response  of 
the  population  to  the  Bread  Loan  campaign 
was  quite  insignificant.    Secondly,  in  the  spring 
of  1922,  many  parts  of  South  Russia  and  the 
Volga   basin    were    infested    with    swarms    of 
locusts,  and  the  new  crops  destroyed.    Further- 
more, the  area  under  cultivation  is  still  falling 
off,  and  in  some  of  the  wealthiest  Caucasian 
districts  it  is  only  25  per  cent,  as  compared  with 
that  of  1921.    Finally,  the  crops  in  the  Volga 
region  for  1922  were  hardly  any  better  than 
in  1921.    Seeds  delivered  to  the  starving  peas- 
ants by  the  American  Relief  Administration 
were  eaten  up  long  before  the  time  for  sowing 
came.    Such  was  the  condition  in  the  Samara 
Province.     Throughout  Little  Russia  weather 
conditions  were  very  unfavorable  during  the 
spring  and  summer  of  1922,  and  it  is  believed 


230      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

that  only  on  the  right  shore  of  the  Dniper 
will  there  be  something  to  collect,  while  on  the 
left  shore  corn  has.  not  come  up  at  all.  In  the 
Don   Valley   the   land   under    cultivation    for 

1922  did  not  exceed  30  per  cent,  of  the  pre- 
war acreage.  Some  places  near  Odessa  were 
left  unsown  by  the  peasants.  The  spring  was 
unusually  cold  and  dry  in  northeastern 
parts  of  Russia,  for  example  in  the  Ufa  Prov- 
ince. Owing  to  this,  the  seed  froze  in  the 
ground.  Approximately  40  per  cent,  of  all 
land  in  the  Petrograd  District  was  damaged  by 
frosts.  The  Commissariat  for  Food  and  Sup- 
ply estimated  that  land  tilled  in  1922,  for  all 
of  Russia,  did  not  exceed  27  per  cent,  of  the 
pre-war  acreage.  Accordingly,  the  famine  is 
far  from  having  been  brought  under  control. 
Quite  the  reverse;  there  is  every  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  by  February,  1923,  the  scale  of  the 
disaster  will  overshadow  the  horrors  of  1921 
and  1922. 

At  the  time  of  The  Hague  Conference,  the 
Bolshevist  Delegation  more  than  once  made  the 
assertion  that  there  will  be  a  good  harvest  in 
1922.  Finkelstein  went  further  when  he  re- 
sorted to  an  obvious  bluff,  explaining  that  in 

1923  Russia  will  become  again  a  self-supporting 
country.  There  was  a  purpose  in  this  lie :  The 
Communists  needed  cash  and  there  was  nothing 
they  would  not  use  as  an  argument  to  obtain 
it.    At  present,  however,  it  is  not  easy  to  dupe 


THE  ALL-RUSSIAN  FAMINE  231 

Western  Europe  with  Communist  propaganda. 
Some  of  the  British  statesmen  themselves  begin 
to  awake  to  the  fact  that  the  Soviets  are 
swindling  capitalist  countries,  using  the  famine 
as  a  pretext.  The  Soviets  are  fast  becoming 
impudent.  Encouraged  by  silly  little  courtesies 
extended  to  them— be  it  by  Lloyd  George  or  the 
King  of  Italy— they  are  openly  ridiculing 
European  politicians.  They  do  not  longer  take 
the  trouble  to  mask  their  activities.  In  this 
connection  Mr.  Chamberlain's  statement  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  made  in  February,  1922, 
revealed  a  very  piquant  situation.  Reporting 
his  speech,  the  Gazette  de  Lausanne,  spoke 
thus: 

"The  Soviets  have  just  bought  in  London,  on 
Moorgate  Street,  some  real  estate  for  use  as  their 
headquarters,  at  a  cost  of  250,000  pounds  (12,- 
500,000  francs).  The  exceedingly  luxurious 
equipment  for  this  house  involved  a  disbursement 
of  100,000  pounds  (5,000,000  francs).  This 
'Soviet  Palace'  is  occupied  by  Mr.  Krassin  who 
is  surrounded  by  a  whole  army  of  stenographers 
and  dactylographs  to  whom  he  pays  salaries 
of  350  to  400  francs  per  week.  The  sum  of  17,- 
500,000  francs  which  Russia  expended  for  her 
palace  in  London  is  precisely  the  sum  which  Russia 
demands  from  England  to  give  relief  to  the 
starving  people."* 

*  See  Gaseite  de  Lausanne,  No.  70,  March  12,  1922.  The  figures 
in  parenthesis  are  furnished  by  the  Swiss  paper  from  which  the 
quotation  is  taken. 


232      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Communist  graft  has  become  a  living  legend. 
The  Soviet  rulers  encompass  themselves  with 
all  the  comforts  of  life  at  the  very  moment 
when  Russians  everywhere  are  undergoing  in- 
describable hardships.  There  is  indeed  a  strik- 
ing contrast  between  Soviet  luxury  on  the 
Thames  and  humiliating  misery  on  the  Volga. 

The  people  on  this  side  of  the  water  are 
unable  to  grasp  the  full  meaning  of  the  Russian 
tragedy,  the  extent  of  despair  driving  creatures 
that  once  were  men  to  cannibalism  and  other 
atrocities.  One  must  personally  live  through 
the  abomination  of  Sovietism  to  understand 
that  years  will  pass  before  the  bestial  instincts 
aroused  by  Marxian  practice  can  be  overcome. 

As  long  as  Trotzky  remains  planted  on  the 
Communist  throne  in  Russia,  there  is  no  hope 
for  that  country. 

Mr.  Hoover's  splendid  work  is  incapable  of 
solving  the  Herculean  task  of  regenerating  a 
great  nation  reduced,  through  Socialism,  to  a 
state  of  savageness  and  cave-like  existence. 


CHAPTER  VII 

SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY 

r>  OLSHEVISM  is  not  a  local  Russian  matter, 
nor  is  it  a  Russian  affair  at  all.  Only  in  so 
far  as  Marxism  has  been  particularly  used  for 
the  destruction  of  Russia  can  it  be  associated 
with  that  country.  At  this  point,  however,  con- 
nection between  the  two  ends. 

Bolshevism  is  decidedh^  anti-Russian.  Not 
only  is  the  personnel  of  the  Soviet  bureaucracy 
made  up  of  the  international  canaille,  with  a 
slight  admixture  of  native  Russians,  but  Com- 
munist policies  are  diametrically  opposed  to 
everything  the  Russian  people  have  stood  for 
during  one  thousand  years  of  their  history.  In 
this  sense  Bolshevism  is  a  direct  negation  of 
Russian  nationalism.  From  a  scientific  view- 
point, to  speak  of  Russian  Bolshevism  is  just 
as  erroneous  as  to  refer  to  American  Confucian- 
ism or  Chinese  Calvinism. 

The  official  expose  of  Bolshevism  and  its 
aims  was  made  by  Bukharin  in  a  pamphlet, 
'^Program  of  the  Communists/'  issued  in  1918. 
The  opening  paragraph  of  one  of  its  chapters 
reads : 

"The  program  of  the  Communist  Party  is  a 
program  not  only  of  liberating  the  proletariat  of 
233 


234      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

one  country;  it  is  the  program  for  the  liberation 
of  the  world  proletariat  since  such  is  the  program 
of  the  international  revolution." 

The  author  further  goes  on  to  explain : 

"The  better  we  are  organized,  the  stronger  the 
armed  detachments  of  workmen  and  peasants,  the 
more  powerful  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat 
in  Russia,  the  more  quickly  will  the  international 
revolution  come.  *  *  *  Sooner  or  later  we  will 
have  the  International  Republic  of  Soviets." 

Apfelbaum,  the  President  of  the  Executive 
Committee  of  the  Third  Internationale,  closing 
his  first  May  appeal  in  1920,  thus  formulated 
the  same  idea: 

"Amidst  storms,  blood  and  tears,  hunger  and 
endless  suffering,  a  new  world  is  being  born,  a 
bright  world  of  Communism;  of  the  universal 
brotherhood  of  the  toilers. 

"In  1918  the  great  Communist  Internationale 
was  bom.  In  1920  the  great  International  Soviet 
Republic  will  be  bom." 

Again,  Lenin  speaking  before  the  Second 
Congress  of  the  Third  International  (July 
19th  to  August  7th,  1920)  expressed  this  basic 
principle  by  stating: 

**Now,  we  have  everywhere  advance  detach- 
ments, and  everywhere  we  have  proletarian  armies, 
although  poorly  organized  and  requiring  reor- 
ganization. We  are  able  to  organize  these  into 
a  single  detachment,  into  a  single  force.    If  you 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  235 

will  help  us  to  accomplish  this,  then  no  mental 
exercises  or  guesses  with  respect  to  what  cannot  be 
known  and  what  no  one  can  know,  will  prevent 
us  from  accomplishing  our  task,  and  this  task  will 
he  that  of  leading  0^1,  to  the  victory  of  the  world 
revolution  and  to  the  establishment  of  an  inter- 
national proletarian  Soviet  Republic."* 

One  year  later  Apf elbaum,  when  greeting  the 
Third  Congress  of  the  Communist  Internation- 
ale, emphasized  the  aims  of  Bolshevism  in  the 
following  terms: 

"Comrades,  in  the  whole  history  of  the  labor 
movement  there  has  been  no  congress  which  had 
such  a  large  representation  of  the  peoples  of  the 
Near  and  Far  East,  as  our  present  meeting.  You 
will  recall  our  Baku  Convention  which  followed 
the  Second  Congress.  Since  then  the  influence  of 
the  Communist  Internationale  has  been  growing 
day  by  day  in  countries  of  the  Near  and  Far  East. 
The  fact  itself  of  the  presence  here  of  numerous 
delegations  from  those  countries,  gives  us  evidence 
that  our  organization  is  not  only  a  workers' 
brotherhood  of  Europe,  but  indeed  a  toilers'  or- 
ganization of  the  world  at  large.  Therein  we  see 
the  pledge  that  the  victory  of  the  revolution  in 
which  we  all,  assembled  here,  are  firmly  convinced, 
will  be  not  merely  a  European  revolution,  but  a 
real  world  revolution  in  the  precise  meaning  of 
the  term.  *  *  *  Long  live  world  revolution! 
Long  live  the  Communist  Internationale  !"t 

•  The  2Dd  Congress  of  the  Communist  Internationale,  p.  30,  Wash- 
ington   Government    Printing    Office,    1920. 

^  The  Communist  Internationale,  No.  18,  pp.  4487  and  4488. 
Petrograd,  October,  1921.     Translated  from  the  Russian. 


236      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Russia,  having  been  the  first  to  fall  under  the 
blows  of  Marxism,  was  naturally  chosen  as  the 
stronghold  and  headquarters  of  the  world  revo- 
lutionary movement.  For  this  reason,  Soviet 
foreign  policy  is  prominently  devoted  to  the 
acceleration  of  a  process  which  Marx  described 
as  ^'the  decomposition  of  bourgeois  society." 

There  is  a  certain  parallelism  between  the 
domestic  tactics  of  Bolshevism  and  its  attitude 
toward  foreign  countries.  In  the  same  way  that 
in  Russia  the  original  banditism  of  Red  Guard- 
ists  gradually  assumed  the  form  of  organized 
oppression,  likewise  militant  tactics  formerly 
used  against  the  "Western  World,  have  recently 
been  substituted  by  a  policy  of  subtle  under- 
mining of  all  traditional  modes  of  civil  order. 
Both  courses  of  action,  however,  pursued  one 
and  the  same  aim — that  is  world  revolution. 

Nowadays,  true  enough,  the  Soviets  refrain 
from  composing  impudent  notes  in  the  style  of 
Tchicherin's  first  communication  to  President 
"Wilson.  Nor  do  they  admit  that  the  red  tape 
of  their  negotiations  with  the  Lloyd  Georges, 
Rathenaus,  or  Schanzers,  is  designed  to  worm 
the  poison  of  Communist  disease  into  the  hearts 
and  brains  of  European  nations.  At  Genoa 
and  The  Hague  they  wash,  shave,  and  wear  silk 
hats.  There  they  try  to  appear  genteel,  and 
smile  pleasantly  into  the  cameras  of  the  news- 
paper reporters, — ^but  can  the  leopard  change 
his  spots? 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  237 

Still,  even  in  Western  Europe,  the  Pinkel- 
steins  and  other  Soviet  envoys,  forgetting  their 
diplomatic  role,  from  time  to  time,  resort  to 
rude  jargon,  swearing  against  capitalism  and 
similar  dreadful  things  that  appear  to  burden 
their  minds.  Otherwise,  as  a  general  rule,  when 
in  the  political  foreground,  they  strive  to  use  a 
language  which  can  be  understood  not  only  by 
their  brethren,  but  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George  him- 
self. The  more  short-sighted  among  the  Euro- 
pean politicians  earnestly  maintain  that  a  fun- 
damental change  has  taken  place  in  Communist 
psychology.  With  this  contention  in  mind,  they 
advocate  peace  at  all  costs  with  the  Moscow 
trouble-makers.  They  overlook  that  on  the  eve 
of  1922  Apf  elbaum,  in  an  appeal  to  the  workers 
of  the  world,  made  the  positive  assertion  that, 
despite  the  ostensible  changes  in  Communist 
tactics,  merciless  war  with  the  outside  world 
remains  the  guiding  policy  of  the  Soviets. 

Everywhere  abroad  Bolshevist  delegations 
have  become  the  centers  of  revolutionary  propa- 
ganda, and  hardly  is  there  a  single  disloyal 
movement  now  on  foot  which  is  not  directly  or 
indirectly  backed  by  the  Soviets.  This  is  par- 
ticularly true  as  regards  Eastern  countries. 
Tchicherin  himself,  submitting  his  report  to 
the  Seventh  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets, 
stated : 

"In  the  East  the  Soviet  Government  ia  reaping 


238      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

the  fruits  of  the  frank  and  far-seeing  policy  which 
it  had  adopted  from  the  first  days  of  its  formation. 
•  *  *  To  whatever  eastern  country  we  turn  our 
eyes,  whether  Persia,  China,  Korea,  Turkey  or 
Egypt,  we  observe  a  deep  fermentation  which  is 
assuming  more  and  more  the  concrete  form  of  a 
movement  against  European  and  American  capi- 
talism. This  movement  has  for  its  ultimate  object 
the  atta/inment  of  our  ideals.'** 

Modern  Communism  is  not  merely  a  theory; 
to  a  greater  extent  it  is  a  mode  of  action,  a 
manner  of  bad  behavior.  Its  schemes  are  pro- 
nouncedly militant.  World  revolution  is  the 
immediate  task  of  its  efforts,  while  the  con- 
quest of  world  power  is  the  ultimate  goal. 
For  the  realization  of  this  end,  the  Bolsheviki 
have  devised  an  elaborate  plan  which  in  sub- 
stance covers  the  following : 

1.  In  Russia,  Communist  dictatorship  en- 
ables the  Red  rulers  to  so  organize  her  man- 
power and  natural  resources  as  to  transform 
the  whole  country  into  a  tremendous  armed 
camp,  ready  to  deliver  heavy  blows  in  any 
given  direction. 

2.  For  the  exercising  of  proper  control  over 
the  revolutionary  movement  in  foreign  coun- 
tries, a  special  body  was  set  up  in  1919  which 
is  known  under  the   name   of  the   Third   or 

•  See  pamphlet  publishcfl  in  London,  entitled  *  *  The  Foreign 
Policy  of  Soviet  Russia. ' '  A  report  submitted  by  the  People 's  Com- 
missariat for  Foreign  Affairs  to  the  Seventh  All-Russian  Congress 
of  Soviets,  pp.  30  to  32. 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  239 

**  Communist  Internationale,  "—in  Soviet  slang, 
called  the  "Komintern."  It  is  composed  of 
professional  agitators  and  revolutionary  inter- 
nationalists. Communist  Parties  in  all  lands 
are  acting  under  the  direct  guidance  and  super- 
vision of  the  Komintern.  Drastic  discipline 
has  been  introduced  among  all  these  groups 
and  instructions  regulating  their  activities  were 
issued  by  the  Komintern  in  a  document  known 
as  ''The  Twenty-one  Terms  of  Admittance  to 
the  Third  Internationale."* 

3.  The  administrative  power  of  the  Third 
Internationale  is  vested  in  its  Executive  Com- 
mittee. Apfelbaum  is  president,  while  Lenin, 
Trotzky,  Sobelsohn  and  Bukharin  are  among 
its  members. 

4.  The  Soviet  of  People's  Commissars  is 
subordinate  to  the  Executive  Committee  of  the 
Third  Internationale. 

5.  The  Executive  Committee  of  the  Third 
Internationale  takes  charge  of  all  organization 
matters  pertaining  to  the  Bolshevist  movement 
in  every  part  of  the  world. 

6.  Every  national  group  reports  to  the  Ex- 
ecutive Committee  of  the  Komintern,  and  re- 
ceives orders  from  it. 

7.  Every  country  has  a  National  Communist 
Center  whose  policies  are  co-ordinated  with 
those  of  the  Executive  Committee. 

*  See  The  Communist  Internationale,  No.  13,  pp.  2387-2392. 
PetTograd  and  Moscow,  September,  1920. 


240      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

8.  All  differences  between  the  various  Com- 
munist groups  abroad  are  finally  decided  upon 
by  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Komintern. 

Following  out  this  program,  the  Executive 
Committee  of  the  Third  Internationale,  begin- 
ning with  1919,  has  been  feverishly  at  work 
in  all  countries,  including  the  United  States. 

By  the  end  of  1921,  an  estimate  was  made  by 
the  Komintern  as  to  the  membership  of  what  is 
termed  ''The  Army  of  the  Communist  Inter- 
nationale." The  official  research  gave  these 
returns : 

Number 
Number       of  weeklies 
of  Com-        and  other 
Number  munist        Communist 

Country  of  members  dailies       periodicala 

U.  S.  of  America. . . .  13,000  8  13 

Austria    18,000  1  3 

England 10,000  . .  2 

Argentine   5,000  1  1 

Australia    2,900  ..  2 

Armenia    5,000  . .  1 

Azerbaijan    16,000 

Bulgaria    37,000  1  21 

Belgium    1,100  ..  1 

Bokhara    6,000  ..  2 

Hungary* . .  1 

Greece   2,200  1  3 

Germany 360,000  33  12 

Holland 4,000  1  3 

Georgia   11,000  4  5 

Gorsky  Republic  . . .  10,000 

•  The  number  of  Communist  members  in  Hungary  is  not  given 
because  the  party  works  underground. 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  241 

Namber 
Number      of  weekliea 
of  Com-        and  other 
Number  munist        Communist 

Country  of  members  dailies        periodicals 

Denmark    1,200  1                1 

Daghestan     7,000 

Far  Eastern  Republic      7,095  6 

Egypt    1,500 

Italy 70,000  3              15 

Spain 10,000  . .                6 

Iceland    3,000  1 

Canada    1,000  ..                1 

China*    

Koreat     

Luxemburg     500  . .                1 

Latviat    

Mexico 1,200  . .                2 

Norway  97,600  14              27 

Polandt     ..                4 

Persia    2,000  ..                1 

Palestine!     500 

Portugal    400  ..                1 

Roumania   40,000  3                6 

Russian    Soviet    Re- 
public    550,000  500             96 

Turkeyt    ..                1 

Ukrainian  Soviet  Re- 
public         61,400  45               2 

Uruguay   1,500  1               1 

France   131,000  8             43 

Finland  . ." 40,000  3               8 

Khiva    1,000  ..                1 

*  No  information  ia  available. 

f  No  data  are  given  because  the  Communist  Party  works  under- 
ground. 
:j:This  number  does  not  include  Poale-Zionists. 


242      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 


Number 
Country  of  members 

Chile    2,000 

Sweden    14,000 

Switzerland    7,000 

Czeeho-Slovakia 360,000 

Esthonia   3,000 

Jugo-Slavia    85,000 

South  Africa 750 

Java    4,000 

Japan*    900 

Y.  M.  C.  I.   (Young 

Men 's    Communist 

Internationale)    ..  800,000 


Number 

Number 

of  weeklies 

of  Com- 

and other 

munist 

Communist 

dailies 

periodicals 

^  ^ 

1 

2 

15 

4 

2 

10 

46 

1 

,  . 

4 

16 

. . 

3 

•  • 

1 

^  ^ 

2 

50t 


2,805,745 


656 


425 


Because  figures  are  missing  for  several  coun- 
tries, such  as  China,  Poland,  Turkey,  Hungary 
and  Korea,  which  were  purposely  left  out  by 
the  Soviets,  it  can  be  estimated,  with  a  degree 
of  certainty,  that  the  total  Communist  member- 
ship throughout  the  world  is  not  less  than 
3,500,000. 

In  Western  countries  the  attention  of  the 
Komintern  is  focused  on  Germany.  This  is 
explained  by  the  peculiar  condition  through 
which  that  country  is  living  at  present.     The 

•  The  Party  works  underground. 

t  This  table  is  taken  from  the  official  publication  of  the  Komintern, 
entitled,  "The  Army  of  the  Communist  Internationale,"  pp.  109, 
110  and  111.     Petrograd,  1921. 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  243 

defeat  of  the  Central  Powers  in  the  Great  War, 
and  the  subsequent  Versailles  Treaty,  have 
made  Germany  the  arena  of  most  complex  in- 
trigues in  which  the  Allies  themselves  take  an 
important  part.  Between  France  and  England, 
the  former  Teuton  Empire  has  indeed  become 
the  apple  of  dissension.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  heavy  financial  burden  imposed  by  the  En- 
tente upon  Germany  leads  her  to  play  a  clever 
game,  alternately  using  the  Red  menace  and  the 
prospect  of  the  restoration  of  a  monarchy  as 
means  of  inducing  France  to  modify  her  repa- 
ration policy.  Realizing  this  situation,  the 
Soviets,  with  the  assistance  of  the  late  Rathe- 
nau,  have  concluded  the  much-talked-of  Rap- 
palo  Treaty,  establishing  close  bonds  of  cama- 
raderie between  Red  Russia  and.  Pink  Ger- 
many. The  German  toreadors  are  waving  this 
document  as  a  red  flag  before  France.  Fur- 
thermore, the  Bolsheviki  are  cognizant  of  the 
fact  that  if  any  European  country  at  all  is  in 
a  position  to  help  them  to  restore  Russia's  in- 
dustries, it  is  Germany,  the  technical  assets 
of  which  have  been  left  intact.  For  all  these 
reasons  the  Komintern  took  special  care  to 
build  up  a  model  revolutionary  apparatus  on 
the  Spree.  Koppelevitch,  alias  Kopp,  the 
"Soviet  Ambassador"  in  Berlin,  is  the  direct- 
ing manager  of  the  revolutionary  movement 
throughout  Germany.  In  his  delicate  task  he  is 
assisted  by  his  Secretary,  Eberstein,  while  all 


244      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

financial  transactions  are  being  conducted 
through  a  Jewish  banking  firm,  Otto  Marque- 
vitch,  of  which  Kopp  himself  is  a  partner. 

The  Communist  organization  center  is  lo- 
cated in  Berlin;  its  more  important  local 
brancEes  are  established  in  Hamburg,  Leipzig, 
Halle  and  Dresden.  Kopp  works  in  intimate 
toucB  with  the  Spartacan  Group.  He  takes  a 
lively  interest  in  the  secret  mobilization  of  the 
German  Red  Army  detachments,  scattered  over 
industrial  districts,  as  well  as  throughout  vil- 
lages, especially  in  the  Ruhr  and  Silesia  Prov- 
inces. The  following  agencies  are  placed  under 
the  supervision  of  Kopp: 

(a)  The  Political  Section. 

(b)  The  Commercial  Department. 

(c)  The  Propaganda  Bureau. 

(d)  The  Soviet  of  Workers  and  German  Red 

Army  Deputies. 

(e)  The  Cheka. 

(f)  The  Espionage  Division. 

Oscar  Kohn  serves  as  a  liaison  officer  between 
the  Kopp  outfit  and  the  German  Spartacan 
Group. 

In  every  country  the  structure  of  the  Com- 
munist Center  is  adapted  to  local  political  and 
social  conditions.  For  instance,  in  Esthonia, 
where  the  government  is  fighting  the  native 
Bolsheviks,  the  Communist  Party  has  a  double 
organization :    First,  the  illegal  or  underground 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  245 

group;  and,  second,  its  parliamentary  delega- 
tion. 

I.  The  underground  group  forms  the  Central 
Committee  of  the  Esthonian  Section  of  the 
Third  Internationale.     It  is  composed  of: 

(a)  The  Central  Executive  Committee. 

(b)  The  Political  Section. 

(e)  The  Information,  or  Espionage  Bureau, 
(d)  The  Propaganda  Department. 

Victor  Kingissepp,  who  was  tried  on  a  charge 
of  high  treason  and  executed  in  the  spring  of 
1922,  was  the  administrative  head  of  the  under- 
ground organization.  Every  one  of  its  branches 
is  entrusted  to  one  "responsible  member"  of 
the  Communist  Party.  Reval  is  its  headquar- 
ters. Aside  from  the  various  sections  which  go 
to  make  up  the  illegal  group,  many  factories 
have  their  own  local  committees  which,  in  turn, 
are  the  nuclei  of  Communist  work  among  the 
Esthonian  laborers.  The  total  membership  of 
these  Factory  Committees,  in  June,  1922,  did 
not  exceed  135;  but  being  closely  united  and 
belonging  to  different  Esthonian  trade  unions, 
they  do  reach  large  workers'  audiences.  Con- 
nected with  the  same  group  is  the  Esthonian 
division  of  the  Y.  M.  C.  I.  (Young  Men's  Com- 
munist Internationale),  which  Association,  in 
April,  1921,  was  dissolved  by  order  of  the 
Esthonian  Government. 

II.   As  to  the  parliamentary  delegation,  it 


246      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

works  in  the  open.  It  uses  the  Esthonian  In- 
dependent Socialist  Party  as  a  cover  organiza- 
tion. In  addition,  the  Communist  members  of 
the  Esthonian  Assembly  maintain  lively  rela- 
tions with  the  Central  Council  of  the  trade 
unions.  This  body  is  being  rapidly  sovietized. 
Although  the  official  membership  of  the  Esthon- 
ian Section  of  the  Komintern  does  not  exceed 
three  thousand,  nevertheless  the  number  of 
Soviet  sympathizers  can  be  roughly  put  at 
twenty  thousand.  All  sums  spent  for  Com- 
munist propaganda  are  supplied  by  Moscow 
through  the  Soviet  representative  in  Esthonia, 
Panchilevitch. 

Similar  are  the  contours  of  the  Soviet 
Agency  in  Sweden,  where  direct  contact  is 
maintained  between  the  Communist  Center  and 
the  Communist  members  of  the  Diet,  headed  by 
Stroem  and  Begarsohn.  The  more  confidential 
documents  of  the  Soviet  delegation  are  kept  in 
the  library  of  the  Left  Wing  Parliamentary 
Group.  It  is  in  Sweden  that  the  Soviet  Tele- 
graphic Agency,  the  **Rosta,"  is  located.* 

The  nature  of  the  instructions  issued  by  the 
Komintern  to  kindred  organizations  abroad  is 
exemplified  by  a  circular  letter  of  Bukharin's 
to  the  Communists  residing  in  the  United 
States.  This  document,  which  reached  these 
shores  early  in  1921,  reads  in  part  as  follows: 

•  Compare  theae  data  with  Efizanof* s  cited  work,  pp.  90,  91  and  92, 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY 

* '  Esteemed  Comrades :  I  wish  to  express  to  you 
a  series  of  considerations  regarding  the  current 
work  in  America.  We  believe  that  since  the  ex- 
pulsion of  all  nationalistic  elements  from  the 
American  Communist  Party,  the  time  is  now  ripe 
for  the  formation  of  a  Communist  Party  in  Amer- 
ica which  will  officially  link  itself  up  with  the 
Communist  Internationale.  We  also  believe  that 
such  a  party  could  consist  of:  (a)  the  former 
Socialist  Propaganda  League  and  those  Left  Ele- 
ments which  were  expelled  from  the  American 
Socialist  Party ;  (b)  Left  Elements  of  the  Socialist 
Labor  Party,  in  which  it  is  necessary  to  bring 
about  a  split,  for,  as  we  are  aware,  one  of  its  sec- 
tions does  not  behave  decently;  (c)  the  I.  W.  W.'s, 
the  passive  attitude  of  whom  towards  political 
matters  has  vanished,  since  they  have  acknowl- 
edged the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  and  the 
Soviet  power.  Should  a  Communist  Party  be 
formed,  it  would  be  reasonable  to  expect  that  it 
would  have  a  representative  of  its  own  at  Moscow. 

"We  Relieve  that  one  of  the  foremost  problems 
at  present  is  the  formation  of  Communist  nuclei 
among  the  soldiers  and  sailors  {military  party  or- 
gamizations) ,  the  duty  of  which  must  he  to  con- 
duct energetic  propaganda  for  the  formation  of 
Soldiers'  and  Sailors'  Soviets,  and  the  reckless 
persecution  of  the  officers. 

"Attempts  to  form  Workers'  Councils  (Soviets 
of  workers)  by  no  means  should  assume  the  form 
of  philanthropic  or  cultural  institutions.  We  are 
very  much  afraid  that  a  danger  of  this  kind  does 
exist  in  America.  Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to 
invariably  emphasize  that  such  Soviets,  before 
they  shall  prove  able  to  seize  the  power,  must  be- 
come fighting  organizations,  aiming  at  the  seizure 


247 


248      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

of  the  power  of  the  State  and  workers'  dictator- 
§hip.     *  *  *  Your  chief  slogans  shall  be: 

(a)  Down  with  the  Senate  and  Congress! 

(b)  Long  live  the  Workers'  Government! 
[(c).  Long  live  the  Government  of  "Workers* 

Soviets ! 
((d)  Down  with  capitalists  and  throw  them 

out  of  their  factories! 
[(e)  Long  live  the  workers'  control  over  the 

factories  and  mills! 
(f)  Down  with  the  profiteers! 

•  ••••••• 

"It  is  necessary  to  pay  special  attention  to  the 
American  Federation  of  Labor.  It  is  necessary  to 
break  it,  working  harmoniously  in  this  direction 
with  the  I.  W.  W.'s  for  the  establishment  of  a 
revolutionary  trade  unions'  movement.  It  is  neo 
essary  to  propagate  to  the  utmost  the  idea  of 
arming  the  workmen.  Demobilized  revolutionary 
soldiers  must  not  give  up  their  rifles.  Our  gen- 
eral  slogan  is: 

**A  WORLD  SOVIET  REPUBLIC!" 

•  ••••••• 

It  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  in 
obedience  to  these  instructions  the  United 
Communist  Party  of  America,  at  its  secret  con- 
vention held  in  February,  1921,  among  other 
resolutions,  adopted  the  following: 

"The  convention  was  dominated  by  an  appre- 
ciation of  the  dawning  industrial  crisis,  the  mass 
lockouts,  and  the  consequent  imperative  need  of 
unifying  all  the  forces  of  Communism  as  directed 
hy  the  Third  Internationale,  at  any  cost  within 
reasonable  security  to  the  revolutionary  movement. 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  249 

•  •  *  The  United  Communist  Party  will  sys- 
tematically and  persistently  familiarize  the  work- 
ing class  with  the  fact  of  the  inevitability  of  the 
armed  conflict  in  the  proletarian  revolution.  The 
United  Communist  Party  must  prepare  the  work- 
ing class  for  arm£d  insurrection  as  the  final  form 
of  mxLss  action,  hy  which  the  workers  shall  con- 
quer the  State." 

A  special  paragrapli  is  devoted  to  the  '^Pene- 
tration of  Military  Units/ ^    It  reads: 

"The  party  must  conduct  a  systematic  propa- 
ganda in  all  military  units,  making  clear  to  them 
the  real  function  of  military  organizations,  in 
order  to  awaken  class  consciousness  amongst  them 
suid  swing  them  over  to  the  side  of  the  proletarian 
revolution.  The  Communist  Party  will  issue  ap- 
peals to  the  soldiers  and  sailors,  which  will  be 
distributed  among  them  and  will  create  Commun- 
ist groups  in  the  army  and  navy,  which  shall  be 
closely  connected,  in  order  to  establish  a  unified 
revolutionary  body  within  the  armed  forces  of  the 
State."* 

No  matter  what  Soviet  representatives  at 
European  conferences  say,  the  Komintern, 
which  is  the  superstructure  of  Marxism,  acts 
in  a  way  that  leaves  no  doubt  as  to  the  nature 
of  its  work  and  final  goal.  It  is  not  in  Genoa 
and  The  Hague  that  the  Soviet  policy  is  being 
framed.  Tchicherin  and  Finkelstein  themselves 
have  to  obey  the  orders  of  their  superiors  who 

*  See  issue  No.  13  of  the  underground  publication  of  the  United 
Communist  Party  of  America,  The  Commv/nist,  for  1921. 


250      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

sit  in  permanent  council  at  Red  Moscow.  The 
momentous  tactical  retreat  of  Communism  be- 
fore capitalistic  countries  of  tlie  world  is 
nothing  but  a  clever  manoeuvre  calculated  to 
draw  them  more  securely  into  the  revolution- 
ary whirlpool. 

Three  basic  features  have  been  observed  by 
the  managers  of  the  Komintern:  First,  the 
utter  fiasco  of  their  economic  policies  in  Rus- 
sia, which  tends  to  increase  the  difficulties  of 
the  Soviets  in  the  way  of  fostering  the  scheme 
of  world  revolution.  On  account  of  Russia's 
domestic  bankruptcy,  it  has  become  next  to  im- 
possible to  make  large  appropriations  to  the 
international  revolutionary  fund.*  The  authori- 

*  The  first  appropriation  by  the  Soviets  for  international  propa- 
ganda purposes  was  made  on  December  13,  1917,  when  the  following 
decree  was  issued: 

"Taking  into  consideration  that  Soviet  authority  stands 
on  the  ground  of  the  principles  of  international  solidarity 
of  the  proletariat  and  the  brotherhood  of  the  toilers  of  all 
countries,  that  the  struggle  against  war  and  imperialism,  only 
if  conducted  on  an  international  scale,  can  lead  to  complete 
victory,  the  Soviet  of  People's  Commissars  deems  it  neces- 
sary to  come  forth  with  all  aid,  including  financial  aid,  to 
the  assistance  of  the  Left  International  Wing  of  the  labor 
movement  in  all  countries,  quite  regardless  of  whether  these 
countries  are  at  war  with  Russia,  or  in  alliance  with  her, 
or  whether  they  retain  neutrality.  In  view  of  these  con- 
eiderations,  the  Soviet  of  People's  Commissars  ordains:  the 
appropriation  of  two  million  rubles  for  the  needs  of  the 
revolutionary  internationalist  movement  to  be  placed  at  the 
disposition  of  foreign  representatives  of  the  Commissariat 
for  Foreign  Affairs.  President  of  the  Soviet  of  People's 
Commissars — Oulianoff  (Lenin),  People's  Commissar  for 
Foreign  Affairs — L.  Trotzky  *  *  *. 

See  Gazette  of  the  Temporary  Workers'  and  Peasants' 
Government,  issue  No.  31,  1917. 


SOVIET  FOREIGN   POLICY  251 

ties  at  Moscow  are  daily  being  urged  by  their 
foreign  representatives  not  to  delay  shipments 
of  gold  lest  the  entire  preparatory  work  abroad 
be  wrecked.  But  gold  is  no  longer  available  in 
the  Soviet  treasury.  Cash  from  the  outside  is 
the  one  thing  which  can  solve  the  problem.  For 
this  reason,  the  Komintern  so  readily  speaks  of 
concessions  and  overtures  to  international  capi- 
talism. 

Second,  much  to  the  regret  of  the  Komintern, 
revolutionary  fermentation  assumed  a  much 
slower  tempo  than  was  originally  anticipated. 
In  many  countries  the  Communist  program  not 
merely  failed  to  solidify  the  forces  of  social  re- 
action, the  radicals  of  all  denominations.  Social- 
democrats,  and  anarchists,  but  also  it  gave  birth 
to  dissension  within  these  groups  themselves. 
In  Germany,  France  and  Italy,  several  social- 
istic factions  refused  to  submit  to  Lenin's 
*' terms  of  admittance.''  The  split  caused 
thereby  in  the  Marxian  camp  created  much 
bitter  comment  on  both  sides.  Trotzky  accused 
Kautsky  of  pro-bourgeois  leanings;  Kautsky 
swore  in  the  name  of  Marx  that  he  was  the  sole 
and  duly  authorized  commentator  of  the  ''Com- 
munist Manifesto"  and  the  ''Capital";  the 
yellow,  or  Amsterdam  Internationale,  was  ex- 
communicated by  the  Red  Internationale; 
French  labor  leaders  of  Frossar's  type  pro- 
tested against  "the  United  Communist  Front," 
as  prescribed  by  the  Moscow  "comrades,"  as- 


252      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

serting  that  such  a  drastic  measure  would  ruin 
the  French  Communist  Party.  In  other  words, 
the  arrogant  behavior  of  the  Komintern  pro- 
duced a  regular  storm  in  the  Socialist  teapot. 
Owing  to  this  fact,  many  organization  plans 
adopted  by  the  Executive  Committee  of  the 
Third  Internationale  were  postponed  or  even 
given  up.  Accordingly,  the  general  scheme  for 
the  world  revolutionary  offensive  had  also  to 
be  delayed. 

Last  but  not  least,  the  Red  leaders  are  laying 
great  emphasis  upon  the  economic  disorganiza- 
tion prevailing  in  Europe.  They  plan  to  use  it 
as  an  asset  for  their  infernal  aims.  They  be- 
lieve that  Europe,  having  been  thoroughly 
Balkanized  as  a  result  of  the  Versailles  Treaty, 
will  never  be  able  to  regain  its  internal  equi- 
librium. Endless  friction  between  Western 
Nations  will  eventually — so  they  hope — bring 
about  a  state  of  chaos,  in  the  midst  of  which 
existing  governments  will  totter,  and  in  lieu  of 
these,  So^det  Republics  will  be  easily  set  up. 

Lozovsky,  one  of  the  originators  of  the  Red 
Trade  Unions  Internationale  (''The  Profin- 
tern"),  analyzing  this  prospect,  expressed  the 
following  view: 

"We  are  witnessing  a  conflict  between  Japan 
and  America,  which  is  still  brewing.  The  Wash- 
ington Conference  in  no  way  has  settled  it;  for 
while  Japan  is  allowed  to  build  only  sixty  per 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  253 

cent,  of  the  warships  which  will  actually  be  built 
by  America,  still  Japan  will  build  just  as  many 
ships  as  she  possibly  can,  since  the  question  of 
Siberia  and  China  is  involved.  On  the  other  hand, 
these  countries  are  designed  to  serve  as  elements 
for  the  restoration  of  capitalistic  peace.  Further- 
more, between  France  and  England,  we  see  a 
sharp  struggle  which  is  daily  becoming  more 
acute ;  this  because  France  exercises  control  over 
Poland,  Roumania,  Jugo-Slavia,  and  Czecho-Slo- 
vakia,  and  thus  is  maintaining  at  present  hege- 
mony on  the  Continent.  She  expands  her  influ- 
ence also  to  Turkey,  which  brings  her  interests  into 
conflict  with  those  of  England.  It  is  therefore 
profitable  for  England  to  partly  uplift  Germany 
so  as  to  enable  her  to  oppose  France  and  neutral- 
ize her  onslaught  upon  England,  which,  after 
Germany,  is  the  strongest  'hereditary  enemy'  of 
the  French  Fatherland.  *  *  *  The  political  and 
economic  controversy  regarding  Upper  Silesia 
now  begins  to  develop,  confusing  the  whole  situa- 
tion, which,  of  course,  does  not  help  to  restore  the 
equilibrium.  Likewise,  friction  between  Jugo- 
slavia and  Italy,  between  Turkey  and  Greece,  are 
far  from  being  conducive  to  the  restoration  of 
peace  in  the  Balkans.  The  same  is  true  about  the 
decomposition  of  the  world  power  of  the  British 
Empire.  Within  its  own  boundaries  we  are  watch- 
ing a  strong  revolutionary  and  nationalistic  move- 
ment (India,  Egypt,  etc.),  which  is  tearing  this 
world  empire  apart.  The  biggest  British  Colonies, 
such  as  Canada,  India,  Australia,  etc.,  are  begin- 
ning to  raise  custom  barriers  against  their  Met- 
ropole."* 


254      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

The  Komintern  keeps  a  vigilant  eye  upon 
this  phase  of  world  politics.  Soviet  papers  are 
persistently  publishing  articles  in  which  the 
international  situation  is  pictured  in  the  dark- 
est colors.  One  quotation  will  be  sufficient  to 
give  a  general  idea  of  the  tenor  predominating 
in  the  Bolshevist  press. 

"There  is  no  hope.  Different  kinds  of  oppor- 
tunists tricks  lead  to  nothing.  Our  class  enemies 
dig  their  own  graves,  while  Poincare,  the  most 
blunt  and  blind  among  the  counter-revolutionists, 
feels  happy  that  he  was  able  to  destroy  the  last 
straw  to  which  drowning  capitalism  was  clinging. 
Again  he  looks  to  impoverished  and  humiliated 
Germany  in  order  to  take  out  of  her  empty  pocket 
those  billions  which  he  lacks.  The  international 
situation  at  no  time  in  the  past  was  so  hopeless  and 
dark."t 

These  three  factors:  The  economic  collapse 
of  Russia,  the  unexpected  delays  in  the  process 
of  world  revolution,  and  the  complex  inter- 
national conjuncture,  have  forced  the  Komin- 
tern to  revise  its  original  foreign  policy.  A 
temporary  truce  with  capitalistic  countries  has 
been  announced.     The   Soviets  have   accepted 

*  See  Lozovsky  's  ' '  The  World  Offensive  of  Capital  and  the  United 
Proletarian  Front,"  pp.  34  and  35,  Moscow,  1922.  Published  by  *'The 
Profintern."    Tramslated  from  the  Eussian. 

fSee  Izvestia  of  the  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee, 
June  3,  1922,  article  by  Rappoport.     Translation  from  the  Eussian. 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  255 

Nietzsche's  motto:  ^'Promote  peace  as  a  means 
for  waging  new  wars/*  Yet  their  principles 
remain  the  same,  their  cardinal  policies  un- 
changed, their  aims  unaltered,  their  malicious 
hopes  unshattered.  Behind  the  screen  of  propa- 
ganda, disguised  under  the  cloak  of  lies  dis- 
seminated everywhere,  protected  by  the  dull 
indifference  of  their  opponents,  posing  as 
friends  of  the  toiling  masses,  the  Soviets  con- 
tinue their  diabolical  work  unmolested. 

Astonishing  ignorance  and  corruption  drive 
European  politicians  from  one  blunder  to  an- 
other in  their  dealings  with  the  Soviet  regime. 
On  this  point  the  Bolsheviki  are  right :  Western 
Nations,  in  their  strife  for  economic  recovery, 
are  playing  with  powder;  they  lose  one  strong- 
hold after  another.  There  is  a  symbolic  signi- 
ficance in  the  fact  that  a  Lloyd  George  finds  it 
pleasant  to  sit  at  the  same  table  in  company 
with  habitual  criminals.*  It  is  a  sinister  thing 
when  a  King  of  Italy  is  not  ashamed  to  shake 
the  bloody  hand  of  a  Tchicherin.     This  signi- 


*  Most  of  the  present  rulers  of  Eussia  have  served  prison  terms, 
and  not  for  so-called  political  crimes.  Some  of  them  were  sentenced 
by  Eussian  Courts  for  grand  larceny,  raping  and  murder  in  the  first 
degree.  According  to  information  given  by  A.  Eezanof  in  his  valu- 
able book,  "La  Trois^me  Internationale  Communiste,"  prepared  for 
the  members  of  the  Genoa  Conference,  Finkelstein,  alias  "Meer- 
Henoch-Movchev  Vallach"  (Litvinoff),  is  known  to  have  participated 
in  the  robbery  of  the  Post  Office  at  Tiflis  on  June  13,  1906.  He 
escaped  to  Paris,  where,  during  a  search,  the  stolen  goods  were  found. 
He  is  head  of  Bolshevist  propaganda  abroad.  Formerly  he  was  regis- 
tered as  a  German  spy  by  the  Allied  Intelligence  Service,  p.  48, 
Paris,  1922." 


256      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

fies  the  universal  lowering  of  moral  standards 
and  ideals.  In  this  atmosphere  of  decadence, 
people  begin  to  cling  to  the  egotistic  formula: 
''Apres  moi  le  deluge.' '  Nothing  is  stable, 
notliing  is  sacred.  Traditions  are  broken, 
everything  ridiculed,  everything  polluted. 

Sobelsohn  (Radek)  put  the  historical  con- 
troversy between  Bolshevism  and  anti-Bolshe- 
vism in  these  forcible  terms: 

"The  Russian  peasants  and  workmen,"  he  said, 
''are  fully  aware  that  they  will  either  be  beaten 
or  else  international  capitalism  will  be  destroyed; 
they  know  that  it  is  impossible  for  Soviet  Russia 
to  exist  side  by  side  with  capitalist  countries. 
Russian  peasants  and  workmen  are  also  awakened 
to  the  fact  that  if  they  do  not  crush  English  capi- 
talists, if  they  will  not  thrash  French  capitalists, 
the  latter  will  crush  them.  The  Russian  workmen 
may  seek  to  make  temporary  peace,  or  rather  a 
truce,  with  them,  during  which  the  revolution  will 
grow  stronger  in  other  countries ;  but  no  peace  can 
exist  between  the  Workers'  State  and  the  coun- 
tries of  exploitation."* 

It  is  remarkable,  however,  that  the  leading 
European  politicians  refuse  to  recognize  this 
elementary  truth.  Like  ostriches,  they  try  to 
hide  from  the  enemy  by  merely  sticking  their 
heads  in  the  sand.  They  consciously  ignore 
volumes  of  Soviet  propaganda  in  which  the  plot 

*  See  Sobelsohn 's  speech  at  the  Conference  of  Eastern  Peoples  at 
Baku.  Stenographic  report  of  the  proceedings,  quoted  from  Efizanof  '3 
work,  p.  127. 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  257 

against  civilization  is  frankly  revealed.  France, 
which  has  every  reason  to  dread  Red  Germany, 
and  which  still  to  a  large  extent  exercises  con- 
trol over  domestic  matters  across  the  Rhine,  al- 
lows Kopp  to  openly  conspire  against  the  wel- 
fare of  the  French  people.  England,  whose  in- 
terests in  Asia  are  vital,  and  which  has  ample 
ground  to  doubt  the  safety  of  her  Eastern  Do- 
minions, helplessly  throws  down  her  hands 
when  it  comes  to  coping  with  the  Bolshevist 
plague  and  its  germ-carriers  on  the  Ganges.  In 
full  knowledge  of  all  circumstances  accompany- 
ing the  destructive  work  of  the  Soviets  in  Asia, 
England  tries  to  buy  off  an  enemy  that  has  nei- 
ther honor  nor  mercy.  The  Anglo-Soviet  Treaty 
of  1921  did  not,  of  course,  arrest  the  scheme  of 
the  Red  East.  Under  the  eyes  of  Western  Na- 
tions, in  the  bright  daylight,  a  second  gigantic 
theft  is  taking  place:  First,  Russia  was  stolen 
from  the  world ;  at  present  the  Communists  in- 
tend to  snatch  the  entire  Asiatic  Continent. 
Their  language  is  plain.  In  their  ^^  Appeal  to 
the  Peoples  of  the  East,"  they  state»- 

"The  peoples  of  the  East  have  long  dwelled  in 
the  darkness  of  ignorance,  under  the  yoke  of  des- 
potism of  their  tyrannic  rulers,  under  the  oppres- 
sion of  alien  capitalistic  conquerors.  But  the 
rumble  of  the  world  butchery,  the  thunder  of  the 
Russian  workers'  revolution  which  tore  down  from 
the  Eastern  Russian  people  the  historical  chains 
of  capitalistic  serfdom,  awoke  them,  and  now, 


258      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

having  awakened  from  their  century-long  dream, 
they  commence  to  rise.  They  are  awakening  and 
they  begin  to  hear  the  apjpeal  to  the  sacred  war, 
to  the  '  Grazavata. '  This  is  our  appeal :  The  ap- 
peal of  the  first  convention  of  the  representatives 
of  the  Eastern  peoples  who,  under  the  banner 
of  the  Communist  Internationale,  have  allied 
themselves  with  the  revolutionary  proletar- 
iat of  the  west.  It  is  we,  the  representatives 
of  the  toiling  masses  of  all  eastern  peoples — India, 
Turkey,  Persia,  Egypt,  Afghanistan,  Baluchistan, 
Kashgar,  China,  Indo-China,  Japan,  Korea, 
Georgia,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Daghestan,  North- 
em  Caucasus,  Arabia,  Mesopotamia,  Syria,  Pal- 
estine, Khiva,  Bokhara,  Turkestan,  Fergan,  Tar- 
taria,  Bashkiria,  Kirghisia,  and  others — ^united  in 
an  unbreakable  alliance  with  the  revolutionary 
workers  of  the  west,  it  is  we,  who  urge  our  peoples 
to  start  the  sacred  war.  We  say:  'Peoples  of  the 
East;  many  times  have  you  heard  appeals  from 
your  governments  for  the  sacred  war,  and  indeed,  * 
you  did  wage  such  wars  under  the  green  banner 
of  the  Prophet;  but  all  these  sacred  wars  were 
nothing  but  deceit  and  lies  for  they  served  the  in- 
terests of  your  greedy  rulers,  while  you,  peasants 
and  workers,  after  the  struggle  was  over,  remained 
in  the  same  state  of  misery  and  serfdom.  You 
secured  all  the  blessings  of  the  world  for  others, 
but  you  never  profited  yourselves.  Now,  we  issue 
to  you  the  first  call  for  a  real  sacred  war  under 
the  Red  banner  of  the  Communist  Internationale. ' 
*  *  *  Long  live  the  union  of  all  workers  and 
peasants  of  the  east  and  west,  a  union  of  all  toil- 
ers, of  all  oppressed  and  exploited !  Long  live  the 
military  staff  of  this  union,  the  Communist  In- 
ternationale.   Let  the  flame  of  the  sacred  war  of 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  259 

all  eastern  peoples  and  the  toiling  masses  of  the 
world  against  imperialistic  England  never  be  ex- 
tinguished!  "* 

The  Bolsheviki  invariably  emphasize  that 
Communism  cannot  be  introduced  in  Eastern 
countries.  They  are  familiar  with  economics 
in  Asia,  and  they  know  that  no  capitalism  is 
there,  at  least  not  in  the  sense  in  which  this 
term  was  used  by  Marx. 

Saf aroff,  the  leading  Soviet  expert  on  Eastern 
matters,  is  quite  outspoken  on  this  point.  He 
says: 

"The  East  is  a  living  history.  There,  in  some 
localities,  the  relics  of  patrimonial  Communism 
and  of  the  patriarchal  household  are  still  alive; 
there,  feudal  and  patriarchal  relations  are  as  yet 
in  force.  The  religion  of  the  East  is  a  social  and 
political  religion.  It  sanctions  the  existing  civil 
order  and  family  life.  It  is  religion  that  forms 
the  basis  of  social  inequality.  *  *  *  Many  Eastern 
tribes  have  not  yet  finally  settled  as  agriculturists 
(the  Kirghiz,  Turkoman,  Arabs,  tribes  of  North- 
em  India,  Kurds,  etc.) ;  nevertheless,  in  their 
midst  the  odds  and  ends  of  patrimonial  Commun- 
ism long  ago  became  the  source  of  exploitation  of 
the  destitute  majority  by  the  wealthy  patrimonial 
chieftains,  "t 

*  See  The  Communist  Internationale,  No.  15,  pp.  3148-3150,  Pet- 
rograd,  December,  1920. 

t  See  Saf aroff  's  article,  ' '  The  East  and  the  Eevolution, ' '  published 
in  No.  15  of  The  Comnvunist  Internationale,  pp.  3137  and  3138. 


26o      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

Another  author,  referring  more  specifically 
to  Persia,  makes  this  remark: 

"Persia  is  neither  a  state  nor  a  nation.  She  is 
a  peculiar  conglomeration  of  feudal  anarchy  and 
a  centralized  fiscal  system,  a  wavering  assimila- 
tion of  nomadic  tribes  and  agriculturists,  weakly 
linked  to  their  lands,  a  monarchical  federation; 
or,  to  be  more  precise,  a  Shah  herd  of  various 
tribes."* 

The  Red  rulers  of  Moscow,  who  are  so  par- 
ticular about  matters  concerning  the  Marxian 
program,  and  who  have  been  fighting  for  the 
** purity"  of  the  Communist  dogma,  suddenly 
become  quite  apathetic  when  their  doctrine  is 
propagated  amongst  the  Eastern  peoples.  They 
know  that  conceptions  of  Socialism  are  en- 
tirely alien  to  the  mind  of  a  Buddhist  or  a 
Brahmanist.  In  fact,  when  BarantuUa,  a  Hin- 
doo  professor,  arrived  in  Moscow  at  the  head 
of  the  Afghan  Mission,  he  hastened  to  explain : 

"I  am  neither  a  Communist  nor  a  Socialist,  but 
my  political  program  involves  the  expulsion  of  the 
British  from  Asia.  I  am  an  implacable  foe  of 
the  European  capitalization  of  Asia,  the  principal 
representatives  of  which  are  the  British.  In  this 
I  approximate  to  the  Communists,  and  in  this 
respect  we  are  natural  comrades.  The  ideas  of 
the  Bolsheviks,  whom  we  call  the  'Intrakion'  have 
already  been  absorbed  by  the  masses  of  India,  and 

•  Compare  with  V.  Berar  's  ' '  Persia  and  the  Persian  Upheaval  of 
1912,"  p.  10.     Translation  from  the  Bussian. 


SOVIET  FOREIGN   POLICY  261 

a  small  spark  of  active  propaganda  is  enough  to 
set  all  Central  Asia  ablaze  with  revolution. '  '* 

The  economic  situation  in  Asia  is  everywhere 
the  same:  The  cultural  backwardness  of  Asi- 
atic tribes  and  nations,  the  absence  of  industrial 
development,  the  theocratic  foundation  of  East- 
ern States,  stand  in  diametrical  contradiction 
to  the  theory  of  Communism;  and  yet  every- 
where Communist  propaganda  is  rapidly  gain- 
ing way  among  the  Asiatic  masses.  It  is  true 
that  tremendous  sums  were  spent  by  the  Soviets 
for  revolutionary  agitation  in  the  East.  Ac- 
cording to  a  confidential  report  of  the  Cheka, 
dated  July  25,  1921,  out  of  16,200  poods  of  gold 
requisitioned  by  the  Bolsheviki  during  the  first 
six  months  of  that  year,  the  major  part  was  ex- 
pended for  revolutionary  purposes  in  India. 

When  Urin,  alias  Dzevaltvosky,  proceeded 
to  China  in  the  role  of  Soviet  Ambassador,  he 
carried  in  his  luggage  a  bag  containing  3  poods 
and  22  pounds  of  gems  and  precious  stones, 
which  were  later  exchanged  for  Chinese  dol- 
lars and  spent  for  propaganda. 

The  Bolshevist  scheme  of  the  Red  East  is  an 
adroit  plan  in  which  even  minor  details  of  the 
work  have  been  discussed  at  length  and  scrupu- 
lously weighed.  Its  general  outline,  however, 
is  based  upon  the  plain  fact  of  the  discontent 
among  the  masses  inhabitating  the  Asiatic  Con- 

*  Compare  Isvestia,  May  6,  1922. 


262      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

tinent.  This  is  the  great  premise  from  which 
the  deduction  is  drawn  that  subconscious  fer- 
mentation among  the  Eastern  peoples  must  be 
used  ad  majorem  Marxi  gloriam.  To  this  end, 
all  means  are  acceptable,  all  methods  should  be 
tried,  all  destructive  forces  set  in  motion. 

When  laying  out  their  strategic  plans,  the 
Bolsheviki  took  into  consideration  that  Asia  is 
a  land  where  all  varieties  of  climate  are  found, 
where  every  tribe  has  peculiar  customs  of  its 
own,  religious  traditions  unknown  to  other 
ethnographic  groups.  Accordingly,  propaganda 
and  organization  methods  employed  in  Eastern 
countries  had  to  be  adapted  to  the  individual 
character  of  the  people  with  whom  Soviet  agi- 
tators came  into  contact. 

A  special  institution  was  established  in  Mos- 
cow for  the  study  of  the  different  dialects 
spoken  by  Asiatic  tribes,  and  their  exotic  habits. 
The  whole  map  of  Asia  was  divided  into 
sections  and  zones  and  assigned  to  Soviet  agents 
who  are  considered  experts  on  the  Eastern 
problem.  They  are  given  authority  to  form  on 
their  own  initiative  such  agencies  as  are  re- 
quired for  the  success  of  the  Communist  offen- 
sive. As  a  typical  example  of  Soviet  *' achieve- 
ments" in  that  line,  the  Far  Eastern  Commun- 
ist organization  may  be  mentioned.  Chita,  the 
capital  of  the  Transbaikal  region,*  was  made 

*  The  Soviets  have  carved  out  of  this  region  a  camouflage  buffer 
state  known  as  the  "Far  Eastern  Kepublic." 


30VIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  263 

the  general  headquarters  for  the  Eastern  Asi- 
atic zone,  comprising  China,  Japan,  Korea  and 
Eastern  Siberia.  China  is  subdivided  into  four 
belts,  with  Peking,  Tien-Tsin,  Canton  and 
Shanghai,  serving  as  communicating  centers. 
Each  of  them  has  business  ramifications  of  its 
own,  subordinate  to  the  local  Soviet  chiefs. 
Thus,  the  Shanghai  organization,  which  prob- 
ably is  the  strongest  among  the  Chinese  groups, 
works  through  the  following  subsidiaries: 

(a)  The  Chinese  Labor  Party,  Gun-Dan-Koui, 
which  disposes  of  considerable  funds.  Its 
members  are  conducting  propaganda  mainly 
among  the  army  units.  It  also  is  engaged  in 
buying  munitions  and  supplies  for  rebel  sol- 
diers. This  party  publishes  in  Shanghai  two 
newspapers  and  one  underground  organ, 
Jan-Bao. 

(b)  The  Chinese  Students'  Federation. 

(c)  The  Chinese  Labor  Union. 

(d)  The  Korean  National   Organization. 

(e)  The  Zionist  Group. 

(f)  The  Esperanto  Club.  i 

(g)  A  Special  Committee  which  prints  The  Shang- 
hai Life. 

Propaganda,  purchase  of  munitions,  and 
espionage,  are  the  three  main  lines  of  work  in 
which  the  Shanghai  Communist  Center  is  en- 
gaged. 

Many  obstacles  had  to  be  overcome  by  the 
Soviets  before  they  were  able  to  solve,  at  least 
in  part,  their  revolutionary  task.    First  of  all, 


264      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

traveling  through  the  steppes,  deserts  and 
mountain  passes  in  Asia  is  a  hazardous  under- 
taking which  cannot  be  attempted  without  ex- 
perienced guides  from  among  the  natives. 
There  also  comes  the  question  of  dialects. 
Oftentimes  two  tribes  which  have  lived  side  by 
side  for  many  years  do  not  understand  each 
other  due  to  the  differences  in  their  speech. 
Therefore,  a  special  staff  of  interpreters  or 
dragomans  was  necessary  to  enable  the  Moscow 
agitators  to  carry  on  their  work.  The  princi- 
pal difficulty,  however,  with  which  the  Bol- 
sheviki  still  have  to  contend  is  what  they  call 
the  ^'religious  prejudices"  of  the  Orientals.  In 
Asiatic  countries  straightforward  attacks 
against  religious  faith  are  liable  to  produce  re- 
sults entirely  opposite  to  those  intended.  Re- 
spect for  the  clergy  there  has  always  been  an 
inherent  duty,  an  integral  part  of  the  habitual 
mode  of  life.  The  Koran  for  the  Mohammedans, 
like  the  Talmud  for  the  Hebrews,  is  not  merely 
a  Book  of  Prayer ;  it  is  a  code  of  laws  and  regu- 
lations which  govern  their  daily  conduct.  In 
the  light  of  these  considerations,  the  Bolsheviki 
themselves  were  compelled  to  modify  their 
standard  methods  of  propaganda.  The  Soviet 
** instructions"  to  the  Red  East  agents  contain 
this  interesting  paragraph: 

"Religious  prejudices  are  far  stronger  among 
the  Mohammedan  peoples  than  among  Russian 
and  other  European  peasantry  and  proletariat. 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  265 

*  *  *  Because  of  this  fact,  great  care  must  be 
exercised  in  combating  religious  prejudices.  These 
should  not  be  fought  by  open  repudiation  but  by 
means  of  gradually  undermining  the  same  by  pro- 
paganda .  .  .  especially  by  emphasizing  the  class 
character  of  the  institutions  controlled  by  the  Mo- 
hammedan clergy  and  their  greedy  attitude  toward 
the  needy  classes  of  the  population."* 

Following  this  recipe,  the  Bolsheviki,  when 
acting  on  Asiatic  soil,  refrain  from  insulting 
the  native  clergy.  They  tame  their  arrogance 
with  cunning,  they  appeal  to  the  lowest  instincts 
of  human  nature.  Wherever  they  find  a  solid 
trunk  of  faith,  they  plant  the  seed  of  doubt; 
they  work  like  worms,  and  little  by  little,  step 
by  step,  they  shake  loose  the  rock  stability  of 
eternal  tradition. 

But  Oriental  psychology  is  impregnated  not 
only  with  religious  principles,  but  also  with 
deeply  rooted  conceptions  of  nationalism,  which 
have  for  their  source  the  economic  seclusion  of 
Eastern  tribes.  The  Soviets  quickly  grasped 
that  Eastern  nationalism  could  not  be  defeated 
by  Marxian  internationalism.  On  the  other 
hand,  however,  they  found  that  nationalistic 
agitation,  inasmuch  as  its  nature  was  rebellious, 
could  be  effectively  used  for  furthering  the 
Coromunist  program.  Consequently,  Soviet 
agents  were  instructed  to  render  their  support 

♦For  further  details  relating  to  these  "instructions"  see  Brasol's 
"The  World  at  the  Crossroads,"  p.  316. 


266      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

to  such  movements  as  Gandhism  in  India,  Poale- 
Zionism  in  Palestine,  and  Kemalism  in  Ana- 
tolia. Similarly,  the  Korean  movement,  which 
is  purely  nationalistic  in  its  aims,  is  being 
backed  by  the  Komintern. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  manoeuvering  of 
this  kind  digresses  a  long  way  from  the  Com- 
munist dogma  as  outlined  by  Marx  and  pro- 
fessed by  modern  augurs  of  Socialism.  But 
with  the  Communists,  it  is  always  so:  the  end 
justifies  the  means.  Anything  is  good  so  long 
as  it  leads  to  a  *' Soviet  Republic." 

The  economic  policy  to  be  pursued  in  the 
Red  East  was  thus  defined  by  Safaroff : 

"An  alliance  of  the  peasants'  Soviet  Republics 
of  the  East  with  the  Socialist  Soviet  Republics  of 
the  West,  such  is  the  path  of  Communism  for  the 
seizure  of  world  economics.  *  *  *  It  is  by  this 
method  only  that  it  will  become  possible  to  put  an 
end  to  the  colonial  dependence  of  the  Eastern 
peoples  upon  European  and  American  banks, 
trusts  and  syndicates."* 

There  is  no  chance  for  Communism  to  tri- 
umph in  Asia.  Yet  under  the  pressure  of 
Soviet  teaching,  the  East  is  being  rapidly  revo- 
lutionized. Race  is  being  thrown  against  race, 
creed  against  creed.  No  Communists  are  there 
among  the  iTastern  nomadic  tribes,  but  duped 
millions  are  looking  forward  to  the  bleeding 

•See  Safaroff's  article  previouily  quoted. 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  267 

Heart  of  Russia.  The  exact  number  of  such 
unconscious  supporters  is  unknown.  At  the 
time  of  the  Washington  Conference,  however, 
experts  on  the  Oriental  situation  made  the  fol- 
lowing rough  estimate: 

China:  Soviet  sympathizers,  most  of 
whom  are  armed   1,000,000 

Afghanistan:     Native  Red  troops....  80,000 

Persia :     Native  Red  troops 35,000 

India:  Natives  in  sympathy  with  the 
Intrakion  movement  and  followers 
of  Gandhi   800,000 

Mongolia:  Native  Soviet  supporters, 
all  of  whom  are  armed 43,000 

Total 1,958,000 

For  the  Komintern,  the  great  task  is  to  set 
Asia  on  fire,  to  unite  all  rebel  elements  into 
one  force,  to  combine  the  Red  danger  with  the 
Yellow,  strengthening  the  tension  until  finally 
the  colossal  discharge  of  revolutionary  energy 
takes  on  the  form  of  a  new  invasion  of  Europe. 
Then  the  epoch  of  Attila  will  be  revived. 

Innumerable  leaflets  and  pamphlets  have  been 
distributed  among  Asiatic  peoples,  picturing 
Red  Moscow  as  the  Mecca  of  the  East,  and 
Lenin  as  the  Mohammed  of  the  Twentieth  Cen- 
tury. On  the  highways  to  Tibet  and  India, 
from  the  Red  Sea  to  the  Pacific,  from  Punjab 
to  the  Arctic  Ocean,  Soviet  agitators  and  spies 
are  sneaking  and  whispering  into  the  ears  of 


268      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

the  natives  deceitful  stories  about  the  heroic 
deeds  of  Red  Russia  and  her  altruistic  struggle 
for  the  good  of  the  exploited  and  oppressed.  At 
times,  to  make  their  tales  more  enticing,  Ori- 
ental legends  are  woven  in. 

A  folklore  lives  among  the  Eastern  peoples: 
It  tells  that  in  days  gone  by,  when  the  invading 
clans  of  Chingishan  were  sweeping  westward 
over  the  plains  of  Asia,  they  encountered  the 
Sopoti,  a  small  and  peaceful  Mongol  tribe 
which  lived  on  the  mountain  slopes  in  Northern 
China.  Their  religion  forbade  the  shedding  of 
human  blood  and  they  refused  to  join  the  hordes 
of  the  stem  ruler.  Chingishan  without  delay 
dispatched  a  special  detachment  to  capture  the 
Sopot  Khans.  But  the  Great  Khutukhta,  the 
Sopot  King,  together  with  his  tribesmen,  fled 
across  the  mountains.  Suddenly,  however,  a 
wide  and  deep  river  barred  Khutukhta  in  his 
flight.  Imminent  was  the  danger  for  the  pur- 
suing soldiers  of  Chingishan  were  near.  Khu- 
tukhta then  fell  upon  his  knees,  praying  Heaven 
to  save  him  and  his  good  people.  These  prayers 
were  heard  by  Lama,  and  on  the  river  bank  a 
cavern  was  discovered  through  which  the  whole 
tribe,  headed  by  their  sovereign,  escaped  to 
the  Subterranean  Kingdom,  the  realm  of  eternal 
peace  and  justice,  where — it  is  said — the  Great 
Khutukhta  still  rules  over  his  happy  subjects. 
Such  is  the  legend. 

In  our  time,  the  Lamaites  believe  that  as  a 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  269 

reward  for  pious  life,  when  death  comes,  they 
will  be  led  to  the  domain  of  restful  shadows, 
where  Great  Khutukhta  reigns. 

Combining  this  folklore  with  propaganda, 
the  Bolsheviki  are  spreading  rumors  that 
Lenin  has  found  the  way  to  the  Subterranean 
Kingdom,  and  that  he  saw  the  Great  Khutukhta, 
who  told  him  to  convey  a  message  to  the  Lama- 
ites,  advising  them  that  their  hopes  will  be 
fulfilled  as  soon  as  they  embrace  the  Com- 
munistic doctrine.  Thus,  in  the  humble  mind 
of  the  Mongolian  herdsman,  Lenin's  name  be- 
comes connected  with  thoughts  and  hopes  that 
are  held  sacred  to  his  heart. 

From  mouth  to  mouth,  from  tribe  to  tribe, 
insidious  propaganda  is  spreading  like  fire  on 
a  prairie. 

It  is  the  Red  dawn  of  the  East. 


Is  anything  being  done  to  arrest  the  grow- 
ing danger? — 

Now  and  then  warnings  are  being  served 
upon  those  who  in  their  hands  hold  the  fate  of 
Christian  civilization. 

But  these  distracted  voices  seem  to  be  lost  in 
the  wilderness  of  invincible  apathy. 

Here  and  there  people  temporarily  pull  to- 
gether in  an  endeavor  to  stem  the  tide  of  hatred 
and  destruction,  surging  from  Red  Moscow. 
Yet  how  weak  are  these  sporadic  efforts. 

The  principal  fact  remains  unnoticed,  that 


270      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

peace  on  earth  will  never  be  achieved  so  long  as 
a  great  nation  is  left  in  the  mad  clutches  of  its 
present  rulers.  In  vain  are  the  attempts  to 
untie  the  Gordian  knot  of  Bolshevism  by 
conferences  with  those  whose  hands  are  be- 
smirched with  the  blood  of  the  Russian  peo- 
ple. Idle  is  the  hope  to  tame  the  beast  by 
feeding  him  with  human  flesh.  Bolshevism  can- 
not be  conquered  by  flirting  with  Trotzky  in 
the  backyard  of  European  politics. 

Moral  courage  is  the  one  great  thing  which 
is  imperative  at  this  solemn  hour  of  history. 
Had  every  European  premier  emulated  the 
wise  example  of  Mr.  Hughes,  Sovietism  long 
ago  would  have  collapsed  and  Russia  been 
liberated  for  her  own  sake  and  for  the  benefit 
of  mankind.  The  impotency  of  Western  Europe 
to  adequately  deal  with  the  Communist  plague 
is  unmistakably  demonstrated  by  the  fact  itself 
that  so  far  the  nations  on  the  other  side  have 
utterly  failed  to  work  out  a  uniform  policy  on 
a  subject  which  is  of  greater  importance  than 
the  Irish  question,  the  enforcement  of  the  Ver- 
sailles Treaty,  or  the  formation  of  a  League  of 
Nations.  For  after  all,  what  has  been  the 
European  attitude  towards  Sovietism?  It  was 
neither  peace  nor  war. 

Even  France,  which  in  the  whole  concert  of 
Continental  States  has  taken  a  more  aggressive 
course  regarding  Communism,  proved  thor- 
oughly incapable  of  setting  the  moral  principle 


SOVIET  FOREIGN  POLICY  271 

in  the  foreground.  France,  too,  laid  empliasis 
on  minor  egotistic  considerations,  on  the  res- 
toration of  private  property  seized  by  the 
Soviets  from  foreign  citizens,  and  other  tech- 
nicalities—as though  these  and  similar  matters 
could  bear  a  decisive  influence  upon  the  far- 
reaching  issues  of  the  eternal  conflict  between 
Judas  and  Christ. 

The  historic  ''To  be  or  not  to  be,"  of  course, 
is  not  confined  to  the  speculative  guess  whether 
Russia  will  or  will  not  pay  her  foreign  debt. 
No  doubt  is  there  that  Russia  will  pay  the 
moment  she  is  restored  to  normal  life.  But 
it  is  also  clear  that  a  regime  that  shows  on  its 
balance  sheet  fraudulent  bankruptcy  cannot 
and  will  not  justly  settle  the  claims  of  foreign 
countries.  The  center  of  gravity,  therefore, 
does  not  rest  in  this  phase  of  the  dispute,  for 
it  is  ethics  rather  than  economics  that  must  be 
called  into  council. 

Now  it  is  time  to  realize  that  in  the  great 
traffic  of  life  there  are  nobler  aspirations  than 
the  petty  strife  for  larger  interest  and  higher 
wages.  Dostoievsky  once  proposed  this  ques- 
tion: ''If  the  happiness  of  a  nation  had  to  de- 
pend upon  the  murder  of  only  one  innocent 
child,  would  we  accept  his  life  in  payment  for 
our  welfare?"  This  is  the  crucial  point,  in 
fact,  the  climax  of  the  world  drama. 

If  Western  peoples  feel  prepared  to  sacrifice 
Russia  on  the  counter  of  mercantile  hopes  and 


272      THE  BALANCE  SHEET  OF  SOVIETISM 

calculations,  if  Eussia  is  the  price  which  must 
be  paid  to  satisfy  shortsighted  avarice  and 
the  pernicious  ambitions  of  foreign  countries, 
then  let  those  nations  start  at  once  their  petty 
trade  with  Lenin,  their  Shylock  bargaining  with 
Trotzky.  But  if  the  price  at  stake  is  found  too 
high,  the  thirty  shekels  offered  for  Russia's 
existence  must  be  rejected,  and  new  modes 
evolved  that  are  designed  to  build  not  merely 
with  stones  and  plaster,  but  with  the  refined 
fabrics  of  high  ideals  and  noble  wisdom. 

Sovietism  has  become  a  deadly  menace  to 
universal  order.  Its  challenge  must  be  met 
with  valiant  resolve.  Where  the  coward  has 
failed,  the  brave  will  win. 

The  storm  of  war  is  near;  its  roarings  can 
be  heard.  No  time  is  there  to  waste.  All  the 
reserve  forces  of  civilization  must  be  sum- 
moned and  placed  on  the  firing-line  to  check  the 
advance  of  the  invading  hordes.  The  great 
battle  must  not  be  evaded,  for  vital  issues  can- 
not be  avoided. 

The  triumph  of  Bolshevism  would  mean  death 
to  Christianity.  The  triumph  of  Christianity 
will  be  the  death  of  Bolshevism. 

The  Cross  shall  conquer. 


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